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Money is Not Everything: How to Enhance the EU’s Security and Defence Readiness
The war in Ukraine and worrying shifts in the transatlantic relationship are forcing EU member states and institutions to think more seriously about Europe’s security and defence. Although the EU has had a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the early 2000s, it is only in recent years that it has taken a comprehensive approach to security and defence that goes beyond crisis management overseas. In fact, if one looks at a range of recent EU strategy documents such as the White Paper on European Defence, the ‘Niinistö Report’, and the internal security strategy, one notes an EU approach that addresses most areas of security and defence.
Resilience, preparedness and readiness have become the watchwords of the EU’s approach to security and defence. Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has had to move in bold, new ways to secure its security and defence. What is more, the re-election of President Trump in the United States has yet again raised serious questions about Europe’s security and the transatlantic alliance. Overall, the EU is being expected to invest more in its own security and defence, and to do so while reducing potentially harmful dependencies. The fact is that any understanding of security and defence today includes the need to recognise the importance of factors such as technologies, critical raw materials, and critical infrastructure.
European Court of Auditors Journal
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The Defence Dilemma: Can Spain Ride Europe’s Defence Revival?
Defence has become a public policy area of the highest priority in Europe. As the war in Ukraine rages on and the second Trump administration encourages Europeans to take ownership of conventional defence within NATO, the European Union (EU) has launched a flurry of initiatives in recent years to bolster Europe’s military capabilities and revitalise Europe’s defence industrial and technological base. What does this mean for Spain?
Spain is often singled out as a laggard when it comes to defence spending. To be sure, input metrics – such as spending – provide an incomplete picture about an ally’s contribution to collective security. And Spain’s ongoing commitment to NATO and EU missions paints a somewhat more positive picture. Moreover, after years of under-investment, Spain announced a €10.4 billion increase in defence expenditure in 2025, aiming to meet NATO’s 2% GDP target. However, questions remain about the sustainability and focus of this investment, particularly as future NATO targets may increase to 3% or 5% of GDP. As NATO and the EU continue to roll out various benchmarks and initiatives relating to spending, capability development and industrial production, Spain must either up its game or risk missing the boat when it comes to defence modernisation.
In this context, Spain faces both an opportunity and a risk: it must assert itself within evolving EU defence frameworks or risk exclusion from key capability-building initiatives. Spain must carefully align its national defence strategy with the EU’s Readiness 2030 initiatives to maintain its role as a key player in EU defence and industrial cooperation. Strategic alignment with EU defence objectives is essential, particularly in the context of uncertain transatlantic relations and evolving security threats. Without a coordinated national effort, Spain risks marginalisation in major EU defence programmes, which would hinder its industrial competitiveness and diminish its influence in European integration.
To play a central role in future EU flagship defence programmes, Spain’s defence innovation ecosystem will need reform. It continues to be challenged by a fragmented, silo-based approach. Despite recent strategic plans promoting regional defence hubs and dual-use technology development, integration with civilian innovation sectors remains limited. A cultural shift toward open innovation and whole-of-society engagement is critical in order to enhance national competitiveness and ensure access to EU funding mechanisms.
This paper has two central aims: first, to map the strategic, technological and regulatory changes shaping EU defence; and second, to assess their implications for Spain’s defence industry. Structured in three parts, the report examines the geopolitical context, emerging industrial trends and Spain’s positioning within EU frameworks. It concludes with recommendations for how Spain can enhance its role in European defence and fully engage in collaborative industrial initiatives.
Co-authored with Félix Arteaga and Luis Simón.
Real Instituto Elcano
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Defence Innovation Trends: A Data Snapshot of the European Defence Fund, 2021-2024
The European Defence Fund (EDF) has been in operation since 2021 and has become an integral part of European efforts to enhance defence investments. Since 2021, the European Commission has invested €4 billion into 225 collaborative defence research and development (R&D) projects. A major challenge will be keeping the momentum by securing more funding for the EDF under the next Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF).
CSDS Policy Brief
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Sovereignty by Design? Security of Supply in Defence in the European Union
In 2025, security of supply in defence in the European Union is yet again on the policy agenda, especially given the ongoing war on Ukraine and shifts in the transatlantic relationship. In this policy paper, we take stock of the EU’s recent efforts to develop defence industrial policy and its relationship with security of supply. We distinguish between different forms of supply insecurity and address the inherent tensions involved in developing an EU security of supply regime in defence. The paper also uncovers whether arguments counter to such a regime are convincing or not. The paper discusses different concepts of security of supply in defence and it analyses the various policies proposed by the European Commission including the EDIP and SAFE. The paper also reflects on the political stakes involved in ensuring security of supply in defence at the EU level.
