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Stocktaking of EU Strategizing

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Content

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Foreword: The EU doesn't need a foreign policy. The EU is a foreign policy

The world is undergoing a cyclical decline in hegemony. The euro crisis may be the most obvious sign of that, but no state is in entirely convincing shape, including the EU's traditional partners. As ***Kliman and Fontaine*** describe, the Western-inspired world order is fraying, as global 'swing states' – powerful emerging democracies – push for more equitable inclusion in, say, the non-proliferation or climate-change regimes. The setup is thus a multipolar one, but the powers in it are also deeply interdependent, afloat in a world of migration and multi-national business, which challenges their hard-won sovereignty. This all, as ***Grevi*** highlights, creates a pressing need to manage global change and the emergence of a new order. He debunks the myth that we in Europe are necessarily heading for conflict with the emerging powers, but also the idea that these powers can be integrated somehow into the existing order. He calls for the EU to steer a middle path between these two eventualities.

If the EU aspires to co-define that new world, it needs already to bolster its foreign policy, turning this area of activity into something more political, more instrumental and more focused. It is against this background, and in the context of an otherwise rather inward-looking political debate about the 'future of the EU', that four think tanks have launched a process towards a 'European Global Strategy' (EGS), a document which: gives guidance to the EU as it prepares for the next ten or so years; does not replace 2003's European Security Strategy, but rather looks to a full range of external action; and is opportunity- and value- rather than threat-based. The initiative has admittedly come about via a rather circuitous route – through the intervention of the foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden who expressed a conviction that such a debate was necessary, even as other governments remained sceptical. But, as ***Jonas*** shows, it is quite usual for strategic processes to be launched as a result of just such political factors. Whilst this may jar with the idea of strategizing as a highly rational process, it does not devalue the strategy itself.

Despite all the gloom and uncertainty, then, there is an appetite for a process which sets out some clear and realistic priorities – see ***Keohane*** in particular here – on a positive basis. Indeed, running through the report is a shared impatience with some of tired old debates: can the EU speak with one voice? Can it reconcile its values and interests? Can it move beyond soft power? Yet, whilst this desire to cut away dead wood and to give the EU a greater sense of its own international agency is understandable in the present crisis, this may all be jumping the gun. After all, is such a document even appropriate for an actor like the EU? It is ***Fägersten*** who pertinently asks what kind of actor has a grand strategy. And if ***Rogers*** is right, the answer is: probably not the European Union. This kind of document traditionally emerged in the domestic context, where the goal of defending the national territory permitted states to call upon patriotic motivations amongst its citizenry. Thanks to its capacity to enlarge geographically, the EU's territory is still shifting and, thanks to the Monnet method, the bloc has always shied away from mobilising its citizens in pursuit of a certain purpose or end goal.

In short, it seems, an object like the EU, whose inner workings are still so much in planless flux, simply cannot have a strategy. And yet, if ***Techau*** is right, herein lies the value of such an exercise: foreign policy simply cannot rest upon the Monnet method. A highly political strategy document is a chance to create a foreign policy proper, and in turn to make the EU fit for purpose in the new century. It is also the chance to settle many of the problems inherent to EU integration: the lack of purpose and common project in a plurinational community, whose political institutions tend to work on the implicit assumption of a sense of shared destiny; the apparent feeling that further EU enlargement is no longer in the interests of the bloc. An outward-looking strategy based on a sound understanding

of how the EU works, and how that might give its constituent parts an advantage in the world, would be a bracing tonic to Euro-apathy.

So what form should that more political, more instrumental foreign policy take? There is no consensus, nor would we expect any: as think tanks we can only set out a European Global Strategy. For ***Conley***, this kind of exercise – she prefers the idea of a European White Paper to a global strategy – provides a chance to sharpen the EU's existing activities in institutional transfer (enlargement), trade and development and to discard those activities where the EU has no place. Similarly, for ***Gross*** this exercise provides an opportunity for the EU to tidy up its existing foreign policy and to make proper use of the European External Action Service. For ***Fiott***, it is an opportunity to ensure the EU's economic welfare and to set the material interests of citizens firmly centre stage. For others – Fägersten again – it is precisely the EU's lack of territoriality which provides the rationale for its future activities. The Union is most effective on those international affairs where territorial issues get in the way – climate change or border conflict.

One caveat. Underlying the present debate is an implicit assumption that foreign policy is somehow an optional add-on to the EU's core business – the internal market, common currency, Schengen area – and that a catchy strategy paper is needed in order to persuade governments and citizens to transfer a measure of their attention to the world outside and support this kind of elite hobby. Undertaken on these terms, any re-launch is bound to meet with scepticism. Against a background of popular euroscepticism, intergovernmental fragmentation and economic crisis, the answer will come, the EU should get its house in order before launching new initiatives. It is worth pointing out, then, that this question whether the EU 'needs' a foreign policy is a false one. Quite simply, the EU is a foreign policy. Its rationale has always been to channel member states' foreign policy aims. As such, the development of a global capacity for action is not a matter of choice. It is a necessity, if the EU is to retain relevance for its members.

Initiated in the Cold War environment and under the US umbrella, EU integration allowed each Western European state to bind its neighbours – the main preoccupation of their foreign policies. By giving up a degree of domestic sovereignty, members gained discretion over each other. Post-Cold War, national preoccupations changed and the range of their foreign policy expanded. If the EU were to remain a relevant tool of member state foreign policy, it had to allow them to deal not only with one another but also with a broader neighbourhood. Enlargement and its weaker version neighbourhood policy thus emerged to allow EU states to exert their norms over third countries. The global constellation has now altered again. In their foreign policies, EU member states are looking far beyond Europe, and the question is not whether the European Union can become an instrument of member state foreign policy, but whether it can remain one

The need to develop a greater external capacity is not, therefore, a diversion from the core task of getting the EU's house in order. Precisely because its effectiveness as a tool of national foreign policy is slipping, the EU is subject to widespread popular indifference, political disparities between governments and seemingly irresistible external pressures. The scale of the challenge is huge. The EU is a remarkable tool of 'cooperative regime change', but it is one that works at a glacial pace and on a very local scale. Its activities are tied long-term into its neighbourhood; it struggles to forge truly common goods with third countries, merely offering access to its own internal achievements (single market, Schengen) in exchange for uptake of its rules; and it is unable properly even to compromise, due to the depth of the legal agreements between its member states. This is the challenge facing the EU, and it would be misleading to see this exercise as an optional one, designed for the amusement of think tanks.

We conclude by expressing our sincere gratitude on behalf of the four organizing institutes – IAI, Elcano, PISM and UI - to these ten authors whom we invited to provide their thoughts on the scope,

rationale and process of the EGS at the early stage of this project, and to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which financed the kick-off seminar in Warsaw in October 2012, where these contributions were presented and discussed. We trust that this report will help foster a broader debate on this pressing issue.

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Giovanni Grevi*

A progressive European global strategy

The initiative of the foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden to launch the debate on a 'European Global Strategy' (EGS) should be welcome because it paves the way to defining the strategic purpose of the European Union (EU) on the international stage. The EGS process starts at a time of serious political crisis within and outside the EU. The financial and economic crisis is spilling over at the political level and eroding the cohesion and legitimacy of the Union. Beyond the EU, geopolitical instability is mounting from the Middle East to East Asia while power grows more diffuse, and responsibility for global public goods more dispersed. The crisis at home has been detracting focus and resources from pursuing common interests abroad.

Current adversities invite resolve. A realistic strategic conversation can and should accompany the arduous shaping of a new phase of European integration. This is not about reiterating complacent slogans on Europe's past achievements but about addressing the core question of the Union's pertinence and purpose, today and tomorrow, in a competitive international environment.

Both EU citizens and the international partners of the Union openly ask what the EU is for and stands for. The Union needs a positive, inspirational message on the global stage and not a reactive or defensive one. The EU needs a new statement of purpose, which would enable the identification and prioritisation of the common interests of a collective international actor.

Strategy in context

The question of the EU's pertinence and purpose in the world can only be addressed by setting strategy-making in context. Today's context looks very different from that of 2003, when the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted, which suggests new parameters for the strategic debate and helps to distinguish the ESS experience from the current process.

The 2003 ESS stood the test of time better than many other European strategic documents as a list of key threats and an outline of the preventive, comprehensive and multilateral approach required to address them. While lacking in guidance for its implementation, it worked as a broad security concept. However, the ESS took its context as a given: it did not debate the endurance of the Western-led global order and was in fact largely directed to confirming Europe's usefulness in dealing with asymmetric threats therein. With some simplification, the ESS was a security strategy for a hegemonic world of deliberate threats by non-state actors.

Ten years on, following the momentous rise of the BRICS and the global financial crisis, globalisation is fraying under economic imbalances, resource constraints and bad governance in fragile states and regions. The emerging world is a polycentric one where increasingly diverse actors matter, and where different worldviews co-exist. Power shifts present many of these actors with greater options to pursue their interests. Conversely, deepening interdependence reinforces constraints on their room for manoeuvre, creating mutual vulnerabilities but also common stakes. The strategic environment is in flux and so are the power strategies of key actors. The EU does not primarily need a new security

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strategy but a global one for a post-hegemonic world of diffused risks and creeping geo-strategic competition.

Challenging assumptions, building deals

Any strategy-making should be set not only in a geo-political context but also in an intellectual one. Starting a European strategic conversation offers the opportunity to scope the intellectual landscape as well, and challenge lingering assumptions. In particular, strategy-making in Europe should eschew two questionable assumptions, namely the optimistic expectation that so-called rising powers would eventually subscribe to the liberal global order as we know it, with relatively minor adjustments, and the gloomy anticipation that the growing competition of interests and ideas will irredeemably lead to their clash and a zero-sum world.

