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Defence Matters: Ten Years of European Defence and What Has Really Been Achieved?
Ten years ago to the day, Heads of State and Government met at a specially designated session of the European Council: the focus, European defence. As the meeting conclusions make clear, the leaders saw defence as a critical area of EU policy and they proclaimed their readiness to increase defence budgets, de-fragment European defence markets, develop military capabilities and enhance the visibility and impact of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). While the 2013 meeting took place in a context of budgetary austerity and the fall-out from the “Arab Spring”, today Europe is faced with far more serious crises; not least due to Russia’s war on Ukraine and profound shifts in the transatlantic relationship. The hard reality is that the past ten years have not been used optimally to help Europe fend for its own defence. To be sure, the Union has probably done more for its own defence in its response to the war on Ukraine, but the next ten years will call for an unprecedented effort by Europeans.
CSDS Policy Brief, No. 32/2023
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Europe’s Geopolitical Coming of Age Requires Greater Defense Efforts
Having already experienced what life is like under a Donald Trump US presidency, the Europeans presently seem rather blasé about what a potential second Trump administration could entail for the European Union and NATO. For all his (very real) sins, Trump gave voice to the long-standing tensions at the heart of the transatlantic relationship. Will Europe spend more on its defense? Are Europeans willing to do more to defend themselves? Are Europeans ready to embrace Sino-American rivalry as the ordering principle of international politics? Europeans have only partially responded to some of these questions: The hard truth is that the hard truths hurt.
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Deterrence and Economic Security: A Dialogue in Japan
I spent the best part of a week in Japan as part of a NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) project we are running on future trends in the Indo-Pacific. It was an intensive week of events and meetings and I was privileged to exchange views with government(al) representatives from Japan, Spain, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). It was also great to meet with Japanese academic friends. As always, the elegance and ceremony of Japan is inspirational: a great country.
A few writings will emerge on the back of my trip, not least as part of the NATO SPS project. Before they are published, however, let me sketch out below in a telegraphic manner the main themes discussed: security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and economic security.
We covered a lot of ground on the security front, especially with ideas on how Japan, the EU and NATO can enhance practical cooperation (in the backs of most peoples’ minds in this regard was the forthcoming US presidential election). The usual avenues, such as maritime security, were underlined but it was clear that more is needed: space was frequently mentioned as an area ripe for deeper cooperation. There was a perception too that the EU and Japan had barely scratched the surface on cooperation to counter foreign information manipulation and interference. And yes, there was interest in how Japan could potentially plug-in to DIANA, the NATO Innovation Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund. Japan is keeping a close eye on how deterrence functions in Europe vis-a-vis Russia, but there is a sense in which Europeans do not fully appreciate similar dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. We kept coming back to deterrence from an inter-theatre perspective during our discussions.
In practical terms, an emphasis was placed here on Europe’s potential role in producing ammunition and investing in logistics as part of any military contingency in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, such steps need to be undergirded by a deeper exchange of information between Japan and Europe. Inevitably, many of the panel discussions that I attended pointed to the furore behind the idea for a NATO liaison office in Tokyo. Many in Japan (and beyond) were frustrated by how the French President handled the affair, but ultimately the lack of an office will not stop the unprecedented level of dialogue and exchange that exists between NATO and Japan today.
Economic security is probably the area with the most potential as far as EU-Japan relations is concerned. In Tokyo, experts are watching what direction economic security takes in the Union, especially after the European elections and with the new European Commission. Japan does not appear to be experiencing some of Europe’s “hang ups” about industrial policy: in Japan, economic security is framed as boosting competitiveness in a safe manner rather than “protectionism”. In this sense, the conversation focused on de-risking and partnerships. Even though the EU and Japan have an Economic Partnership Agreement in place, it was felt that greater cooperation in technology sharing could take the relationship to a new level. Both Japan and Europe should also not forget that businesses need to be part of economic security strategies. The core challenge, however, was identified as the need for close partners (US, EU, Japan) to avoid any dramatic turns in economic and industrial policy. The balance needed in maintaining national security and economic competitiveness across the US-led alliances was not an easy one: unilateralism can set back the cause of economic resilience.
