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The European Defence Union: An Article-by-Article Commentary
The European Defence Union has been under construction for several years within a worrying security context. It depends fundamentally on EU law: i.e. both the rules laid down by the Member States in the Treaties and those adopted by the European institutions, as the European Union’s approach is no longer limited to the highly intergovernmental Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Instead, it encompasses and goes beyond the CSDP, extending to the so-called ‘Community’ or ‘supranational’ sphere, from which defence was long excluded.
The European Defence Union transcends the distinction between the supranational and intergovernmental spheres, and therefore has to be understood not only from the perspective of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which governs the CSDP, but also from the perspective of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC Treaty, known as the Euratom Treaty). This publication has three parts, each dedicated to one of these Treaties. The analyses focus both on the provisions of these Treaties and the various secondary acts that apply to defence, the most recent being the EU Regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). Taken together, these shape the contours of the European Defence Union.
At a time when security issues are once again a major concern for European citizens and their governments, and when the question of the emergence of genuine common defence – an existential issue for Europe – is being raised, this publication is aimed at practitioners, policy-makers (both national and European), defence experts and academics (students, PhD students, teachers and researchers). They will find here a novel, law-based approach to examining European defence.
Edited by Elsa Bernard : Professor of Public Law; Quentin Loïez : Drafting of the proposed regulation establishing the instrument to strengthen the European defence industry through joint procurement; and Stéphane Rodrigues : Associate Professor of Public Law.
I have contributed two chapters to the book:
“Article 173 TFEU: The European Defence Industry”
“The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument”
Larcier Intersentia
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Between the Berlaymont and the Glass Palace: The Relative Roles of the EU and NATO in European Defence
Europe’s defence landscape is complex, and the relationship between the European Union and NATO is a prime example. Though only five kilometres apart in Brussels, the EU and NATO often appear worlds apart in practice. This new HCSS report by Davis Ellison and Daniel Fiott offers a clear-eyed assessment of this relationship and a roadmap for improvement.
Persistent political tensions, overlapping memberships, and entrenched institutional suspicion have historically constrained cooperation between these core European security actors. The second Trump presidency, Brexit, and ongoing regional disputes – most notably involving Türkiye and Cyprus – have compounded these challenges.
Yet, European states continue to invest heavily in both organisations. Lead author Davis Ellision notes:
“Despite tensions, EU and NATO remain the indispensable frameworks for European security. Cooperation and competition coexist, but neither can be replaced.”
The report identifies key areas for strengthening EU-NATO cooperation:
- Reform of the Berlin Plus Agreement to streamline EU access to NATO assets.
- Closer political coordination in Brussels, particularly between the EU’s Political and Security Committee and NATO’s North Atlantic Council.
- Reconceptualising European defence scenarios to better align strategic planning across institutions.
- Greater alignment of defence planning to reduce duplication and enhance operational readiness.
Crucially, improving institutional cooperation also requires addressing Europe’s dependence on the United States. While some capitals aim to reduce reliance on American forces and defence industry, this will require careful coordination and at least tacit approval from Washington.
The study highlights that European security is inherently regional: both NATO and the EU operate in service of European stability. Germany and France, in particular, play leading roles in navigating the complex web of institutional relationships, with other states such as the Netherlands actively supporting reforms.
Daniel Fiott, co-author, emphasises:
“The moment is ripe for reform. European capitals must seize this opportunity to build a more self-sufficient, resilient, and credible security architecture within and alongside NATO.”
The report provides a provisional menu of reforms for policymakers seeking to strengthen the EU’s role within NATO, improve institutional cooperation, and foster European strategic autonomy without jeopardising the transatlantic bond.
The Hague Centre for Strategies Studies
By Davis Ellison and Daniel Fiott
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What Role for European Economic and Military Enablement in Deterrence?
Dans un environnement marqué par la superposition des crises, l’intensification des interdépendances et le retour assumé du rapport de force, les vulnérabilités des systèmes – énergétiques, informationnels, économiques, climatiques, logistiques – ne sont plus seulement des facteurs de fragilité : elles deviennent tout autant de leviers de conflictualité. Ce dossier propose d’interroger cette « guerre des systèmes » en articulant trois exigences complémentaires : évaluer les risques systémiques, comprendre la manière dont des acteurs peuvent instrumentaliser des systèmes interdépendants, et penser les conditions d’une résilience opératoire, au croisement des sphères civile et militaire. Conçu comme un abécédaire, il offre des entrées thématiques autonomes qui composent, par leur enchaînement, un continuum analytique.