ARES Group, May 2025
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Hanging Together or Hanging Separately? Europe and the Indo-Pacific in United States-China Rivalry
The United States appears to be consistent on the idea that “great power” or “strategic” competition and, more specifically, “competition with China” stands out as its overriding national security priority. Insofar as Trump administration’s strategic approach towards Ukraine and Europe appears to be significantly informed by China and Indo Pacific-related considerations, the US is operating under the assumption that there is a high-degree of interdependence between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific strategic dynamics. This CSDS In-Depth Paper tries to make sense of how strategic dynamics in Europe and the Indo-Pacific intersect with each other, what that means for US strategy and the implications for US allies in both regions. The paper offers key US allies such as European states and Australia a pathfinder into how dynamics within and between strategic theatres may play out, and, more importantly, what are the repercussions of these dynamics for key Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific actors such as Australia, Europe, Japan, South Korea and others.
CSDS In-Depth Paper with Luis Simón, Daniel Fiott, Octavian Manea, Zack Cooper and Toshi Yoshihara
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Europe’s Dual Challenge in the Trump Era
In the absence of the US security guarantee, Europe will have to rearm while also remaining united. The good news is that the Europeans are capable of achieving both—as long as they truly want to. When faced with the second Trump presidency, Europe may be experiencing all five stages of grief at the same time: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. Where Europe’s defense and deterrence are concerned, the stakes of coming to terms with the new US administration could not be higher. Europe faces war in Ukraine and the Russian threat will not simply go away, even with a temporary “peace.” Europe’s whole security architecture has been founded on cardinal, sacred truths for many decades: The United States provides Europe’s nuclear and conventional defense and in exchange Europe keeps its markets open to America, buys US military equipment, and joins the US on expeditionary operations.
Internationale Politik Quarterly
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Primed for Deterrence? NATO and the Indo-Pacific in the Age of Great Power Competition
As the United States prioritises deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific, the question of how Europeans can take primary responsibility for conventional defence in Europe will take centre stage at NATO’s upcoming 76th Summit in The Hague. Against this backdrop, the future of the Alliance’s own Indo-Pacific agenda hinges on the ability to reconcile two seemingly contradictory pressures. On the one hand, NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners must think about how their cooperation can add value in the context of strategic competition with China. On the other hand, however, they must ensure that their cooperation does not detract from what must be their overriding priority: shoring up deterrence in their respective regions. This In-Depth Paper outlines a way to square that seemingly impossible circle. Ultimately, NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners face a strikingly similar conceptual and operational problem: how to implement deterrence by denial in their home regions. This underscores the potential for synergies. We advocate for NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners to strive towards a cross-theatre ecosystem of concepts, doctrines, capabilities, technologies and standards that i) bolsters deterrence by denial; and ii) respects the principle of regional prioritisation. Such cross-theatre deterrence ecosystem, we argue, would simplify standards and reduce the number of systems, platforms and munitions produced by the US and its allies, thus potentially yielding significant gains in terms of efficiency, scale and speed of delivery.
CSDS In-Depth Paper with Luis Simón, Alexander Mattelaer, Masayuki Masuda, Lotje Boswinkel, Alexander Lanoszka and Hugo Meijer.
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Going it Alone, Doing So Divided? The Era of Uncertainties and Europe’s Defence Industrial Politics
Despite the epoch changing nature of Russia’s war and the second Trump presidency, Europeans do not yet appear ready for more European Union (EU) defence integration. The European Commission has designed a credible package of defence industrial initiatives, detailed its White Paper, but some schemes risk reinforcing the very structural risks the Commission seeks to avoid. The forthcoming negotiations for the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) will be a genuine test of whether the Union can craft a well-financed, durable and equitable EDTIB.
CSDS Policy Brief
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Special Delivery? The European Council and the March 2025 Defence Summit
The 6 March 2025 European Council special meeting focused on European defence and support to Ukraine. European leaders have put-off answering fundamental questions related to European security guarantees. The special European Council meeting set the parameters for a substantial increase in European defence spending.
CSDS Policy Brief
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Spending Our Way Out of a Crisis? The Challenges and Benefits of ReArming Europe
The European Commission has announced a €800 billion increase in defence spending, but this figure masks the challenges facing Europe’s defence market. The injection of €150 billion worth of loans for defence raises questions about the real needs of Europe’s defence. The European Commission is set to introduce a raft of new measures to support European defence, but this will be a test of true political solidarity within the European Union (EU).
CSDS Policy Brief
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Daniel Fiott 