So, much more reflection and dialogue is required on the topics of inter-theatre deterrence and economic security. While at Keio University’s museum, there was a placard with quotes from notable Japanese academic texts. One, from Keio’s founder Yukichi Fukuzawa, reads: “learning is completely useless if it does not involve the understanding of the bonds between things”. Fukuzawa, having travelled to Europe and America on multiple occasions during the 19th century, was all too aware of the importance of forming lasting bonds during tumultuous periods. In this respect, Japan, Europe and the United States have no choice but to strengthen their bonds, come what may.
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Grand Designs: The EU’s Future Political Structures in Times of Crisis and Geopolitical Transition
The advent of institutional change in the European Union will inevitably give rise to new and old ideas about bureaucratic design. As the clock runs down on the present legislature and European Commission, expect calls for new bodies and the reshuffling of existing structures. Before this author reflects on some of the possible ideas and potential changes, we should acknowledge from the start that not all bureaucratic changes result in more effective policy. The risk is that focusing on organigrams, while the stuff of intrigue in Brussels circles, leads to introspection. Focusing on institutional design alone can all too easily become a facade to avoid the deeper reforms the EU requires. In the absence of treaty change, and a shift in the nature of intergovernmental – supranational politics, little meaningful reform can ultimately be made.
Still, the recent call to create the post of an EU Commissioner for Defence is evidence of a yearning for some degree of change. In fact, the idea of a Defence Commissioner is not new and neither are calls for a fully-fledged Defence Council or Committee (dropping the “sub”) for Security and Defence in the European Parliament. Calls for such posts come from a good place. For too long, defence has lived in the shadows of foreign affairs, which is increasingly absurd in an EU context when one considers the importance of defence today. Indeed, there have arguably been bigger political steps in CSDP than CFSP over the past years, so why not reflect this in the institutional set up. One of the chief benefits of upgrading all of these informal or dependent bodies is to raise defence matters to a higher political level. This will not necessarily lead to more effective defence policy, but it is a start in becoming more serious about defence. For example, creating a Defence Council may afford the time and political space to enforce a consistent and serious approach to matters related to capabilities, operations and industry.
The creation of DG DEFIS a few years ago provides evidence of how a new bureaucratic structure can enhance EU defence. True, it was created to provide a centralised location for the management of the European Defence Fund, but DG DEFIS is more than just a fund management agency. In the hands of an ambitious and skilled Commissioner, DG DEFIS has become a key institutional location for all things defence-related. In fact, such is its success that the future could see – depending on the politics that feed into the new Commission – further reform: the creation of a “DG for Security and Defence”. This could build on defence and space to also include the Commission’s work on cyberdefence, hybrid threats and more.
Yet, we should be realistic. “What the right hand giveth, the left hand taketh away”. A more powerful Commission in the area of security and defence immediately raises sensitive questions about the roles of the External Action Service and European Defence Agency. Not a new problem, to be sure, but these bodies have traditionally been used to underline national control over security and defence policy and to safeguard against a more ambitious role for the Commission. The idea of an EU Defence Commissioner also raises obvious questions about the High Representative / Vice-President. The HR/VP, as its own political organism, currently embodies both supranational and intergovernmental approaches to security and defence. It is often said that the HR/VP post is already overburdened with too many responsibilities.
Yet, if the HR/VP post is “stripped” of defence, what will that do for bureaucratic politics? An HR/VP for just CFSP and an EU Defence Commissioner may work well together when personalities align (e.g. the Borrell-Breton tandem has worked well), but when they don’t what happens? More questions present themselves: for example, would the Defence Commissioner chair any potential Defence Council and what powers would they have over the operational dimensions of CSDP? Surely, the title of Defence Commissioner is only really valid if it brings under one roof matters pertaining to operations, capabilities and industry? In any case, it would be some spectacle to see political parties and governments vie for the post of Defence Commissioner.
