The advent of institutional change in the European Union will inevitably give rise to new and old ideas about bureaucratic design. As the clock runs down on the present legislature and European Commission, expect calls for new bodies and the reshuffling of existing structures. Before this author reflects on some of the possible ideas and potential changes, we should acknowledge from the start that not all bureaucratic changes result in more effective policy. The risk is that focusing on organigrams, while the stuff of intrigue in Brussels circles, leads to introspection. Focusing on institutional design alone can all too easily become a facade to avoid the deeper reforms the EU requires. In the absence of treaty change, and a shift in the nature of intergovernmental – supranational politics, little meaningful reform can ultimately be made. 

Still, the recent call to create the post of an EU Commissioner for Defence is evidence of a yearning for some degree of change. In fact, the idea of a Defence Commissioner is not new and neither are calls for a fully-fledged Defence Council or Committee (dropping the “sub”) for Security and Defence in the European Parliament. Calls for such posts come from a good place. For too long, defence has lived in the shadows of foreign affairs, which is increasingly absurd in an EU context when one considers the importance of defence today. Indeed, there have arguably been bigger political steps in CSDP than CFSP over the past years, so why not reflect this in the institutional set up. One of the chief benefits of upgrading all of these informal or dependent bodies is to raise defence matters to a higher political level. This will not necessarily lead to more effective defence policy, but it is a start in becoming more serious about defence. For example, creating a Defence Council may afford the time and political space to enforce a consistent and serious approach to matters related to capabilities, operations and industry. 

The creation of DG DEFIS a few years ago provides evidence of how a new bureaucratic structure can enhance EU defence. True, it was created to provide a centralised location for the management of the European Defence Fund, but DG DEFIS is more than just a fund management agency. In the hands of an ambitious and skilled Commissioner, DG DEFIS has become a key institutional location for all things defence-related. In fact, such is its success that the future could see – depending on the politics that feed into the new Commission – further reform: the creation of a “DG for Security and Defence”. This could build on defence and space to also include the Commission’s work on cyberdefence, hybrid threats and more. 

Yet, we should be realistic. “What the right hand giveth, the left hand taketh away”. A more powerful Commission in the area of security and defence immediately raises sensitive questions about the roles of the External Action Service and European Defence Agency. Not a new problem, to be sure, but these bodies have traditionally been used to underline national control over security and defence policy and to safeguard against a more ambitious role for the Commission. The idea of an EU Defence Commissioner also raises obvious questions about the High Representative / Vice-President. The HR/VP, as its own political organism, currently embodies both supranational and intergovernmental approaches to security and defence. It is often said that the HR/VP post is already overburdened with too many responsibilities. 

Yet, if the HR/VP post is “stripped” of defence, what will that do for bureaucratic politics? An HR/VP for just CFSP and an EU Defence Commissioner may work well together when personalities align (e.g. the Borrell-Breton tandem has worked well), but when they don’t what happens? More questions present themselves: for example, would the Defence Commissioner chair any potential Defence Council and what powers would they have over the operational dimensions of CSDP? Surely, the title of Defence Commissioner is only really valid if it brings under one roof matters pertaining to operations, capabilities and industry? In any case, it would be some spectacle to see political parties and governments vie for the post of Defence Commissioner. 

So, the idea to create a Defence Council, Security and Defence Committee and Defence Commissioner are back in the spotlight. We should think about them in a serious and open-minded manner. Yet what about the other ways in which the Union could enhance its security and defence structures? For example, since the Strategic Compass the EU has rightfully invested time and energy into securing the strategic domains (air, maritime, cyber and space). As the years go by, and the Union develops its surveillance capacities in these domains, why should it not consider the creation of unified Command and Control structures in these areas? Putting aside whether they would fall under the Commission or Council for one moment, what is stopping the EU from unifying its disparate surveillance, tracking and monitoring capacities? Why not have an “EU Maritime Command”, “EU Cyber Command” or “EU Space Command”? 

Think too at how important the issue of economic security has become for the EU in recent years. Traditionally, the EU has been constructed as an economic actor and now it runs into the security dimensions of the economy, not least because of China. The logic of liberalism/competition – still very much alive in the Commission – has led to some contestable decisions (think of the CAI or the “FSM affair”). This raises the question of whether the Commission can effectively manage the balance between security and economic matters: to put it another way, what processes could ensure that seemingly “harmless” economic decisions are vetted from a security perspective? Some will say the College of Commissioners suffices to maintain the essential security interests of the EU: are we so sure? And what happens if the Council or Parliament fundamentally disagree with the Commission’s approach? What then beyond public spats? 

US-China rivalry will continue to help the EU breakdown the psychological and treaty-based (as well as politically artificial) barriers between security and economic policy. It would not surprise this author, therefore, if at some point calls for a “European Security Advisor” do not emerge. Just like the US National Security Advisor, the post holder could make their opinions heard on all economic policy, especially if there are concerns that such policy may be a security risk. Again, we would immediately be faced with a dilemma: how would the European Security Advisor relate to the HR/VP (indeed, not every US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State have gotten along so well). Perhaps, in this regard, it would be advisable to select a European Security Advisor by consensus between the Council, Commission and Parliament. Yet, even here, questions about whether such a personality could override the President of the Commission would not take long to surface. 

Finally, I wonder whether we can completely disregard some “big picture” changes in the coming months. Before the last Commission took office, there were whispers in Brussels that the EU could select an individual to simultaneously hold the posts of European Council President and European Commission President. This idea has the elegance of overcoming the now obvious vanity competition between the posts. It could also lead to much more coherent political leadership in times of crisis (the norm for Europe today), and ensure that the Commission is not tempted to act too independently of the European Council. Yet, even here, no unified single President would overcome the cacophony of various national interests in the Council. 

Let’s see what the next few months bring: both in terms of grand designs and crises.

By Daniel Fiott