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Advancing the Inclusion of SMEs in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the rapid battlefield adaptation that it has led to, defence innovation and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are being seen as key contributors to Europe’s industrial preparedness, production scalability and security of supply. To this end, recent European Union (EU) policy and financial initiatives have specifically targeted SMEs in the defence sector, to address the financial, regulatory and industrial bottlenecks facing SMEs in Europe. However, SMEs still face considerable challenges and barriers. This Study examines the evolving role of SMEs within the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). It specifically analyses the persistent barriers preventing SMEs from entering the defence market in Europe, and, once present, from scaling their innovation, services and products. The Study argues that, despite the growing political recognition of SMEs as sources of technological and disruptive innovation, SMEs still face considerable financial, regulatory and political barriers to access the EDTIB.
European Parliament study, 2026
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The Strategy Trap? European Threat Assessments and the Problem of Common Action
The EU’s 2026 threat assessment demonstrates that while Europe has developed a clearer understanding of its strategic environment, it remains less certain about the political choices required to respond to it. Russia’s war has brought European threat perceptions closer together, but convergence around the existence of a threat has yet to produce a genuinely common European strategic outlook. While Europeans increasingly agree on the threats they will face by 2030, they remain far less confident in their collective ability to respond to them.
CSDS Policy Brief, 17/2026
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Russia’s War on Ukraine: A Zeitenwende for European Defence?
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 profoundly transformed Europe’s strategic landscape, forcing governments across the continent to rethink the foundations of their defence policies. But did the war truly result in a European “Zeitenwende”? This volume provides the first comprehensive analysis of how European countries, the EU, and NATO responded to the largest security shock in Europe since the Cold War. Written by leading experts, the chapters offer empirically grounded analyses of how the war reshaped defence objectives, military procurement, and political debates across Europe.
The book shows that the war triggered far-reaching changes in threat perceptions, objectives, and military capabilities. Still, significant differences remain in how European states perceive the Russian threat, how rapidly they invest in defence, and how far they are willing and able to adapt. Europe’s security will ultimately depend on whether European states can cooperate effectively despite persistent national differences, a major challenge that will shape the future of the continent.
My own chapter contribution focuses on how the European Union have adjusted to the war on Ukraine. A big thank you to the excellent editors of the book: Tim Haesebrouck, Michelle Haas and Servaas Taghon.
Palgrave Macmillan, September 2026
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Ankara and NATO 3.0: A Time of Reckoning?
NATO leaders will meet once again in Ankara on 7-8 July 2026. This will be the second summit ever held in Türkiye, with the first held in Istanbul in 2004. Back then, allies were celebrating the enlargement of NATO to include seven new allies, mostly from the Eastern Flank countries. The Summit also expanded the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan and reinforced the alliance’s presence in the Western Balkans and Mediterranean. The 2026 Ankara Summit, by contrast, will have three main formal agenda points: 1) increasing defence investment in line with The Hague Summit goal of 5% of GDP; 2) strengthening NATO’s defence industry; and 3) supporting Ukraine. On all three points, NATO can boast some success as allies are demonstrably increasing defence investment and, as a result, their defence industries are being spurred into action with increased defence production. Even on Ukraine, allies will meet in Ankara with the relatively positive news that Ukraine is making significant military advances over Russia – and quite literally over Russia, when one considers all of the impressive drone strikes on Russian defence and energy infrastructure.
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, July 2026.
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Wanted: European Defence Sector Talent
High-end talent and skills have emerged as a decisive factor in Europe’s ability to convert greater spending into defence capabilities. Without a sufficient talent pool, the defence industrial base risks becoming a bottleneck rather than an enabler of security. The scale of the challenge is already visible. ASD Europe calculates that the European defence industry employs roughly 581,000 people, yet demand for labour has surged sharply since 2022, with job postings remaining over 40% higher than pre-war levels.
Firms in Europe report persistent difficulties in recruiting engineers, technicians and digital specialists, even as governments pledge hundreds of billions in additional defence spending. The European Commission openly recognises skills shortages as a structural constraint, warning that gaps in the labour market threaten Europe’s security. Eurostat indicates that the median age of the workforce in hightech manufacturing in Europe is about 42 to 44 years of age, so it is imperative that younger talent pools are tapped for the defence sector in the years ahead.
The challenge is not just about numbers.Defence increasingly depends on advanced AI skills that are also in high demand in civilian sectors, intensifying competition for talent. Years of underinvestment, an ageing workforce and fragmented training systems have further strained the pool of specialised skills. While one estimate states that around 0.41% of Europe’s workforce are AI professionals, Europe continues to train talent in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics subjects (STEM) that it struggles to retain, as they leave Europe.