Dans la continuité de réflexions précédentes consacrées aux transformations de la conflictualité et aux vulnérabilités contemporaines (« Géopolitique du basculement », « Armements et arsenalisations »), ce numéro assume une hypothèse directrice : le risque systémique n’est plus un horizon abstrait, mais une grammaire de l’action – et parfois de l’agression. À l’instrumentalisation de la propagation des chocs se conjuguent le brouillage entre l’accidentel et l’intentionnel et l’opacité croissante de l’attribution. C’est précisément cette zone grise que le dossier explore, en réunissant scientifiques des systèmes complexes, spécialistes du risque, chercheuses et chercheurs en sciences sociales et hautes autorités militaires, afin de dépasser les approches sectorisées et de construire une représentation partagée des vulnérabilités et de la résilience, selon les sciences et les armées.
La Revue Internationale et Stratégique
By Maxime Cordet and Daniel Fiott
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Controlled Adaptation and Integration: Defence AI in Belgium
Belgium’s engagement with artificial intelligence (AI) in defence is best understood not as a dramatic technological leap, but as a series of pragmatic, institutionally embedded steps shaped by alliance politics, budgetary realism and an enduring preference for multinational solutions. Rather than positioning itself as an AI front-runner, Belgium has sought to integrate AI-enabled capabilities where they reinforce existing strengths: intelligence analysis, logistics, cyber defence, training and interoperability within NATO and the European Union (EU). This approach reflects a broader Belgian defence culture that favours the centrality of the NATO alliance, EU cooperation in defence and multinational cooperation.
Defense AI Observatory
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Up in the Air: What Could FCAS Mean for Common EU Defence Projects?
The FCAS project appears to be over, at least in its original incarnation, although technological elements of the project may be salvaged, such as the development of a combat cloud. The case of FCAS serves as a cautionary tale for how to develop collaborative defence industrial programmes in Europe, especially when these projects involve large defence firms and member states. The failure of FCAS should not hinder plans for joint EU defence industrial programmes, but lessons from the failure of FCAS must be integrated into project planning sooner rather than later.
CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 6/2026
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Europe’s Rearmament Dilemmas
Europe has entered a profound rearmament cycle driven by Russia’s war on Ukraine, sharpening US strategic conditionality, and intensifying global geopolitical rivalry. After decades of underinvestment, European states are attempting to rebuild depleted stockpiles, scale up industrial production, and reconcile defense investments with fiscal, political, and technological constraints. The European Union has emerged as an important actor, deploying novel financial instruments, regulatory reforms, and strategies to strengthen defense manufacturing and reduce external dependencies. Yet transatlantic frictions, divergent national priorities, and structural reliance on the United States and China complicate Europe’s quest for strategic autonomy. Rearmament now defines Europe’s economic, political, and security future.
Current History, vol. 125 (2026)
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Taking the Pulse: Can European Defense Survive the Death of FCAS?
Europe’s next-generation fighter plane has not even taken off, and it looks as though it will be grounded indefinitely. The drama surrounding FCAS does not bode well for Franco-German defense industrial cooperation.
Germany has long sought to use the FCAS project to develop its own national aeronautics industry and skills base, which is why Dassault—among other reasons—has been reluctant to share technology so freely with partners.
The FCAS project reflects deep-seated divergent defense industrial interests, which are not easy to overcome. Could this cautionary case stand in the way of European joint capability projects? Perhaps. Yet, the key is to get the partner coalitions right and to iron out political expectations from the start.
Joint projects will likely go ahead at the EU level, but they may not always be centered on Franco-German cooperation. There is a need to study the FCAS project and to better understand why it has fallen apart, to ensure that mistakes are not repeated. If the failure of FCAS leads to greater dependencies on non-European weapons systems in the future, then this hardly bodes well for more European sovereignty in defense.
Image: Getty.