It is argued here that the space for EU strategy-making and for EU external action more generally lies precisely between these two opposite readings of ongoing change. In short, the EU strategic debate should primarily avoid the conflation of change and chaos, difference and conflict, power transitions and a power clash. In each of these pairs, the former need not entail the latter.

De-linking change from conflict does not amount to denying tensions or neglecting crises but operating in a number of ways to defusing them. Defusing tensions, from territorial disputes in the South China Sea to the Iranian nuclear issue, from frictions on exchange rates and capital flows to barriers to trade and investment, is the condition for defining new deals on these and other challenges. Seeking new deals, whether on managing resources or implementing the Responsibility to Protect, does not mean surrendering the EU's interests but finding ways of enhancing them in a different world. This sets a tall order for Europe's ambition but provides a viable ordering principle for Europe's global action.

A progressive global strategy

Drawing up a European global strategy cannot be about preserving a given global order or simply defending Europe's interests therein. The only sure thing when looking ahead is that the status quo is not an option, whether in terms of balance of power or normative paradigms. A 'conservative' global strategy would be outdated before its adoption. Europe's interests should be defined and enhanced based on the close scrutiny and anticipation of change.

Contrary to what Lord Palmerston said, interests are not permanent (aside of course from broadly-defined ones such as security against aggression or safe trade routes). They are contingent and so is their relative ranking on the priority list. Were the US, for instance, to become progressively energy self-sufficient thanks to shale gas and technological advances, it is unlikely that its interests in Middle-East geopolitical crises would remain unaltered, relative to domestic priorities or investment in East-Asian stability. The interest of China and India in the stability of the Gulf region, where most of their growing oil imports come from, is correspondingly escalating, with political implications that may hold opportunities for cooperation. To take yet another example, it was widely (if implicitly) regarded as advantageous to the EU and its member states to accept the rule of authoritarian leaders in the Arab world and do business with them, not least for the management of migration flows and countering violent Islamic radicalism. Such an interpretation of Europe's interests would be less popular today, after the Arab uprisings.

In other words, Europe's global strategy should be about shaping change, and not countering or denying it, in ways that are consistent with Europe's core values and evolving interests. The

catchword is therefore not containing (unadvisable) or driving (unachievable) change, but co-shaping it with other influential state and non-state actors by seeking new deals, promoting the reform of the international order and initiating cooperation on specific issues or crises.

Pursuing a progressive global strategy is very difficult but not beyond reach. Two macro-factors seem to offer a window of opportunity. For one, while in relative decline, the EU and the US remain predominant across most dimensions of power and have kept the political initiative, for example in managing the fallout of the financial crisis or in dealing with Iran. For another, the heterogeneous constellation of other emerged, emerging, restored or aspiring powers does not add up to an alternative bloc. Global re-ordering does not start from scratch.

A lasting but nimble global strategy

As stressed above, the European strategic conversation cannot isolate itself from the political crisis that is shaking the Union but it cannot be entirely subsumed by the crisis either. It needs a sober assessment of what the EU and its member states are willing and able to do today but it must outline a purpose that goes beyond the current difficult conjuncture. What is needed is a global strategy of lasting relevance but nimble application.

The strategic reflection should take a long-term look at current and emerging trends. Foresight should inform this exercise and provide knowledge on the key factors and actors shaping the world as it will be tomorrow and not just as it is today. For example, the rise of the BRICS is yesterday's story: what counts for the future are their growth patterns, domestic challenges, evolving political culture and consequent priorities on the international stage. Upcoming middle-powers or swing-states such as Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia and Nigeria can prove significant partners for engagement in shaping regional dynamics where diplomatic alignments are changing, from the Middle East to South East Asia but also sub-Saharan Africa.

Besides, any European global strategy should be seen not just as a point of arrival but also as a point of departure: it should be a living document. Continuity in the broad strategic posture should be reconciled with the capacity to adjust the focus, sense of priority and policy mix of EU external action depending on needs. Strategic agility could be supported by envisaging a regular process of testing and reviewing the global strategy or parts of it, which could take the shape of a yearly Strategic Europe assessment.

Conclusion: power is defined by purpose

This paper has argued that the first-order strategic purpose of the EU is to avoid the conflation of change and conflict and to co-shape the transition of the international system by seeking new deals with other important actors. Such purpose would define Europe as a global power and would also guide the Union's exercise of power. The strategic debate should overcome the sterile but widespread distinction between hard and soft power, and thus between coercion and attraction, and even more so the mistaken identification of hard power with military means. Both hard and soft power tools and capabilities will be critical to Europe's influence. Power is defined by purpose and not by the means by which it is exercised.

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Daniel M. Kliman, Richard Fontaine*

Global swing states and European strategy

A new European Global Strategy must account for one of the most important geopolitical trends of the early 21st century: the growing influence of emerging market democracies in world affairs. Four rising powers – Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey – should receive special focus, for together they are key to adapting and renewing today's international order. All possess large and growing economies, inhabit strategic locations in their respective regions, and boast democratic governments. Critically, the role that each country plays on the world stage remains in flux. In this sense, all four rising democracies are "global swing states."[1]

Brazil now boasts the world's sixth largest economy, and it has emerged as a major player on global issues such as trade and finance. India's economy has taken off since the reforms of the early 2000s, and New Delhi has embarked on a major naval modernization program. Indonesia's economy is similarly growing rapidly, and the country has become a prominent advocate of democracy and human rights. Turkey, too, has experienced rapid economic growth and has emerged as a key player in the new Middle Eastern politics. All four are members not only of the G20 but also a raft of other international groupings.

Engaging these four is ever more important because the global order is today coming under new pressures. For six decades, that order – an interlocking web of norms, institutions, rules, and relationships – has helped to keep great power peace, fostered economic prosperity, and facilitated the spread of democracy. But multiple factors now challenge it: the stagnation of global trade talks, the rise of state-owned enterprises, financial instability, the exclusive maritime claims of some states, the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, and the fragility of political transitions in the Middle East and beyond.

Alongside the United States, Europe has underwritten the rules-based order through a combination of hard and soft power. Yet current – if not necessarily long-term – financial constraints on American foreign affairs and defence spending coupled with an even bleaker fiscal outlook in Europe mean that the order's long-time supporters are increasingly limited in their ability to exert power in its defence.

Europe's future remains bound up with the fate of the international order. If the order endures, open markets and secure transportation routes will continue to underpin European prosperity while the consolidation of democratic governments will reinforce the values that Europe holds dear. If the order fragments, however, Europe will see a world that increasingly diverges from its economic and political practices and could become both poorer and less secure.

Working to adapt and renew the international order should become a central task for European Global Strategy. As the United States looks to enlarge the order's circle of supporters to include key rising democracies, Europe should do the same. This task plays to European strengths in trade,

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[1] This piece draws on D. M. Kliman, R. Fontaine, "At G20 summit, West must partner with rising democracies in new global order," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 18, 2012; D. M. Kliman, "The West and Global Swing States," *International Spectator* 47, no. 3 (September 2012): 53-64; and a forthcoming report by the two authors.

finance, development, and democracy support, and even in an era of fiscal austerity, does not involve enormous financial burdens.

European engagement of rising democracies must start by recognizing the order's current shortcomings. The order's bedrock institutions give disproportionate weight to European countries at the expense of today's emerging powers. With varying degrees of intensity, all four global swing states desire a stronger voice in major international institutions. Greater representation may diminish the temptation these four face to duplicate existing international structures. At a minimum, according them a larger say can help their leaders justify more robust external engagement, as was recently evidenced in their contributions to the IMF lending facility. It is thus important, for instance, that Europe supports the timely implementation of the quota and voting share changes approved by the IMF Executive Board in 2010, and demonstrate a willingness to continue adjusting representational arrangements as the relative economic weight of the four grows.

Public diplomacy will constitute a major component of European engagement. Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey contain multiple centres of power and feature contending perspectives on how to relate to the existing international order. This creates a unique opportunity for European public diplomacy. Europe should take the case for partnering on key global issues to the publics and private sectors in these four powers. The latter type of outreach is particularly important; as they go global, corporations in these four countries are becoming more dependent upon the international trade and financial architecture and on secure transportation routes. The private sector wields considerable political influence in all four states and could make a decisive case for why governments should lend support to a system that favours market capitalism and contains threats to the peace.

When engaging rising democracies, Europe should work closely with the United States, its traditional partner in upholding international order. The U.S. Department of State, the European External Action Service, and the foreign ministries of interested European powers should establish an annual dialogue on rising democracies. Bringing together policy planning directors or their equivalents, the dialogue would serve as a mechanism for coordinating U.S. and European engagement. The dialogue would help to ensure that in pursuing closer partnerships with these key countries, Europe and the United States pull together rather than apart.[2]

Brussels and other European capitals should recognize that Turkey's emergence as a player on key regional and global issues translates into an even stronger case for European Union (EU) membership. In the past, the prospect of joining the EU served as an effective tool for encouraging Turkey to move toward the trade, finance, and human rights pillars of the international order. The EU has in recent years, however, put Turkey's accession on the back burner due to opposition from some member states. Fully integrating Turkey into the EU would make the process of adapting and renewing today's order considerably easier. With Europe's hard and soft power contracting due to cuts in defence and foreign affairs budgets, expediting Turkey's membership would represent a significant European contribution to global order.[3]

As Europe seeks to partner more closely with the global swing states, it should emphasize that investing in a rules-based order is also a way to encourage a peaceful Chinese ascendance. The military and economic expansion of China is the backdrop against which Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey rise. All four view China with ambivalence if not outright concern, for reasons ranging from the growing competition posed by its state-owned enterprises to Beijing's military build-up. That

[2] This recommendation reflects conversations with several U.S. officials who commented on the lack of transatlantic coordination on policy toward global swing states.
[3] This recommendation was originally made in D. M. Kliman, R. Fontaine, "Turkey: A Global Swing State," GMF On Turkey Paper, April 13, 2012.

adapting and renewing the global order may channel China's growing strength in a constructive direction is a message that can come effectively from Europe, which, unlike the United States, is not caught up in a military rivalry with Beijing.