So, the idea to create a Defence Council, Security and Defence Committee and Defence Commissioner are back in the spotlight. We should think about them in a serious and open-minded manner. Yet what about the other ways in which the Union could enhance its security and defence structures? For example, since the Strategic Compass the EU has rightfully invested time and energy into securing the strategic domains (air, maritime, cyber and space). As the years go by, and the Union develops its surveillance capacities in these domains, why should it not consider the creation of unified Command and Control structures in these areas? Putting aside whether they would fall under the Commission or Council for one moment, what is stopping the EU from unifying its disparate surveillance, tracking and monitoring capacities? Why not have an “EU Maritime Command”, “EU Cyber Command” or “EU Space Command”?
Think too at how important the issue of economic security has become for the EU in recent years. Traditionally, the EU has been constructed as an economic actor and now it runs into the security dimensions of the economy, not least because of China. The logic of liberalism/competition – still very much alive in the Commission – has led to some contestable decisions (think of the CAI or the “FSM affair”). This raises the question of whether the Commission can effectively manage the balance between security and economic matters: to put it another way, what processes could ensure that seemingly “harmless” economic decisions are vetted from a security perspective? Some will say the College of Commissioners suffices to maintain the essential security interests of the EU: are we so sure? And what happens if the Council or Parliament fundamentally disagree with the Commission’s approach? What then beyond public spats?
US-China rivalry will continue to help the EU breakdown the psychological and treaty-based (as well as politically artificial) barriers between security and economic policy. It would not surprise this author, therefore, if at some point calls for a “European Security Advisor” do not emerge. Just like the US National Security Advisor, the post holder could make their opinions heard on all economic policy, especially if there are concerns that such policy may be a security risk. Again, we would immediately be faced with a dilemma: how would the European Security Advisor relate to the HR/VP (indeed, not every US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State have gotten along so well). Perhaps, in this regard, it would be advisable to select a European Security Advisor by consensus between the Council, Commission and Parliament. Yet, even here, questions about whether such a personality could override the President of the Commission would not take long to surface.
Finally, I wonder whether we can completely disregard some “big picture” changes in the coming months. Before the last Commission took office, there were whispers in Brussels that the EU could select an individual to simultaneously hold the posts of European Council President and European Commission President. This idea has the elegance of overcoming the now obvious vanity competition between the posts. It could also lead to much more coherent political leadership in times of crisis (the norm for Europe today), and ensure that the Commission is not tempted to act too independently of the European Council. Yet, even here, no unified single President would overcome the cacophony of various national interests in the Council.
Let’s see what the next few months bring: both in terms of grand designs and crises.
By Daniel Fiott
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The EU Defence Industrial Strategy: Some Preliminary Reflections
Daniel Fiott
In advance of the 2024 EU Defence Industrial Strategy, and before I write a more focused and substantial piece of analysis, I wanted to lay out some key themes and issues that will confront the drafters of the new Strategy.
First, let me say that the Strategy itself should be placed in its proper political context. It is, of course, questionable whether such a strategy should be released just before the EU heads towards parliamentary elections and a new Commission. The downsides of releasing the Strategy in advance of this transition is that it could get lost in the fog that will surround the new Commission: a fog of new initiatives and, perhaps, a different political direction. The upsides are clear too, though. For example, we simply do not know who will end up in charge of DG DEFIS in the new Commission – the DG could be subsumed into another broader security and defence DG that puts into the shadows the industrial dimension or a less ambitious Commissioner could take the portfolio, leading to inertia. A Strategy agreed now in a sense could “bind the hands” of the forthcoming Commission by outlining a coherent level of ambition. Let us be clear, defence is so intrinsic to EU integration now that the Union cannot afford to be lax in the defence-industrial dimension. In any case, a majority of Member States want a clearer direction for EU defence-industrial policy, and so does industry too.
