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Security of Supply and Interdependency: A New Approach to Strategic Autonomy and Indispensability
This paper argues that Europe’s renewed focus on defence since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed and, in many cases, extended deep structural dependencies, particularly on the United States. It contends that traditional notions of strategic autonomy are no longer viable in an era defined by complex, globalised and commercially-driven supply chains. Instead, the paper proposes a more pragmatic framework in which autonomy is achieved through the management, rather than elimination, of dependencies. The paper introduces the concept of “strategic indispensability” as a novel way forward. In so doing, the paper calls for Europe to cultivate critical capabilities and leverage asymmetric interdependence to enhance both resilience and influence. Ultimately, the paper argues that European defence policy should shift from a form of reactive dependency to the proactive shaping of interdependencies that align industrial policy, capability development and partnerships to strengthen Europe’s position within global defence ecosystems.
ARES Group EU, by Renaud Bellais and Daniel Fiott
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Malta’s European Defence Procurement: Neutrality, Participation and Adaptation
Malta’s engagement with EU security and defence is characterised by a delicate balancing act between neutrality and cooperation. Rooted in a constitutional commitment to non-alignment and neutrality, Maltese defence policy prioritises national sovereignty and regional security, while maintaining selective engagement with European partners. Within the EU, Malta occupies a peripheral yet symbolically relevant position. Its non-participation in key initiatives such as PESCO, EDF and SAFE underscores the limits of cooperation, while its support for EU policies – particularly in response to the Ukraine war – demonstrates a willingness to align politically with European objectives. However, Malta remains a very modest defence actor, focused on niche capabilities and interoperability rather than high-end military power. The Ukraine war has reinforced existing trends towards resilience and cooperation, without fundamentally altering the country’s strategic orientation.
European Defence & Security Law and Policy Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2026)
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From Inertia to Innovation? Five Years of the European Defence Fund, 2021-2025
On 15 April 2026, the European Commission released the results of the 2025 call under the European Defence Fund (EDF). Overall, in 2025, the Commission invested some €1.07 billion in 57 defence projects, which demonstrates the continued popularity and relevance of the EU-level funding tool. The Commission reports as part of its rollout of the 2025 EDF projects that some 634 unique legal entities from 26 member states and Norway and Ukraine are part of projects that will feed into critical defence domains such as artificial intelligence (AI), cyber, sensors, drones and flagship areas such as air and missile defence, space and (counter-)drones. From 2021 to 2027, the European Union (EU) will invest €7.3 billion in defence research and development (R&D) under the Fund.
In this respect, the 2025 results constitute a sufficient period – five years – to make preliminary observations on the functioning of the Fund. In this CSDS Policy Brief, we will first look at the 2025 results using publicly available data provided by the EU, before then comparing the results across five years since 2021. We are interested in examining where EDF financial support is being channelled, which innovators coordinate projects and which member states participate in EDF projects. We also give some indication of the diversity of innovators that participate in the Fund.
CSDS Policy Brief 12/2026
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The European Defence Union: An Article-by-Article Commentary
The European Defence Union has been under construction for several years within a worrying security context. It depends fundamentally on EU law: i.e. both the rules laid down by the Member States in the Treaties and those adopted by the European institutions, as the European Union’s approach is no longer limited to the highly intergovernmental Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Instead, it encompasses and goes beyond the CSDP, extending to the so-called ‘Community’ or ‘supranational’ sphere, from which defence was long excluded.
The European Defence Union transcends the distinction between the supranational and intergovernmental spheres, and therefore has to be understood not only from the perspective of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which governs the CSDP, but also from the perspective of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC Treaty, known as the Euratom Treaty). This publication has three parts, each dedicated to one of these Treaties. The analyses focus both on the provisions of these Treaties and the various secondary acts that apply to defence, the most recent being the EU Regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). Taken together, these shape the contours of the European Defence Union.
At a time when security issues are once again a major concern for European citizens and their governments, and when the question of the emergence of genuine common defence – an existential issue for Europe – is being raised, this publication is aimed at practitioners, policy-makers (both national and European), defence experts and academics (students, PhD students, teachers and researchers). They will find here a novel, law-based approach to examining European defence.
Edited by Elsa Bernard : Professor of Public Law; Quentin Loïez : Drafting of the proposed regulation establishing the instrument to strengthen the European defence industry through joint procurement; and Stéphane Rodrigues : Associate Professor of Public Law.
I have contributed two chapters to the book:
“Article 173 TFEU: The European Defence Industry”
“The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument”
Larcier Intersentia
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Between the Berlaymont and the Glass Palace: The Relative Roles of the EU and NATO in European Defence
Europe’s defence landscape is complex, and the relationship between the European Union and NATO is a prime example. Though only five kilometres apart in Brussels, the EU and NATO often appear worlds apart in practice. This new HCSS report by Davis Ellison and Daniel Fiott offers a clear-eyed assessment of this relationship and a roadmap for improvement.
Persistent political tensions, overlapping memberships, and entrenched institutional suspicion have historically constrained cooperation between these core European security actors. The second Trump presidency, Brexit, and ongoing regional disputes – most notably involving Türkiye and Cyprus – have compounded these challenges.
Yet, European states continue to invest heavily in both organisations. Lead author Davis Ellision notes:
“Despite tensions, EU and NATO remain the indispensable frameworks for European security. Cooperation and competition coexist, but neither can be replaced.”
The report identifies key areas for strengthening EU-NATO cooperation:
- Reform of the Berlin Plus Agreement to streamline EU access to NATO assets.
- Closer political coordination in Brussels, particularly between the EU’s Political and Security Committee and NATO’s North Atlantic Council.