The history of Europe – from its post-1945 resurgence to its post-Cold War expansion – is intertwined with the emergence and triumph of the rules-based order. Today that order requires new supporters. Partnering with rising democracies in pursuit of international order could – and should – become a focal point of European Global Strategy.

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Jan Techau*

Too much Monnet, too little money: The two key problems of EU foreign and security policy

How not to improve EU foreign policy

On 18 September 2012, the 11 foreign ministers of the "Future of Europe Group" published their much-commented final report, outlining ideas on how to develop the EU's integration process. On foreign policy, the report is a huge disappointment. That's not because the ideas themselves are all old news. It's because the paper shows that the foreign ministers, who really should know better, still have not learned a most crucial lesson from more than 20 years of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: an EU common foreign policy will never be made by the Monnet method.

The paper's approach to strengthening EU foreign policy reveals classic conventional integration thinking: first, you create a set of procedures, instruments, and institutions in a given policy field. Then you slowly feed a few real-life policy problems into this new machinery so it can start working. Finally you hope that the machinery will create its own momentum, sucking ever more, and ever bigger issues into the apparatus, thereby, slowly but surely, widening and deepening the integration process on its path towards ever closer union.

This was the technocratic approach Jean Monnet suggested in the 1950s, and it has proven to be a forceful driver for the hugely successful integration process that has served all of Europe so well. However, the dirty little secret of this integration procedure is that the Monnet method works very well in policy fields in which political disputes can be monetized. Or, to put it more bluntly, in which political compromise can be bought. It does not work very well in areas that touch upon the core elements of national sovereignty, such as foreign, security, and defense policy. Because these are difficult, if not impossible, to monetize.

This does not mean, of course, that foreign policy, by definition, could never be more closely integrated in the EU than it is now. It only means that it can never be integrated by creating institutions first and getting political later. Which is exactly what the Maastricht, Nice, and Lisbon Treaties have been trying to do. And which is exactly what the foreign ministers have tried again in their final report last week. In foreign policy, it takes much more than the Monnet method to bring about a common approach. You have to be political right from the start. You can't delegate the creation of political will to bureaucrats and lawyers. Instead, the leaders must bring it to the table before any kind of process can start.

The suggestions made by the eleven ministers prove the point: strengthening the position of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; majority voting on CFSP in the Council; maybe a European Army at some point; overall more cohesion and coordination. All of these are truly wonderful ideas. The problem is that even if we had all of that, it still would not give us an EU foreign policy. Because policy starts with shared ambitions and interests, not with procedural improvements.

So what could the 11 foreign ministers have done instead of re-stating the pointless? It would have really been revolutionary had they come out with a policy paper that identified a maximum of three

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prioritized and tangible foreign policy objectives, shared by all of them. Accompanied by an agreed plan of concerted steps to pursue these interests over an identified period of time. In short: they should have presented a strategy for EU foreign policy. Such a declaration of political will and determination could have changed the debate in dramatic ways. It would have brought the political back to a world of stale and useless procedural and institutional haggling. Unfortunately, the ministers did not have the daring to do so.

What are the threats, anyway?

During a recent event at Carnegie Europe, four panellists, all of them security experts, when asked what the real threats to European security were, named these four: (1) Lack of confidence, (2) the de-linkage across the Atlantic, (3) lack of public resilience, and (4) the undermining of European solidarity.

It is a most revealing list, as it illustrates the most fundamental truth about today's security environment in Europe: The biggest threat to our security is us. And that the best way to threaten ourselves is to carelessly treat those instruments and institutions that are in place to keep us safe.

The lack of European confidence in security and defence matters manifests itself in a very distinct way. Europeans, in fact, spend a lot of money on security matters, only that they don't spend it on military assets but on what Americans call Homeland Security. Expenditures on police forces, surveillance, internal intelligence, and counter-terrorism have sky-rocketed in the decade after 9/11, while defence spending has gone down almost everywhere. This trend reveals a profound sense of insecurity at home. It also illustrates the failure to understand that in a globalized world, security and defence is primarily about stabilizing missions and protecting interests across the globe. Nations are now global citizens. They cannot hole up in their expensively fortified, isolated niches. As players in the globalized commons, everyone is responsible for everything else. The failure to acknowledge this is a sign of missing confidence in one's own role in the world which could have serious security implications. In the long run, a lack of confidence is indeed one of Europe's primary security problems.

The un-coupling, or de-linkage, across the Atlantic is a fear as old as NATO itself. The simple truth of the matter is that Europeans still rely on Americans for their security. They cannot guarantee their own conventional security interests on their own, as the Balkan, Kosovo, and Libya wars have amply demonstrated. They could not replace the American nuclear umbrella with an equally effective means that would keep them safe from nuclear blackmail. All of their recent decisions to cut defence spending further increase the dependency on American services at a time when American assets are shrinking and a greater share of the security and defence effort should be carried by Europeans. Instead, Europeans become ever less interesting as partners for the United States, thereby becoming slowly but surely unable to "pay back" for U.S. services by providing meaningful support to U.S. military operations when needed. In essence, by failing to understand that the transatlantic security link has turned from a one-way operation in the Cold War to a two-way operation today, they uncouple European and American security. Europeans not only have to understand the new arithmetic of transatlantic security, they must also understand that by boosting their own capacities, they become both less dependent on, and more attractive to, the United States. Which is exactly what they should be very interested in.

Lack of public resilience is the least clear-cut of the four threats mentioned by the panellists. At its most basic level, it refers to a general rejection of hard security as a relevant factor of life in general. At first sight, this is great news. No better sign of a peaceful Europe than the lack of any kind of popular ambition for military adventures or a misguided, jingoistic competitiveness that equates

national greatness with military preponderance. However, such demonstrated anti-belligerence can become a problem when it turns into ignorance about the lesser post-modern state of affairs in most other parts of the planet. European leaders need to make a much better case why military strength is still required. And they must tell the truth about the operations themselves. Then they will regain the political manoeuvring space that they will need when push comes to shove.

Buried underneath all of this lies the fourth threat to European security, the lack of solidarity among Europeans. By making themselves less interesting as partners for their main ally across the Atlantic, they also make themselves less capable of defending one another. They don't even talk to each other. In fact, the reform of national militaries is largely done without any kind of prior consultation among NATO members. Far-reaching cuts and restructuring are announced only after decisions have been made in the individual capitals. France, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, among others, have conducted business this way just very recently. On top of that, pooling and sharing efforts within NATO and the EU fail to gain traction. Not only do nations guard their military assets jealously, they also protect their local jobs in the armaments industries at the expense of tax payers' money and defence efficiency. Lots of trust is required among European allies to rely on their neighbours and partners to make their assets available to everyone, so that role specializations can become possible. But trust as a defence commodity is in short supply. Should this mentality prevail in times of austerity and an increasingly disorderly neighbourhood, the price to pay for a lack of solidarity might become rather high in the not-so-distant future.

These four "meta-threats" are the real risks to European security. They work as silent force multipliers for the real substantive threats that might be waiting outside the continent's borders. They can turn small nuisances into real problems. They can embolden ill-meaning adversaries into being more assertive than they would naturally be inclined to. They are therefore Europe's homework, both in NATO and the EU. The good news is that all of these threats are much easier to deal with than any of the far bigger threats they might encourage if left unattended. The bad news is that dealing with them will require leadership, that scarcest of security and defence commodities.

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James Rogers*

Empowering the tribe: confidence comes before strategy

In 2003, Javier Solana put his name to the European Security Strategy.[4] He – like many pro-Europeans – dreamt it would re-unite Europeans around a common strategic endeavour after the acrimony and fallout surrounding the invasion of Iraq spearheaded by the United Kingdom and United States. The hope was that it would fuel more robust thinking at the European level, and gradually nudge some European countries towards a more realistic and sophisticated foreign and security policy, that is to say, one that is underpinned by armed force. Unfortunately, with hindsight, it seems to have done nothing of the sort. Europeans still do not share a common strategic worldview: the Libya crisis and subsequent airstrikes serve as irrefutable evidence of this fact. During February 2011 a direct affront to European interests emerged within the European neighbourhood, which threatened to usurp once again Europeans' much vaunted values in an orgy of mass killing. The two European great powers took action, while most other large countries – particularly Germany – not only sat back and twiddled their thumbs but actively sought to frustrate the British-French action. So we are still where we were a decade ago: London and Paris (with a handful of others in support) remain as willing as ever to use armed force to secure their geopolitical objectives, while most other European capitals are not, preferring a quiet life like little Switzerland.[5] This issue is at the crux of the problem – a problem no new grand strategy can fix.

It should come as no surprise that history is repeating itself. Over the past year, calls have grown louder for Solana's security strategy – written over nine years ago – to be regenerated. An updated version is seen as part of the antidote for the gangrenous rot that now infects the European enterprise, a means of injecting fresh blood into a creature that seems to be on its last legs. The days when some analysts boasted that the 'European approach' to foreign policy would eventually 'run the twenty-first century' are long gone.[6] The heady days of American hegemony – which gave Europeans the opening to act, sometimes haughtily, as a 'normative' power – are an increasingly distant memory. Contrary to the expectations of many, lofty multilateralism has not become the international framework for our time; instead the world has witnessed the return of dynamic multipolarity. We seem to be observing the return of the early twentieth century world after the decline of the British *pax* – an age when great powers compete with one another for power and influence. China's ascendancy is a case in point: Beijing's power grows almost by the day.[7] But China is not alone: Japan has become more assertive in protecting its sovereign rights; Russia has become prickly and aggressive; and India has sought to stake out a claim for itself around the Indian Ocean.[8] And since the election of President Barack Obama, the United States has accelerated not so much a

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[4] European Council, *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, Brussels: European Union, December 2003.