Second, any EU Defence Industrial Strategy will require reflection on the purpose of the text. Yes, it will probably be released at around the two year anniversary of the Versailles Summit and publication of the Strategic Compass. This is a symbolic objective to keep up political messaging on EU defence industrial policy. It is also a way for the Commission to assert its continued and undisputed relevance in the field of defence, especially as the Strategic Compass – as a process of deliverables – suffers from a degree of fatigue. Beyond the fineries of symbolic politics, however, any serious Strategy will have to grapple with some basic but difficult questions: what is the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)? What should the EDTIB become and how? In 5-10 years, how should we shape the EDTIB? What role will regulation, financial incentives and major strategic defence products play in this process? How can Europe successfully marry demand and supply in the coming years? What can we produce in the EU today and what else should we be able to develop in the future? What skills, investments, regulations and manufacturing capacities will be required to meet these goals?
Third, in answering these questions any EU Defence Industrial Strategy should move beyond the existing content of the Strategic Compass (see the “Invest” chapter). Even though the EU Defence Industrial Strategy will likely echo the Compass’ language on capabilities, the Strategy must set out a coherent set of objectives. At its most basic level, the EU Defence Industrial Strategy will likely recap and regroup the major initiatives outlined by the Commission over the past few years, including:
- European Defence Fund (EDF) – to continue the early successes of the Fund over the coming years and to work for a financial increase of the fund during the mid-term review of the Multi-annual Financial Framework. This may also be an opportunity to call for more direction on the types of defence capabilities the EU finances, which could also influence wider debates about EU capability prioritisation under Permanent Structured Cooperation, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the Capability Development Plan.
- European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) – to use both the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) as preparatory initiatives to pave the way for joint defence procurement. Here, the Commission will likely plea for a substantial amount of investment for joint defence projects. The Member States, who are also negotiating the future financial size of the European Peace Facility, will be key to the success of the EDIP.
- Technologies – the EU Defence Industrial Strategy will also likely devote attention to the Commission’s work on dual-use technologies, the Observatory on Critical Technologies and the linkages between existing EU investments in civil, space and defence sectors. Here, the Commission may be tempted to flesh out some of the industrial implications of the recent EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence.
- Investments – here, the Commission will likely recall its commitment to supporting SMEs and the need to unlock investment for these firms. This could be an opportunity to outline the political steps needed to unlock capital from the European Investment Bank and venture capital funds. This may lead to a clarification of the Commission’s vision regarding defence and sustainability, which has caused some concern and questions in the past. Furthermore, the Commission will have to stress the continued importance of defence investment, but it will also need to make a case for more collaborative investments on the part of EU Member States.
- Regulation – the Commission is likely to stress the importance of the defence sector as part of the Single Market. It may again underline the importance of the two directives on transfers and defence procurement, but a less celebratory tone will likely be taken. Instead, both of these legislative tools will be highlighted as accompanying tools to broader Commission initiatives on joint defence procurement and security of supply.
- Skills – a major industrial objective in the current period is the need for skilled labour. Many current and future defence programmes will require the right people and management processes, yet it is still a challenge to recruit individuals with the right skill sets. This is, of course, ultimately a question about the direction and priorities of the education sector in Europe, but any ambitious EDTIB will require a human capital base.
- Greening – as part of the discussion on sustainability and defence, the Commission is likely to devote some of the EU Defence Industrial Strategy to “green defence” capabilities and initiatives. This may be a hard element to sell in the Strategy, as the war in Ukraine has placed the focused on short-term (and fossil fuel powered) weapons systems. In this regard, any language on “green defence” is likely to be bound up in the language on innovation and future technologies.
These are just some of the issues the EU Defence Industrial Strategy is likely to tackle. I will update the list as I get closer to publishing the final version of this reflection. Whether the content of the EU Defence Industrial Strategy will be the quantum leap the EDTIB needs remains to be seen. One document alone will not do the job. Instead, Europe needs ambitious investments for joint defence programmes. Let’s see if the horses (Member States) can be drawn to the water.
Finally, we have to understand that any EU Defence Industrial Strategy will be a Commission document. Of course, the European Council could use their Spring 2024 meeting to endorse the Strategy. Yet, more than an endorsement is needed. If the Strategy is to be brought forward into the next Commission the European Council should set down a political programme with objectives for the next Commission to pursue. Here, we should recall that the European Council’s own political agenda will end in 2024 and there will be a need for a new five-year agenda. In this new agenda, the European Council has a golden opportunity to set the direction for the European defence industry.
