The Strategic Compass promises to give the EU greater clarity over the strategic direction of CSDP and, potentially, EU security and defense more broadly. Which direction is the EU headed? What do North, South, East, and West mean in the context of CSDP? Who is carrying the Compass, and who is joining the Union on the route? Can EU security and defense ever function as effectively and accu- rately as a compass? These are longstanding questions, of course, but the process the EU is about to embark on also calls for a debate about what the EU will pack in its back-packs (just a pickaxe, or is a proverbial Swiss Army Knife required for the journey?). An uncomfortable truth is that any discussion about capabilities under the Strategic Compass process will have to deal squarely with the unfulfilled promises of the past: that is, the Union’s longstanding inability to fill capability shortfalls. After twenty years of CSDP, the gaps barely merit mentioning, although they serve as a painful reminder of failed commitments. While Europeans are starting to bring online air-to-air refueling and strategic airlift capabilities, the continent is still behind in areas such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and it continues to struggle to generate the force packages required for missions and operations.
The Strategic Compass emerges at an important time for the EU, especially given the geopolitical challenges it currently faces. Yet, there is a risk that if there is insufficient and/or no sustained buy-in from member state governments, the Compass will only raise expectations further without making any real material difference. The Compass’ third basket on capabilities therefore emerges as a crucial pillar of the whole exercise – without capacity, defense is simply built on stilts. Yet, before the EU identifies what ca- pabilities it requires – through the other baskets – it needs to make sense of the geopolitical terrain facing the EU. The truth is that this is not your father’s CSDP anymore, and missions and operations have to keep abreast with technological and strategic/tactical shifts in conflict. The wid- er political context should be kept in mind too. The EU will need to grapple with the uncertain economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Union appears committed to achieving technological sovereignty all while Washington and Beijing battle for global supremacy.
With this context in mind, developing a capabilities bas- ket under the Strategic Compass will require engagement with at least four major questions: 1) Should EU capability development cater only to the needs of CSDP, or is a wider concept of EU security and defense required?; 2) What is the correct balance between filling existing capability shortfalls and investing in future technologies, systems, and platforms?; 3) What capabilities should be prioritized to simultaneously respond to operational needs, industrial objectives, and increased technological sovereignty?; and 4) Is the current EU capability development process still fit for its purpose? Unavoidably, it will also be necessary to reflect on what is meant by “capability” today and what the expression “full spectrum” implies in the context of an increasing- ly contested operational landscape and the so-called digital revolution.
German Council on Foreign Relations, 2020 (edited by Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz)
Daniel Fiott 