[5] Some Europeans have even taken to celebrating the Swiss character of the contemporary European Union. For a good take on this, see: H. Kundnani, "The Swiss Illusion", *Whose World Order?*, 19th September 2012, http://ecfr.eu.

[6] For an exposition of this approach, see: M. Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21st century,* Fourth Estate, London, 2005.

[7] For a good overview of China's growing power, see: A. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, W. W. Norton and Company, New York City, 2011.

[8] See: J. Rogers, "From Suez to Shanghai: the European Union and Eurasian maritime security," *Occasional Paper No. 77*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2009.

'pivot' but an *entrenchment* in the Indo-Pacific, and especially East and South-East Asia, to counter Beijing's growing geostrategic reach and burgeoning military might. The longer-term implications of this American entrenchment are still unclear, although they do not look very propitious for the Atlantic Alliance.[9]

Equally, if the European Union's international reach has shrunk, things are little better on the home front. The project to integrate Europeans looks like it was built on unsteady ground. Germany has become imperious; Britain has become indifferent; the European economy has sunk; enlargement has stalled; the European Neighbourhood Policy has suffered set-back after set-back; Russia maintains its stranglehold over several Member States' energy grids; the Common Security and Defence Policy has not met expectations; and monetary union – the crowning glory of the European project – teeters lethargically, with an uncertain future. In short: for all the delusions of the European enthusiasts, the European Union is not at all in good shape.

So will a new European Security Strategy – or a European Global Strategy – act as a pump to extract the heavy waters from a sinking ship, and then as a rudder to guide it to calmer seas? Unfortunately, it will *not*. The European Union does not need any new form of grand strategy, at least not one concerned with the outside world. The European Security Strategy, the Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership are all strategies of one form or another. They are all built with specific objectives in mind, be they a 'secure Europe in a better world', a 'ring of friends' to surround the European Union, or an eastern neighbourhood where European liberal values – and not Russia's autocratic values – reign supreme. Those who support a new grand strategy at the European level must first come to terms with another issue. This is not a strategic issue but is rather a philosophical one. It brings us back to where we started: a willingness to use armed force.

Robert Kagan recognised Europeans' growing disinclination to get tough with opponents.[10] What he failed to realise, however, was that this timidity is not born from a lack of military capabilities or dependency on the military resources of the United States (or United Kingdom), but rather Europeans' collective failure of belief; or, more precisely, their failure to believe in themselves or what they stand for. Who is willing to die for European integration? The question seems almost absurd. Yet it is a question worth asking: for if no-one is willing to make the ultimate sacrifice to defend the values and principles the European Union is supposed to represent, what does it say about European confidence? And perhaps more importantly, what does it say about European values? If they are not worthy of armed protection – or even promotion, at least in those circumstances where only force is the solution – why even think of them at all?

Any European Global Strategy must propel this question to its heart: is a global strategy possible if the power behind it is too disaggregated and – more importantly – too morally and intellectually exhausted to make it work? Think for a moment: what happens to societies that lose faith in themselves? What happens to tribes – or even countries – that lose the ability to muster the means to protect themselves? After all, the European Union is not so dissimilar from a tribe: the only difference is it is many orders of magnitude bigger. Like past tribes, the European Union – as Robert Cooper reminds us – is still surrounded by jungle.[11] And jungles tend to expand. To prevent the jungle – chaos – from threatening its existence, the tribe must be prepared to send its best warriors out to

[9] For a discussion of how the 'pivot' might affect the Atlantic Alliance, see: S. Frühling, B. Schreer, "NATO's New Strategic Concept and the US Commitments in the Asia-Pacific," *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 5, pp. 98-103; J. Holmes, "How Europe Can Support the 'Pivot'," *The Diplomat*, 9 July 2012, http://thediplomat.com.

[10] R. Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,* Vintage Books, New York City, 2003.

[11] R. Cooper, "The New Liberal Imperialism," *The Observer*, 7 April 2002.

kill the beasts, fell the thicket and keep any opponents at bay. More importantly, the tribe must demonstrate decisively its political determination and resolve (its 'will to power') to build up its credibility. Consequentially, the tribe's first objective is not to counter threats or to provide defence (viz. strategy), or even to push back the frontier of civilisation, but to generate a centre of gravity from which to operate. To do that, the tribe must believe in itself; it must believe with absolute conviction that the future belongs to it. For if the tribe loses faith in itself, if it is no longer willing to send its warriors out to protect what it believes in and to instil awe into both friends and enemies alike, the tribe will soon collapse and fade away, or be crushed by surrounding – more confident – tribes who believe that the future belongs to them.

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Björn Fägersten*

What can a European global strategy do?

European external relations clearly suffer from strategic and political deficits. Years of institutional and bureaucratic tampering have done little to boost the two most important preconditions for Europe's emergence as a global actor: an idea about how and for what purpose we can shape international affairs, and a political will to do so. An overarching strategy would clarify for Europeans themselves what their basic values and interests are and contribute to a new narrative of what European integration is about now that peace at home is secured. On a less lofty level, a strategy would also help the Union to prioritize its external engagements and resources, something that is never more relevant than at times of scarcity. The assignment to draft a *global strategy* for European external relations is therefore welcome but raises some fundamental questions about the EU as a foreign policy actor: can the Union really 'do' strategy, what sort of strategic concepts are applicable to a collective of states, and perhaps most importantly, how does strategy affect the other much needed part of European external action, the political will to matter?

Attributes of a grand strategy

Popularly defined as "the calculated relationship of means to large ends", *grand strategy* has a long pedigree in the crossroads of history, political science and diplomacy.[12] While being a rather elusive concept, grand strategy has a few unmistakable characteristics.

- First, it takes as its point of departure a clear understanding of interests. While other, issue- or sector-specific strategies might be reactive, i.e. relating to external threats or opportunities, a grand strategy is meant to maximize gains in relation to the articulated interests of the actor.

- Second, grand strategy is an instrument for powerful actors and them alone. To borrow from Thucydides, the strong have much to gain from a grand strategy in doing what they have the power to do, while the weak have little use of it when accepting what they have to accept.[13]

- Third, grand strategy, at least in its traditional usage, is deeply intertwined with military power and the objective of winning wars.

- Fourth, the principal proprietor of a grand strategy is a state or even a nation-state. Indeed, it is the preservation of Westphalian sovereignty that is the very essence of a grand strategy. This state-centric focus is reinforced by the fact that nationalism, ever since the French revolution, has proven extremely effective in mobilizing the full capacity of a territory towards a common goal.

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A full version of this paper can be found at http://www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu/upl/files/77859.pdf.

[12] J. Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Post Cold War World," in: T. Henriksen, *Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-first Century*, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 2001.

[13] W. Murray, "Thoughts on grand Strategy," in: W. Murray, R.H. Sinnreich, J. Lacey, *The shaping of grand strategy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011.

- Fifth, from the British strategy to master the seas to the US strategy of containing Communism, grand strategy is intrinsically linked to the territory of both the strategic actor and the goal it seeks to attain. Grand strategy thus inevitably has a geopolitical element to it.

- Finally grand strategy – or at least the successful formulation and execution of it – is closely tied to effective and far-sighted leadership. Such leadership is not only dependent on personal qualities but also on high-quality decision-making structures and bureaucratic capacities for strategic intelligence analysis and long-term planning.

How grand can the EU's global strategy be?

All of these characteristics are problematic when transposed to an EU format. Like classic grand strategies, for instance, it is the intention of the global-strategy project to formulate an approach based on interests and values rather than being reactive to threats. While this is a positive ambition, the different ways the member states perceive their Union may make a common understanding of interests illusive. Considering, next, the attributes of power and military might, it has been a point of contention to what extent the EU is or even can be a powerful actor. Here too, the notion of a European global strategy collides with the traditional notion of grand strategy as state-centric. Not only will a European strategy have to guide the behaviour of a collective of states acting through a semi-autonomous organization, it will relate to challenges where states are not the dominant actors. A European global strategy must somehow offer a roadmap for how Europe can navigate a global system that simultaneously houses pre-modern, modern and post-modern states.[14]

The link between territory and strategy raises several other challenges from a European perspective. For starters, the Union displays a remarkable geographical diversity. Forging a common strategy based on geopolitical reasoning will not come easy. Adding to this complexity is the fact that Europe, at least as a polity, is a non-determined territory; possible extensions include territories crossed by the Arctic Circle as well as the Euphrates. Also, how are its spatial dimensions such as outer space or even non-territorial dimensions such as cyber-space inserted in a strategic framework? A European global strategy will need to problematize and perhaps breach the grand strategic link between territory and strategy. Finally, the demand for effective and far-sighted leadership offers a number of challenges for an ad-hoc driven, consensus searching bargaining organization like the EU. A discussion on what institutional and political elements need to be in place for an effective interpretation and execution of strategy is vital.

Conclusion: a strategic Europe in a post-Westphalian world

Certain problems thus stand in the way of the EU becoming a grand strategic actor, but these may provide a useful innovation to the strategizing process in the modern context rather than an immutable obstacle.

The first challenge relates to change versus stability. Grand strategies are often said to be either transformative or preservative.[15] The former is usually deemed more ambitious but also more costly and prone to backfire. Arguably, an actor such as the EU, which in itself is in constant transformation, cannot opt for a strategy of preservation and should not opt for one that simply reacts to changes set

[14] I use these concepts as elaborated in R. Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations – Order and chaos in the twenty-first century*, Atlantic books, London, 2004.