- Reconceptualising European defence scenarios to better align strategic planning across institutions.
- Greater alignment of defence planning to reduce duplication and enhance operational readiness.
Crucially, improving institutional cooperation also requires addressing Europe’s dependence on the United States. While some capitals aim to reduce reliance on American forces and defence industry, this will require careful coordination and at least tacit approval from Washington.
The study highlights that European security is inherently regional: both NATO and the EU operate in service of European stability. Germany and France, in particular, play leading roles in navigating the complex web of institutional relationships, with other states such as the Netherlands actively supporting reforms.
Daniel Fiott, co-author, emphasises:
“The moment is ripe for reform. European capitals must seize this opportunity to build a more self-sufficient, resilient, and credible security architecture within and alongside NATO.”
The report provides a provisional menu of reforms for policymakers seeking to strengthen the EU’s role within NATO, improve institutional cooperation, and foster European strategic autonomy without jeopardising the transatlantic bond.
The Hague Centre for Strategies Studies
By Davis Ellison and Daniel Fiott
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What Role for European Economic and Military Enablement in Deterrence?
Dans un environnement marqué par la superposition des crises, l’intensification des interdépendances et le retour assumé du rapport de force, les vulnérabilités des systèmes – énergétiques, informationnels, économiques, climatiques, logistiques – ne sont plus seulement des facteurs de fragilité : elles deviennent tout autant de leviers de conflictualité. Ce dossier propose d’interroger cette « guerre des systèmes » en articulant trois exigences complémentaires : évaluer les risques systémiques, comprendre la manière dont des acteurs peuvent instrumentaliser des systèmes interdépendants, et penser les conditions d’une résilience opératoire, au croisement des sphères civile et militaire. Conçu comme un abécédaire, il offre des entrées thématiques autonomes qui composent, par leur enchaînement, un continuum analytique.
Dans la continuité de réflexions précédentes consacrées aux transformations de la conflictualité et aux vulnérabilités contemporaines (« Géopolitique du basculement », « Armements et arsenalisations »), ce numéro assume une hypothèse directrice : le risque systémique n’est plus un horizon abstrait, mais une grammaire de l’action – et parfois de l’agression. À l’instrumentalisation de la propagation des chocs se conjuguent le brouillage entre l’accidentel et l’intentionnel et l’opacité croissante de l’attribution. C’est précisément cette zone grise que le dossier explore, en réunissant scientifiques des systèmes complexes, spécialistes du risque, chercheuses et chercheurs en sciences sociales et hautes autorités militaires, afin de dépasser les approches sectorisées et de construire une représentation partagée des vulnérabilités et de la résilience, selon les sciences et les armées.
La Revue Internationale et Stratégique
By Maxime Cordet and Daniel Fiott
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Controlled Adaptation and Integration: Defence AI in Belgium
Belgium’s engagement with artificial intelligence (AI) in defence is best understood not as a dramatic technological leap, but as a series of pragmatic, institutionally embedded steps shaped by alliance politics, budgetary realism and an enduring preference for multinational solutions. Rather than positioning itself as an AI front-runner, Belgium has sought to integrate AI-enabled capabilities where they reinforce existing strengths: intelligence analysis, logistics, cyber defence, training and interoperability within NATO and the European Union (EU). This approach reflects a broader Belgian defence culture that favours the centrality of the NATO alliance, EU cooperation in defence and multinational cooperation.
Defense AI Observatory
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Up in the Air: What Could FCAS Mean for Common EU Defence Projects?
The FCAS project appears to be over, at least in its original incarnation, although technological elements of the project may be salvaged, such as the development of a combat cloud. The case of FCAS serves as a cautionary tale for how to develop collaborative defence industrial programmes in Europe, especially when these projects involve large defence firms and member states. The failure of FCAS should not hinder plans for joint EU defence industrial programmes, but lessons from the failure of FCAS must be integrated into project planning sooner rather than later.
CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 6/2026
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Europe’s Rearmament Dilemmas
Europe has entered a profound rearmament cycle driven by Russia’s war on Ukraine, sharpening US strategic conditionality, and intensifying global geopolitical rivalry. After decades of underinvestment, European states are attempting to rebuild depleted stockpiles, scale up industrial production, and reconcile defense investments with fiscal, political, and technological constraints. The European Union has emerged as an important actor, deploying novel financial instruments, regulatory reforms, and strategies to strengthen defense manufacturing and reduce external dependencies. Yet transatlantic frictions, divergent national priorities, and structural reliance on the United States and China complicate Europe’s quest for strategic autonomy. Rearmament now defines Europe’s economic, political, and security future.
Current History, vol. 125 (2026)
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Taking the Pulse: Can European Defense Survive the Death of FCAS?
Europe’s next-generation fighter plane has not even taken off, and it looks as though it will be grounded indefinitely. The drama surrounding FCAS does not bode well for Franco-German defense industrial cooperation.
Germany has long sought to use the FCAS project to develop its own national aeronautics industry and skills base, which is why Dassault—among other reasons—has been reluctant to share technology so freely with partners.
The FCAS project reflects deep-seated divergent defense industrial interests, which are not easy to overcome. Could this cautionary case stand in the way of European joint capability projects? Perhaps. Yet, the key is to get the partner coalitions right and to iron out political expectations from the start.
Joint projects will likely go ahead at the EU level, but they may not always be centered on Franco-German cooperation. There is a need to study the FCAS project and to better understand why it has fallen apart, to ensure that mistakes are not repeated. If the failure of FCAS leads to greater dependencies on non-European weapons systems in the future, then this hardly bodes well for more European sovereignty in defense.
Image: Getty.
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Daniel Fiott 