Patria Group
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Defence Technology Governance in the European Union
The 2025 EU White Paper on Defence underscores the need for a more risk-tolerant regulatory environment to foster European defence technologies and innovation. As the EU expands its role in defence, it faces complex governance challenges, particularly in managing emerging technologies such as AI, robotics, cyber and biotech. The Union’s sui generis structure—comprising diverse state and non-state actors—complicates efforts to design cohesive regulatory frameworks, especially given the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Legal competencies outlined in EU Treaties further constrain centralised governance, as operational control remains with member states. Nonetheless, instruments like the EU Common Position on arms exports, the Dual-Use Regulation and the European Defence Fund introduce mechanisms for responsible oversight. This chapter examines both existing EU regulations and the political challenges of governing defence technologies amid rising global proliferation and reduced emphasis on governance by major powers like the US and China.
Springer Cham, 2026
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Security of Supply and Interdependency: A New Approach to Strategic Autonomy and Indispensability
This paper argues that Europe’s renewed focus on defence since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed and, in many cases, extended deep structural dependencies, particularly on the United States. It contends that traditional notions of strategic autonomy are no longer viable in an era defined by complex, globalised and commercially-driven supply chains. Instead, the paper proposes a more pragmatic framework in which autonomy is achieved through the management, rather than elimination, of dependencies. The paper introduces the concept of “strategic indispensability” as a novel way forward. In so doing, the paper calls for Europe to cultivate critical capabilities and leverage asymmetric interdependence to enhance both resilience and influence. Ultimately, the paper argues that European defence policy should shift from a form of reactive dependency to the proactive shaping of interdependencies that align industrial policy, capability development and partnerships to strengthen Europe’s position within global defence ecosystems.
ARES Group EU, by Renaud Bellais and Daniel Fiott
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Malta’s European Defence Procurement: Neutrality, Participation and Adaptation
Malta’s engagement with EU security and defence is characterised by a delicate balancing act between neutrality and cooperation. Rooted in a constitutional commitment to non-alignment and neutrality, Maltese defence policy prioritises national sovereignty and regional security, while maintaining selective engagement with European partners. Within the EU, Malta occupies a peripheral yet symbolically relevant position. Its non-participation in key initiatives such as PESCO, EDF and SAFE underscores the limits of cooperation, while its support for EU policies – particularly in response to the Ukraine war – demonstrates a willingness to align politically with European objectives. However, Malta remains a very modest defence actor, focused on niche capabilities and interoperability rather than high-end military power. The Ukraine war has reinforced existing trends towards resilience and cooperation, without fundamentally altering the country’s strategic orientation.
European Defence & Security Law and Policy Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2026)
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From Inertia to Innovation? Five Years of the European Defence Fund, 2021-2025
On 15 April 2026, the European Commission released the results of the 2025 call under the European Defence Fund (EDF). Overall, in 2025, the Commission invested some €1.07 billion in 57 defence projects, which demonstrates the continued popularity and relevance of the EU-level funding tool. The Commission reports as part of its rollout of the 2025 EDF projects that some 634 unique legal entities from 26 member states and Norway and Ukraine are part of projects that will feed into critical defence domains such as artificial intelligence (AI), cyber, sensors, drones and flagship areas such as air and missile defence, space and (counter-)drones. From 2021 to 2027, the European Union (EU) will invest €7.3 billion in defence research and development (R&D) under the Fund.
In this respect, the 2025 results constitute a sufficient period – five years – to make preliminary observations on the functioning of the Fund. In this CSDS Policy Brief, we will first look at the 2025 results using publicly available data provided by the EU, before then comparing the results across five years since 2021. We are interested in examining where EDF financial support is being channelled, which innovators coordinate projects and which member states participate in EDF projects. We also give some indication of the diversity of innovators that participate in the Fund.
CSDS Policy Brief 12/2026
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The European Defence Union: An Article-by-Article Commentary
The European Defence Union has been under construction for several years within a worrying security context. It depends fundamentally on EU law: i.e. both the rules laid down by the Member States in the Treaties and those adopted by the European institutions, as the European Union’s approach is no longer limited to the highly intergovernmental Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Instead, it encompasses and goes beyond the CSDP, extending to the so-called ‘Community’ or ‘supranational’ sphere, from which defence was long excluded.
The European Defence Union transcends the distinction between the supranational and intergovernmental spheres, and therefore has to be understood not only from the perspective of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which governs the CSDP, but also from the perspective of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC Treaty, known as the Euratom Treaty). This publication has three parts, each dedicated to one of these Treaties. The analyses focus both on the provisions of these Treaties and the various secondary acts that apply to defence, the most recent being the EU Regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). Taken together, these shape the contours of the European Defence Union.
At a time when security issues are once again a major concern for European citizens and their governments, and when the question of the emergence of genuine common defence – an existential issue for Europe – is being raised, this publication is aimed at practitioners, policy-makers (both national and European), defence experts and academics (students, PhD students, teachers and researchers). They will find here a novel, law-based approach to examining European defence.
Edited by Elsa Bernard : Professor of Public Law; Quentin Loïez : Drafting of the proposed regulation establishing the instrument to strengthen the European defence industry through joint procurement; and Stéphane Rodrigues : Associate Professor of Public Law.
I have contributed two chapters to the book:
“Article 173 TFEU: The European Defence Industry”
“The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument”
Larcier Intersentia
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Daniel Fiott 