[15] R. H. Sinnreich, "Patterns of grand strategy," in: W. Murray, R.H. Sinnreich, J Lacey, *The shaping of grand strategy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011.

about by events or other actors. Europe should therefore use the Global Strategy to complement its usual crisis-management perspective with opportunity creation, and supplement its customary preventive diplomacy with proactive diplomacy. Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom, a preservative strategy might be even more hazardous than a transformative one in the current circumstances. With today's levels of global transformation, the EU's fluidity is a characteristic which states do not possess.

Second, the fact that the EU constitutes less of a unitary actor than most other strategic actors means that it will have to pick its priorities carefully; after all there are areas where no strategy can bridge the gap between government preferences. However, only looking at areas where high levels of common interest already exist will rule out the sort of overarching quality that a strategy aims for. Consequently, a European strategy must not simply be a tool for expressing political will, as in the national context, but also a tool for fostering it. As such, it should include resolute goals that can be pursued now (perhaps relating to climate, innovation, democracy promotion) as well as more general principles with a longer time horizon, where engagement can be stepped up over time. On a wider note, the diversity of European states – and the habit of negotiating and compromising that comes with it – can be a strategic advantage vis-à-vis more unitary actors for whom compromises are harder to accept and present at home.

Finally, a grand strategy from an EU perspective needs to relax the focus on states and their sovereignty rather than reinforcing it. To a large extent, the level of intra-European cooperation following WW2 has been achieved thanks to nation states selectively giving up their decision-making autonomy. Whether talking about individuals or eco-systems, Europeans are now spearheading the view that protection must be assured beyond national frameworks. From this perspective, the territorial fixation of the nation state obstructs constructive responses to current challenges. This is an issue that is likely to become a dividing line between global actors in the years to come and one where a European strategy should give clear guidance.

To conclude, in its aim for an overarching strategy for its external affairs, the EU clearly has much to learn from both historical and contemporary endeavours to articulate a grand strategy. However, even the best of strategies will prove an empty vessel without political will; a will to actually matter to the world but also a will to transform ourselves in order to make it possible. This is perhaps the greatest irony of European grand strategy: to let go of national prerogatives and old habits that stand in the way of a truly strategic Europe demands considerable levels of national political will. To steer us towards global irrelevance demands nothing at all.

Heather A. Conley*

Reflections on a European global strategy

In 2011 and in partnership with three European think-tanks (Swedish Institute for International Affairs, *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique*, and the Italian Institute for International Affairs), CSIS participated in a European Commission grant that examined US and EU security strategies through a variety of prisms. CSIS led an examination of US and European strategic reviews, both bilaterally (the 2008 French *Livre Blanc* and U.S. National Security Strategy 2010) and multilaterally (NATO Strategic Concept of 2011 and the 2003 and 2008 European Security Strategy and Review).
Our transatlantic research concluded that today's strategic reviews are more valued for their ability to:

- educate the general public about the current and future threats to national security;
- provide a venue for governments and multilateral organizations to offer their vision of how best to meet these challenges; and,
- publicly signal their resolve to other governments, non-state actors and world opinion leaders,

than for the actual value of the document itself.[16] There is a clear bureaucratic "value to the process" in undertaking a comprehensive strategic review for set periods of time. It is an exercise that brings disparate elements of the bureaucracy together to find common ground and strategic understanding; in essence, the process creates an enduring strategic culture which adds value to the day to day work of any complex organization. Finally, a strategic review has a profound impact on bureaucratic structures, whether it is creating new, streamlining current or downsizing old structures.[17] In sum, the study found that strategy documents now perform a much greater public diplomacy role than a strategic function.

Clearly, at a time of diminished confidence and increased policy distraction within Europe in a post-Lisbon Treaty era, there would be a very strong "value to the process" in the development of a European White Paper (rather than a Global Strategy document) in 2013. This White Paper would help build greater consensus and clarity among EU member states on the growing role of the EU and encourage greater synergy between national strategies and the EU's overarching strategy.[18] Moreover, it would be an excellent bureaucratic "team building" exercise for the European External Action Service (EEAS) to move beyond construction fatigue by bringing together policy professionals in a focused, collaborative effort.[19] It would be wise to use the 2013 review of the European External Action Service (EEAS) Decision for higher purposes and not simply to bemoan bureaucratic ineptness or lethargy.

Valued process takes time. Analysing the best examples of the NATO Strategic Concept and the *Livre Blanc*, our research recommended the establishment of an expert group or commission which would

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[16] Center for Strategic and International Studies, *EU-U.S. Security Strategies: Comparative Scenarios and Recommendations*, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C.:2011, XIII, http://csis.org.
[17] Ibidem, XIV.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.

include current and former European officials (to include select members of the European Parliament) and highly respected business, non-governmental and academic officials prior to the official drafting of the White Paper. It is vital that the process be given an appropriate amount of time for extended consultations both within Europe and with Europe's strategic partners, and effective outreach to the European think-tank community. Importantly, consultations should continue throughout the drafting process.[20]

But, this is a process, and substance is desperately needed. In a perfect world, a European White Paper would educate Europeans on the current and future security and threat environment, articulate how the EU will address these threats and inform other governments of the EU's analysis and policy prescriptions and be tied to specific budgets and resource allocations.[21] The White Paper should be strategic in outlook and focused on a few select priorities to ensure subsequent and adequate resource allocation (rather than an exhaustive, least common denominator, list of issues).[22] And herein lies the challenge. In the recently released final report of the Future of Europe Group, the first two sentences appropriately summarize Europe's current dilemma, and the challenge of establishing a future European strategic document: *"The European Union has reached a decisive juncture. The on-going sovereign debt crisis and the ever accelerating process of globalization pose an unprecedented dual challenge for Europe."*[23] An American interpretation of these introductory sentences could be: *We in Europe need to define a new path forward as the old approaches no longer suffice and in doing so, we must be realistic about our current limitations*. It is interesting that the next four pages of the document went on to discuss economic integration and governance issues, not necessarily the purview of eleven foreign ministers, but it again underscores the necessary limitation of global ambition due to the crisis.

It is only on page five of the Future of Europe text, under the heading "Europe as a global player" that a realistic outline of a future European strategy is described. The document calls for a "comprehensive and integrated approach to all components of the EU's international profile. …it must include, among other things, issues relating to trade and external economic affairs policy, development aid, enlargement and neighbourhood policy, the management of migration flows, climate negotiations and energy security."[24] That list alone is quite an ambitious undertaking.

As I look at Europe's comparative advantage in foreign policy, I would seek to more closely integrate its three greatest strengths: its trade and investment power as the world's largest trading block (despite the stress of the economic crisis), the outreach and impact of its development assistance (which is both regional and global) and its ability to slowly and painstakingly reform economies and political structures through institutional twinning, training and mentoring (aka the enlargement agenda). A future EU strategy should solely concentrate on that which the EU does best: putting resources and policy impact together to excel in a given area, rather than fighting for attention in areas where Europe's contribution would be welcome but not decisive or effectual.

There is a common perception that if the EU does not have a policy on every single global issue, or it is not physically present at every international gathering (this must be one reason for Lady Ashton's extraordinary travel schedule), its relevancy as a global actor is called into immediate question. The 2003 European Security Strategy was a perfect reflection of such strategic "stretch" as it represented

[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Future of Europe Group, *Final Report*, Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, Warsaw, 17 September 2012, http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/komunikaty/20120918RAPORT/report.pdf.
[24] Ibid. 5.

an exhaustive list of all the things that the EU should be aware of and do, but without the ability to influence results.
Many European officials and thought-leaders will be distraught to consider such a limited menu of its strategic goals and objectives. Where is Europe's military value? Where is its contribution to Middle East peace?

However, this author believes that:

- the €3.2 trillion in total trade as well as three recently negotiated free trade agreements and several more in advanced negotiations; [25]
- the €369.9 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI);[26] the €53.1 billion in official development assistance (including €1.02 billion to the Middle East and North Africa, and €1 billion to Afghanistan); [27] and
- the success of reforming (in partnership with the U.S.) twelve (soon to be 13) Baltic, Central European and Western Balkan countries into Europe over the last decade

ensure Europe's international prominence and does not diminish it.[28]

In sum, Europe must spend less time focusing on its relevance and representation and focus more of its energy on where it is already policy relevant. At the same time, Europe must become more realistic with regard to its capabilities as the next decade will be consumed by Europe's internal reconstruction. A European White Paper would be a valuable process to bring bureaucratic coherency to these three areas and integrate them more completely. This does not suggest that Europe will cease to play a role in Iran negotiations or be a strong voice in climate change negotiations. On the contrary, but this new strategy does suggest that Europe should concentrate on what it does best in order to give its policy voice greater weight in the future.

[25] "EU Bilateral Trade and Trade With The World," *European Commission*, 21 March 2012, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147269.pdf; and "Agreements," *European Commission*, 21 August 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/agreements/#_other-countries.
[26] "EU27 investment flows with the rest of the world recovered in 2011," *Eurostat*, 13 June 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/12/88&type=HTML.
[27] "Council conclusions on Annual Report 2012 to the European Council on EU Development Aid Targets," *Council of the European Union*, Brussels, 14 May 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130239.pdf; "Annual Report 2012 on the European Union's Development and external assistance policies and their implications in 2011," *European Commission*, 6 August 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/documents/annual-reports/europeaid_annual_report_2012_full_en.pdf; and "Annual Report 2012 on the European Union's Development and external assistance policies and their implications in 2011," *European Commission*, 6 August 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/documents/annual-reports/europeaid_annual_report_2012_full_en.pdf.
[28] "Countries," *European Union*, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm.

Eva Gross*

A global strategy for the EU: what role for the EEAS?