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European Defence Projects of Common Interest: From Concept to Practice
The development of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs) represents a decisive step towards strengthening the EU’s crisis response, economic competitiveness and strategic autonomy. EDPCIs aim to overcome fragmented national defence efforts by promoting joint development, production and procurement of key military capabilities, enhancing the EU’s governance structure for defence investment. While earlier frameworks like the EDF, PESCO and CARD have achieved limited integration, EDPCIs could enable large-scale collaboration by pooling demand, streamlining supply chains and reinforcing the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Proposed flagship projects such as the Drone Initiative, Eastern Flank Watch, Air Shield, and Space Shield address urgent needs but face challenges of funding, technology gaps and diverging national planning cycles. Other potential EDPCIs, such as a Cyber Defence Shield, a Combat Cloud, Military Mobility Network or EU Command and Control could expand into critical enabler domains but also depend on balancing EU-level regulation and intergovernmental ownership and ensuring sustained financial and political backing. This study recommends a coherent governance framework, harmonised standards and inclusive industrial participation to sustain innovation. Ultimately, success will hinge on EDPCIs’ capacity to deliver credible capabilities and advance Europe’s goal of a resilient, autonomous and integrated defence posture.
European Parliament
With Steven Blockmans
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Which Type of Armament Cooperation Do We Want/Need? The Case of Spain
This paper is the second of the ARES series titled “Which type of armament cooperation do we want/need?”. The purpose of this series is to explore how EU Member States envision the future of armaments cooperation, taking in account the objective to develop joint procurement as promoted in the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the newly adopted European Defence Industrial Programme as well as in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative. This comment, written by Daniel Fiott and Félix Arteaga from the Real Instituto Elcano, focuses on the Spanish case. A first paper has already been released on Poland’s approach and subsequent papers will examine the approaches of other Member States, including France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Lithuania.
ARES Group
With Félix Arteaga
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Assessing Europe’s Resilience and Preparedness in an Era of Strategic Risks
Europe’s security environment is increasingly shaped by “whole-of-society” shocks in which military threats intersect with climatic, economic and technological disruptions. This new reality demands that preparedness and resilience be treated as mutually reinforcing strategic imperatives for both the EU and NATO. Yet Europe’s baseline levels of resilience remain highly uneven.
This new report, co-authored with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS), evaluates ten EU and NATO member states — Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden — through the seven domains of the EU’s Preparedness Union Strategy. The study finds that resilience is often situational rather than systemic: countries tend to strengthen domains recently stress-tested while leaving others exposed. The absence of minimum foresight and anticipation requirements leads to widely varying national approaches and persistent structural gaps.
A core finding is that civil–military cooperation is the decisive connector between preparedness ambitions and operational delivery. Where institutionalised, it acts as a force multiplier; where ad hoc, it becomes a bottleneck during crises. These dynamics are illustrated through the report’s focus on military mobility, which depends heavily on the resilience of civilian energy, transport and digital systems.
The report highlights key vulnerabilities — fuel and distribution constraints, transport chokepoints, rail-gauge discontinuities, and exposure in 5G and undersea cable networks. These weaknesses accumulate into collective exposure across the EU and NATO, as the weakest links can impede deterrence, crisis response, and the deployment of forces.
To strengthen Europe’s strategic resilience architecture, the report offers clear policy recommendations in three categories:
EU–NATO-wide:
- Powering the military: Establish an EU–NATO Fuel Assurance Compact, create EU-wide fuel storage redundancy, and develop joint supply-chain due diligence for energy systems.
- Transporting the military: Greatly expand EU funding for dual-use infrastructure, coordinate rail-gauge transitions, and integrate lessons learned from Finland and Spain.
- Digitisation: Form an undersea cable intelligence task force and unify EU–NATO due diligence for 5G and other dual-use technologies.
Netherlands-specific:
- Powering: Position the Netherlands as a leader in green-defence resilience.
- Transporting: Build redundancy around the Port of Rotterdam, expand alternatives, secure civilian carrier partnerships, and institutionalise joint civil-military exercises.
- Digitisation: Expand Dutch critical-infrastructure protection programmes to include EU and NATO partners.
Ultimately, the report concludes that resilience is not a secondary concern but a core strategic capability fundamental to deterrence, crisis response and democratic stability.
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and CSDS
By Hans Horan, Pieter-Jan Vandoren, Daniel Fiott and Jan Feldhusen with contributions by Davis Ellison and Frank Bekkers
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Daniel Fiott 