A global strategy and its components

The EU's evolving external action apparatus can play an important role in formulating and implementing a global strategy. The most urgent challenge, however, is one that the European External Action Service (EEAS) cannot address: economic growth and a way out of the current economic crisis. After all, a global strategy that encompasses foreign, security as well as economic aims and interests must be centred on the physical safety and material well-being of Europe's citizens.

This reinforces the notion that the EEAS is not the sole stakeholder in this debate, a fact that should be reflected in the drafting and conceptualization of a global strategy, and the institutions involved in its implementation. Given the multi-faceted nature of European interests, but also the actors involved in the implementation of EU objectives, collecting input from all relevant actors is key in strengthening the legitimacy, let alone the applicability, of any resulting document.

At the same time, given the EEAS' remit and the enduring relevance of threats and interests identified in the 2003 European Security Strategy, as well as the 2008 implementation report, the EEAS under the leadership of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton, has an important role to play in the formulation, but also the implementation, of any global strategy.

Perhaps most immediately, the on-going transitions in the MENA region as well as incomplete transitions and frozen conflicts in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood reinforce the need to extend democracy and the rule of law beyond the EU's borders to ensure stability. On the global strategic level, the rise of emerging powers and shifts in the global distribution of power confronts the EU with the challenge of engaging with these countries and formulating policies towards but also *with* rising powers in response to individual policy challenges. At a time when the global and European economic crisis hints at the limits of Europe's – and perhaps also the West's – power, this calls for the EU and the EEAS as part of the EU's external representation, to develop political and strategic approaches to address these challenges.

Potential contributions of the EEAS

The EEAS thus can, and should, contribute in both ideational and material terms to the formulation of a global strategy – and its potential contribution is two-fold.

The first is that of participating, if not in the formulation of a strategy per se, then in the creation of a strategic outlook and objectives on a broad scope of external action. The second is that of implementing the EU's strategic objectives to the extent of its competences and with a view to coordinating different EU instruments as well as the material and ideational contributions of individual member states for greater coherence of action.
Achieving this kind of comprehensive approach to foreign and security policy challenges, then, can be seen as both a style of implementation, and a strategic choice in jointly addressing at first glance

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disparate challenges of, for instance, security and development. In other words, the EEAS and the way it implements its policies is part and parcel of an emerging strategic culture – a strategic culture that goes beyond security policy to encompass foreign policy more broadly defined.

The record to date I: formulating strategy, setting strategic objectives

To date, the EEAS under the leadership of the HR/VP has not led the formulation of a global strategy. Instead, it has focused on the formulation of sub-strategies as a means of providing added value and concrete output. Similarly, decisions to emphasize and promote certain policy and geographic areas signal strategic priorities the HR/VP intends to set but also an emerging strategic approach towards individual functional and geographic areas that rests on improving coherence among EU policy instruments.

The appointment of an EU Special Representative for human rights, for instance, highlights a continued and a reinforced normative commitment as part of the EU's external action. While this is unlikely to resolve potential contradictions between prioritizing strategic and political interests and an emphasis on normative commitments, it demonstrates a conscientious effort (and a strategic choice) to emphasize human rights and to minimize such contradictions.

The EEAS has also concluded the formulation of individual regional/geographic strategies that include the Strategic Framework towards the Horn of Africa and the recently concluded EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, and these set out the EU's overall approach, policy instruments and geographic and functional/operational priorities – again, emphasizing comprehensiveness and coherence between policy instruments.

Such efforts at strategy formulation can be seen as a bottom-up process of formulating individual strategic approaches that, when combined with a top-down process of consolidating the different strands of an emerging global strategy in a coherent document, could guide the formulation of broader EU interests and objectives as well as their implementation.

The record to date II: creating a strategic culture

The ongoing review of the EEAS crisis structures, but also the prioritization of conflict prevention and security sector reform (SSR) as part of CSDP missions highlight the on-going engagement with the comprehensive approach as a method of implementation. Here, the EEAS can be said to be shaping an emerging strategic culture for EU external action as a whole. A commitment and emphasis on addressing root causes alongside immediate crisis situations is bound to be replicated in fields beyond security and development, given that challenges facing the continent are increasingly interconnected and call for both short- and long-term measures.

Where next? The world in 2030

Forecasts for 2030 indicate increasing empowerment of individuals as well as an on-going diffusion of power - but not necessarily emerging governance structures to manage such tendencies. Such power diffusion will affect not only the relative power and influence of the nation-state, but also speaks to the increasing influence of non-state actors. Opportunities arising from increasing political participation can also have a downside: populism, and the rise of extremism in light of persistent inequality. This calls on the EU – and the EEAS as part of the EU's international relations – to define interests but also policy options for addressing threats but also opportunities for European security and prosperity.

It would give the EEAS strategic weight through its presence abroad, and add to the emerging strategic foreign policy culture. The EU's consolidated presence through its EU Delegations can provide additional opportunities for the EEAS structures to feed information into the policy process, link up with local stakeholders, and initiate appropriate policy responses that take into account the need of governments and citizens, thereby increasing legitimacy and effectiveness.

Summing up: linking individual efforts with overarching strategy formulation

The EEAS has an important contribution to make when it comes to the formulation and implementation of a strategic approach towards individual policy challenges as well as the creation of a culture of coherence and coordination among instruments and actors that make up the EEAS.
To date, the EEAS' contribution has not so much been work on a strategic narrative, but a bottom-up contribution through the formulation of individual strategies and an engagement with the comprehensive approach as a means of implementation. This leaves scope for others to contribute to and steer the debate towards a global strategy – and solicit input and expertise from a wide range of stakeholders – and align this debate and an eventual drafting of a strategy with the EEAS for a fusion of the processes and strategic objectives sketched above.

egs

Daniel Fiott*

How to avoid the three pitfalls of European strategy

European academics, think-tankers and policy-makers make three consistent and critical errors when debating strategy: firstly, they do not clearly define what they mean by "strategy" – a problem that has long haunted the field of strategic studies[29]; secondly, and as a result, they tend to speak of European strategic interests, all too often treating the EU as a unitary actor and overlooking the continued importance of national strategic interests in the formulation and conduct of EU foreign policy; and finally, and related to these two failings, they have a fixation with *strategic objectives* rather than focusing on the *strategic methodology* - both in a material and intellectual sense - that is to be used to pursue such objectives. Thinking about a European Global Strategy (EGS) must not commit the same errors.

The first error is easily overcome, at least in conceptual terms. The ultimate objective of any strategy must be to secure and maintain - as far as possible - the material and ideational well-being of any given society or nation. There is no point in talking about strategy if this is not the end in sight. Yet achieving this in practice is difficult. Indeed, in order to pursue economic and political well-being the strategist would have to have some idea of what the future holds in store: in reality the strategist must think in terms of many possible eventualities, or "futures".[30] The strategist will usually try to predict the future on the basis of historical precedent.[31] However, it is perhaps more prudent to work on an entity's social and economic cohesion, in the EU's case putting in place the proper institutional mechanisms, so as to improve readiness to respond to any international contingency.[32]

Accordingly, if the EU is to be awake to international opportunities, the EGS must first stress the importance of the EU's institutional set-up. The EEAS is the embryonic "strategic hub" of the EU yet more needs to be done to bring together the EU's economic, social, international trade, energy, industrial, internal market, defence, and other policies in order to achieve this kind of strategic reactiveness. Silo-thinking still prevails across the different Directorates-General (DGs) and the EEAS, but each of these policy areas has a strategic element. For example, only until very recently did the DG for Enterprise and Industry open its eyes to the strategic importance of defence policies by devising measures to boost EU military capabilities through the gradual liberation of intra-EU equipment procurement and acquisition. More of this "cross-pollination" is needed in the EU institutions and between member states.

A lynchpin in this approach is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). The EGS must emphasize, firstly, the need for the HR/VP to be more entrepreneurial in utilizing the "double-hatted" nature of his/her portfolio to bring policy areas together, and secondly, for the member states to not work against the innovations they themselves brought in under the Lisbon Treaty. Only the member states can

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[29] See: T.C. Schelling, "The Retarded Science of International Strategy", *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May) 1960, pp. 107-137; R.K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Autumn) 2000, pp. 5-50.

[30] M. Fitzsimmons, "The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2006, pp. 131-146.

[31] R. Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3, (Winter) 1991-1992, pp. 39-73.

[32] P. Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View,* Currency Doubleday, New York, 1991.

encourage the HR/VP to feel more comfortable about being more proactive in this regard. They are equally the only actors that can select a candidate that will work more stringently on improving the EU's readiness to deal with a plethora of future eventualities by bringing together all relevant EU policy areas, and to deal with these eventualities in an innovative and coherent manner – sometimes even when it irks some member states. The EGS may suggest that the EEAS' Strategic Planning division be specifically encouraged to help in overcoming these constraints.

Here the second error becomes important. The EGS' focus on opportunities as opposed to threats does not side-step the importance of identifying a strategic point of departure that could be held in common by a majority of member states. While ambitious, any strategy that does not attempt to start a debate on finding commonalities between the national interests of the member states - a "strategic critical mass" – will eventually wither away. No strategy can be defined in isolation from the interests of the individual member states - especially the most powerful ones, and indeed it must distil and reflect them wholeheartedly. The EGS must somehow reconcile the Anglo-German tradition of exportation and market openness with the French *dirigiste* tradition. It must equally attempt to accommodate individual members' reluctance and willingness for further European integration. This is not an easy task but neither is it completely insurmountable.

The economic crisis may have been a source of internal dissent between member states, but it could provide the necessary platform for a strategy on external action. In this regard, the EGS should focus its energies on placing the European economy at the centre of any strategic objectives it formulates. Given the Eurozone crisis, and the years of economic challenges that lie ahead, no EGS will work without European domestic support for it. Thus, the logic of putting the material welfare of Europeans at the heart of the EGS has a second rationale. And yet, this will mean pursuing courses of action - even if unpalatable and seemingly against the EU's virtues - that provide jobs and growth in Europe. The European economy not only remains the EU's most effective foreign policy tool but also its core strategic interest around which the member states would find it hard not to rally.

Accordingly technology, research and industry should be at the heart of any EGS. After all, one key strategic advantage open to the EU is its added value in the high-tech, high-end manufacturing and service sectors, and it should ensure that policy structures within the EU are suited to making maximum gains from the emerging economies such as Brazil, China and India. This will mean ensuring that the Union makes efforts to pool resources on R&D investment and gear its educational systems for a highly competitive global market place. The EU should move beyond the Lisbon and 2020 strategies and put more focus on industrial policy; the current Eurozone crisis compels the EU to not only boost employment but to come up with innovative ways of ensuring sustainable growth.

Yet the ideas briefly outlined above defer to common sense. It does not take a master strategist to put the economy at the heart of any EGS. The real problem for any strategy, and the final error, is not so much the objectives to be pursued, but the method employed that underpins their achievement. In strategic studies two different methods stand out. On the one hand, the realist approach acknowledges that strategy implies competition between States, and that the way to secure interests is to check the actions of other States and capitalize on their mistakes. On the other, a "strategic culture" approach argues that strategy is not about competition but about acting in such a way as to be true to one's own experiences as a people and to one's moral sensibilities.[33]

Each approach has something worthwhile to say for the EGS. The EU should take onboard both and not drift to either extreme. On the one hand, the EU must not rely solely on the idea that it is a *sui*

[33] See: A.I. Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (Spring) 1995, p. 34; T.C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Culture*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980.

generis entity, a normative actor that shuns the "wicked" methods of the past. Thinking about European strategy must not become melded to such ideational fictions. Indeed, current thought on European strategy finds it difficult to square normative perceptions with the realities of international politics. Europe as a whole finds itself competing with States that are focused on their own economic and military development, and which have little time or patience for the EU's ontological introspection. The word "opportunity" implies the need for a certain degree of cunning, but is the EU collectively willing to capitalize on opportunities even if this harms the interests of competitors and its own values?

On the other hand, any EGS should recognize that it is indeed a shallow thing to be Machiavellian without any virtue. While one cannot always be virtuous when being strategic or when securing opportunities on a global basis, the EU will have certain "red lines" when acting internationally. The EU has learned certain lessons from its past that will make certain courses of action unpalatable. Yet strategic action will at some point be required, and so the question will be whether necessity will trump sensibilities. Therefore, the challenge in Europe is as much about a conversation about *how we* act, and not just about *what we* act for. Avoiding the pitfalls of strategy formation will require the nurturing of a strategic culture based on, and reactive to, the realities and difficulties of international relations.

egs

Daniel Keohane*

Strategic priorities for CSDP

The EU cannot cope with all the potential security threats and challenges facing the world, nor should it aspire to. As Frederick the Great told his generals "to defend everything is to defend nothing". If the EU is to be effective in the future, it will need a clear sense of its strategic priorities, and what it is prepared to do through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It is much easier to predict what the EU will not do. For example, the EU will not fight wars in East Asia. The challenge for EU governments is to define what the EU will do via CSDP in the future, especially how they intend to use their military resources, which are much more costly to deploy, both politically and financially, than civilian assets.

Threats, geography, interests and values

There are many ways to define strategic priorities, including assessing threats, geography, interests and values. Perhaps the most obvious official document to consult when trying to develop priorities for CSDP is the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 (and the 2008 review of its implementation). The ESS identified five threats to European security: the spread of weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMDs), terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. The 2008 review added three further challenges: cyber-security, energy security and climate change.

The ESS does not, however, clarify the precise role of CSDP in coping with all these threats and challenges. It is difficult to prescribe what role military force in particular could even have countering some of these threats – such as cybercrime, energy, climate change, terrorism and organised crime. Moreover, even on those topics where a military role is foreseeable in principle – like WMDs, regional conflicts and state failure – it is not certain that the EU would always organise such tasks, for instance in the event of Iran developing a nuclear weapon.

The ESS is not myopic geographically, and points out that security challenges in South and East Asia, such as North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, matter for Europe. But it does add that "even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important". The ESS further prioritises efforts to build security in Europe's neighbourhood – listed as one of three strategic objectives in the 2003 document, along with addressing the security threats listed above and supporting an international order based on effective multilateralism. In other words, the ESS says that the EU's geographic priority should be its neighbourhood, including the Balkans, the Caucasus, North and sub-Saharan Africa and the broader Middle East.

Perhaps the phrase the ESS is best known for is advocating "effective multilateralism" as a strategic objective for the EU. This is not simply a question of values – upholding international law; rather it is in the EU's interest to support the development of global governance and regional organisations. However, the guidance of the 2003 ESS for today is weakest on how the EU should navigate a more multi-polar world, and on the geo-strategic consequences for Europe of the rise of non-Western powers.

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The rise of the rest and the US Pacific pivot

Everyone knows that economic power has been shifting from West to East over the last decade. Less frequently discussed is the concomitant shift in military power from West to East – or more correctly from the European part of the West to the East. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Asian defence spending will already exceed European expenditure for the first time this year. The IISS says that Asian countries increased their defence spending in 2011 by just over 3% (in real terms) on average, while China increased its defence budget by a whopping 6.8% in 2011.

Another think tank, SIPRI, says that Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia and Japan (along with China) are climbing up the defence spenders league, while Britain (4th), France (5th) and Germany (9th) are falling down the top ten – indeed Italy, 10th in 2010, fell off the list of top ten military spenders in 2011. Furthermore, SIPRI adds that Russian defence spending exceeded both France and Britain's in 2011, pushing Moscow into third place. Even though it will cut some $489 billion from its defence budget over the next decade, the United States will remain the world's top military spender for some time to come; but according to some projections, China's defence budget will surpass the collective spending of the European members of NATO by 2020.

It is this evolving strategic and military context that explains the US military "pivot" to the Pacific. Europeans have nothing comparable to the already large (and growing) military presence and commitments of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. But they do have an interest in East Asian security. Some 28 per cent of EU external trade in 2010 was with East Asia, an impressive five per cent more than the EU traded across the Atlantic the same year. In contrast to the global footprint of US defence policy, however, European defence planning is almost exclusively focused on Europe's neighbourhood. For example, all but two of 27 CSDP missions to date have been deployed in Europe's broad neighbourhood (the exceptions are Afghanistan and Aceh in Indonesia). Put simply, the US is an Asian military power, but the Europeans are not.

A key question, consequently, is how will Europeans cope with problems in their neighbourhood – with or without the US? One key factor may be the readiness of rising military powers such as China and India, along with Turkey and Russia, to play a greater role there. Sometimes the US may wish to take the lead, with or without Europeans (think Bahrain, where the US fifth fleet is stationed). Sometimes, the US may get involved with Europeans (think Libya or Iran). But sometimes Europeans may have to act without the US: the UN force sent to the Israeli-Lebanese border in 2006 was primarily made up of Europeans; and although they didn't use military force, it was the EU-27 that led the international response to the Georgia crisis in 2008. The EU's current and planned operations in Mali to tackle the grave security crisis in the Sahel also fit into this emerging strategic trend.

This in turn raises the altogether thornier question whether Europeans would use robust military force when operating alone. At first glance this seems unlikely, based on past evidence and their lack of capabilities. But that said, at the start of 2011 the idea of France and Britain leading a military operation in Libya also seemed fanciful. While the US is not abandoning Europe, given the Pentagon's recent reluctance over Libya and Georgia, Washington would surely be happy to leave most future Balkan, Caucasian and North African crises to the Europeans. The US, after all, has enough to worry about in the broader Middle East and Asia.

Updating strategic priorities for CSDP

The lists of threats and challenges outlined in the 2003 ESS and the 2008 update remain valid. Regional conflicts and state failure have not disappeared (think Mali or Syria); the spread of WMDs is still relevant (think Iran); while the global challenges of climate change, energy security and cyber-security continue to evolve. CSDP will continue to have a role in coping with aspects of these threats

and challenges, especially regional conflicts and state failure (in particular peacekeeping and state-building tasks).

The geographic focus on Europe's neighbourhood also remains important, not least given the current turbulence in the region: at the time of writing (Autumn 2012) a civil war is raging in Syria; Libya is not yet fully stabilised; and there are concerns over Iran's nuclear programme – amongst many other challenges. The EU will play a low-profile and mainly non-military role in East Asian security; but from the Eastern Atlantic to the Western Indian Ocean it needs to consider how to both better share the security burden with the United States, and increasingly work with rising military powers (China, India and Russia) in that Atlantic-Indian Ocean axis.

In addition, if Europeans think they may need to use force autonomously in the future (especially in a robust manner), they should develop a clearer sense of their common external interests. One way to think about interests would be to draw up a list of priorities for EU foreign policy. These could include supporting the international rule-of-law; free trade; energy security; a more democratic and stable neighbourhood; and a constructive working relationship with Turkey, Russia and the US – the key non-EU players in European security.

Concerning CSDP, defining shared foreign policy interests sets the context for identifying the scenarios that may require Europeans to use force in the future. These scenarios could be geographic (i.e. the neighbourhood or beyond); more functional (keeping sea-lanes open or protecting energy supplies); or more existential (opposing major breaches of international law or old-fashioned self-defence – Iran's nuclear programme could potentially apply in both ways here). Linked to this is the prickly question of the level of operational ambition for CSDP: should the EU be able to potentially carry out a robust Libya-style military operation in the future?

None of this is to pretend that the EU is or will soon become a full-spectrum geo-strategic military actor. The 27 CSDP operations initiated so far have been mostly civilian, small relative to UN or NATO missions, and some have been little more than flag-planting exercises. As a result, the Union sometimes gives the impression that it is more interested in being perceived as a politically-correct power than a geo-political one. In a rapidly-changing world, geo-politics should not be ignored. Assessing how global military power is changing, and how that may impact upon European security and foreign policy interests deserves much more attention from EU governments.

CSDP should not become simply a form of armed charity work, nor will it become a vehicle for great power military competition. But there is a number of potentially important tasks in-between. For example, 90 per cent of European external trade is carried by sea, so maritime security and the protection of trade routes is essential for the EU. Naval operations, therefore, like the current EU mission to tackle piracy on the waters off Somalia – which was deployed in part because of the disruption to EU-Asia shipping – may become increasingly prominent missions for CSDP. In future, alongside a geographic focus on Europe's broad neighbourhood and helping to tackle some key threats to European security, CSDP should contribute to protecting vital European interests as well as projecting European values.

egs

Alexandra Jonas*

Strategy processes: opportunities, challenges and traps

„[…] it is an effort to negotiate the limits of what the polity can agree on, to smooth out the most logically incompatible edges of that consensus, and to produce a document that can command widespread respect and agreement. The resulting strategy document, even if it gets the headlines, is the least important part of that process. The document is in fact the result of the process of strategy formulation, not its catalyst"
(Jeremy Shapiro)[34]

The process that leads to new foreign, security and defence strategy documents - whether in the national, the European, or any other multinational realm - is of eminent importance. This is not only claimed by Jeremy Shapiro, former Director of Research at the Brookings Institution, but also reflected in the innovatively designed and well-orchestrated development processes which led to recent national security strategy documents across the EU as well as to NATO's latest strategic concept.

Hence, drafters of a potential new EU strategy could benefit from a thorough look at national strategy processes as well as at the Alliance's 2010 strategic concept when thinking about how to design the development process.

Generally, a well-designed process is believed to reinforce the shared vision for (a specific part or even all of) an actor's external relations and thereby create unity between the various relevant stakeholders. Also, a well-designed development process is considered to lead to broad acceptance and a legitimate document, to increase chances for the effective implementation of the strategy and to lead to an equally durable and dynamic document. Thus, the 'right' strategy process has the potential to open avenues for success.

Best practices for strategy processes?

As each country or organization has to operate in its very specific context, there is not one catch-all best practice example. However, one can identify several landmarks that are usually given attention to when developing a new strategy document:[35]

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[34] J. Shapiro, "A new European Security Strategy?," *Europe's World*, 2 March 2009, www.brookings.edu.

[35] These exceed the three typical functions of foreign, security and defence-related strategies, namely: To define the relevant threats to that particular actor's security; to map aims, interests and priorities; and to identify the suitable instruments and means with which to meet threats and pursue aims.

Bringing on board the right circle of actors

There are good reasons to carefully think about who should participate in the strategy drafting process: First, in order to create ownership and consensus amongst those that need to support and implement the strategy, and second to develop a sensible, candidly reflected document of high quality. Hence, crucial questions revolve around who should participate in what way (e.g. active participation or consultation), but also around who should be in the lead, steer, and coordinate the process.

Strategy drafters increasingly opt for an open and inclusive process,[36] bringing together a plethora of actors who participate in variable modes. In the national case, this might include various governmental departments, the parliament, academia, the private sector, civil society as well as input from international partners, and potentially implies the creation of new structures. For instance, France and Spain, when developing their latest security strategy documents, created commissions to drive the process,[37] while the UK, for successive strategy documents in 2009 and 2010, established new cross-governmental structures on various levels as well as an institutionalized exchange with academia and the parliament. These new structures, such as the UK's National Security Council, might help integrate competing perspectives and smooth out incompatible positions.

Further, the newly established structures to steer strategy processes are usually headed by high ranking, senior officials, as in the case of the Spanish Security Strategy of 2011 (Javier Solana) and the French Livre Blancs of 2008 and 2012/13 (Jean-Claude Mallet and Jean-Marie Guehenno). These personalities, due to their experience and the respect that is given to them, have the potential to contribute substantially to negotiating compromises and achieving agreements, a quality that has, for instance, also been attributed to Anders Fogh Rasmussen when pulling his weight to translate the Group of Expert's final report into a strategic concept everyone subscribed to.

Of course, orchestrating the participation of the various actors involved is much more complex in multinational contexts than in the national realm - already due to the sheer heterogeneity of stakeholders. Hence, the development process of NATO's strategic concept was marked by a combination of inclusive and exclusive elements, alternating between reflection and consultation phases, thereby carefully sequencing the input of experts or civil society on the one hand and the feedback of member states' decision makers on the other.

Creating acceptance and legitimacy by including the public

There's an increasing effort to involve the public in transparent strategy processes in order to create appreciation, acceptance and legitimacy for the concerned policy field (or organization). While there are obvious means to make the end-product, the actual strategy, an accessible instrument of communication, e.g. by producing a concise, well-readable and clear document, there are various ways to include the respective public in the process. Instruments used when developing the Alliance's strategic concept as well as national strategies ranged from using blogs (inter alia those of established institutions, such as the King's College in the UK), webcasts and internet forums to organizing subject-matter chats with officials, actively involving journalists for in-depth media

[36] Contrasting exclusive processes that take place behind closed doors, comprise a rather small group of people with the same institutional background and lead to a document that is only released to the public once finalized.

[37] For one, the commission that is currently in charge of developing the new French *Livre Blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale* comprises of nearly 50 people with diverse backgrounds (see http://www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/membres-de-la-commission-du-livre-blanc-sur-la-defense-et-la-securite-nationale).

coverage, covering expert-seminars and – in particular during the strategic concept's development process - organizing a plethora of public events.

Providing for a document that is durable, but never outdated

While it is at the same time easy and difficult to produce a long-term strategy (easy, as one does not have to engage in strategy exercises anymore for a long time; difficult as it is practically impossible to foresee the international environment that one's external actions will have to cope with during the next 5, 10 or even 20 years), the real challenge is to try to draft a strategy document that is as durable as it is dynamic and up-to-date.

Therefore, strategists across Europe, increasingly acknowledging this challenge, developed various game plans. First, strategy development is declared as a permanent task: The respective document (as well as its implementation) shall be constantly questioned and monitored and must be renewed on a regular basis. The UK and Spain, for instance, commit to renewing their National Security Strategies (approx. every five years) by scheduling the revision, i.e. defining the year of renewal, in their current strategy document. Second, sub-strategies to a relatively thin, capstone document are commissioned to guide concrete implementation of the overarching strategy - with regard to a particular policy field or a specific thematic or geographical area. These functional sub-strategies are then supposed to be developed on the basis of the overarching strategy's principles and structure. Third, and closely related, are arrangements and institutional structures to monitor the implementation of strategies, e.g. a regular review, conducted by a parliamentary committee on national security strategy, such as in the UK.

Paying attention to the right timing

In the national context (and unless a scheduled revision is due), there were, in the past, in particular two windows of opportunity that created appetite for a new strategy document: The coming into office of a new government and the need to reform (wide) parts of the government apparatus and policy, e.g. due to new budgetary realities. Sarkozy's "rupture" with the previous administration as the background for the 2008 Livre Blanc as well as the cuts in the UK's state budget, that informed the 2010 NSS and SDSR, are cases in point. However, the budget rationale proved disadvantageous in a number of cases, as the according strategy processes were overly affected by departmental strives for money.

In multinational contexts, windows of opportunity to create a new foreign, security and defence strategy document (such as external shocks or drastic changes in the international environment), that are accepted as such by all relevant stakeholders, are scarce. Further, it is only through skilful policy entrepreneurs, who are willing to take advantage of the respective momentum, that strategy processes are set in motion, such as in 2003, when Solana and his team drew on the Iraq war and drafted a document that deliberately differed from the 2002 US' national security strategy.

Managing expectations: strategy (documents) and strategic culture

Strategy exercises are sensitive, fragile and highly symbolic processes that can easily become a dangerous litmus-test, clearly displaying the limits (or even the non-existence) of a multinational actor's strategic culture. For instance, if stakeholders cannot agree on a document or if the final product is, content-wise, so light, that it is barely more than a proof of disaccord.

Generally, national strategy documents, such as security strategies, codify a particular country's (relatively persistent) strategic culture – its identity in foreign, security and defence matters that is

based upon shared experiences and accepted narratives unique to the respective nation.[38] In the case of multinational actors, such as the EU, one popular reading when it comes to the relation between strategy documents and strategic culture is to argue that strategies reveal the degree of convergence between the national strategic cultures of member states. Hence, a multinational strategy would be an expression of the lowest common denominator of national strategic cultures, disclosing those beliefs, norms and ideas that all member states have in common at a particular point in time. According to this reading, the respective multinational actor's common strategic culture can only be enhanced if national cultures converge further, e.g. through shared experiences.

However, alternative readings of the relation between multinational strategies and strategic culture acknowledge that strategy processes offer plenty of entry points to coin strategic debates. Hence, development processes that lead to multinational actors' strategy documents can be seen as an opportunity to forge the common identity beyond a mere account of national strategic cultures' concurrent elements. From this perspective, well-designed strategy processes can open avenues for participating policy entrepreneurs to highlight certain narratives and create consent around particular ideas, norms and values that operate at the limits of what is - on the declaratory level - acceptable to stakeholders. Thus, thoroughly designed and orchestrated strategy processes have the potential to create a picture that is more than the lowest common denominator of member states' visions. Whether and how such boosted visions are then translated into practice, remains the crucial question.

[38] While strategic cultures are not static and can change under certain circumstances, national security strategies that were drafted in times of austerity prove that the core of a nation's strategic culture, for instance expressed by a traditional level of ambition, is relatively persistent.