Such a strategic message needs to establish the defence industry as an integral part of defence and society as a whole. Since 2016, the EU has taken huge steps forward in the defence-industrial domain and the public has been exposed to the importance of defence manufacturing due to the Ukraine war. Yet, the images of ammunition tells only a partial story of Europe’s defence industry. It is a high-tech industry that is the basis for Europe’s security and economic agility. Years of neglect has dented one of Europe’s industrial jewels. The European Council should use the forthcoming EU Defence Industrial Strategy as a chance to demonstrate to the public, ministries and investors that the EDTIB is the foundation for any credible defence.
More on this topic soon…
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The EU and the Military Dimensions of Ukraine’s Recovery
When accepting the Charlemagne Prize of Aachen on behalf of the Ukrainian people in May 2023, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy boldly proclaimed that ‘Ukraini- ans will always make Europe stronger’. He also cautiously warned that while history is built on victories, it also remembers defeats. It is clear that European leaders do not want to leave Ukraine prey to any negative fate of history. The shock of a return to war in Europe has certainly galvanised leaders and forced them to act in ways unthinkable before the war. Rus- sia’s war on Ukraine has also done more for any notion of strategic responsibility or autonomy than any single speech by European leaders. Out of the destruction in Ukraine comes a sense, however faint, of a strategic culture in Europe built on action and initiatives.
EU Military Forum, No. 3/2023
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EU Defence after Versailles: An Agenda for the Future
This analysis focuses on developments in European Union (EU) security and defence since the Versailles Summit, held on 10–11 March 2022. It shows how the Union’s response to Russia’s war on Ukraine has unleashed and spurred on a range of operational, industrial and political initiatives that will influence security and defence policy for the years to come. The EU is presently trying to grapple with the growing relevance of deterrence and defence while affirming the importance of projecting stability beyond Europe’s borders. In this study, we argue that the next institutional cycle offers an opportunity to balance those priorities. We advance two sets of recommendations: a) the need to rebalance the focus of EU defence policy instruments such as EDF, PESCO or EPF towards generating the skillsets, technologies and capabilities required for deterrence, and strengthen EU-NATO relations; and b) the need to rethink the EU’s approach to external crisis management and adapt to the requirements of non-permissive political and operational environments.
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Purchasing Power: Towards Joint Procurement and Planning in European Defence?
Since 2016, the European Union has financially supported the joint development of defence innovation and capabilities. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, the Union sought to develop its defence industrial base for the production ammunition and equipment. This step comes with an emphasis on “joint-ness”: the idea that Europeans need to invest more in joint defence procurement and planning to overcome unnecessary costs and produce capabilities at scale. Such a step raises serious questions about national defence priorities and processes, but there is also a need to consider how joint defence procurement and planning in the EU could be developed. This Policy Brief assesses these ideas by analysing the link between funding and politics, as well as showing how any joint defence planning process in the Union may emerge organically. Despite the impetus provided by the war, member states in the European Union still hold to largely national approaches to defence industrial cooperation.
CSDS Policy Brief, No. 24, September 2023
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Qualified Majority Voting in EU Foreign Policy: A Cost of Non-Europe Report
The following study deals with qualified majority voting (QMV) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU). As the EU develops into a geopolitical actor, it is necessary to analyse its existing and future foreign policy decision-making procedures. However, a series of high-profile instances have called into question the EU’s ability to act in a rapid and effective manner, especially as the need for unanimity has in practice obstructed EU action on human rights, restrictive measures and common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations. This study shows how unanimity affects the operation of CFSP and how divergences among EU Member States can be managed, before considering what costs and benefits could result from applying QMV in the areas of human rights, restrictive measures and civilian missions under the CSDP. To this end, it employs four case studies focusing on human rights in Hong Kong, restrictive measures on Belarus, the EULEX Mission in Kosovo* and restrictive measures on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.
European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023 (written with Giulia Tercovich).
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Two Fronts, One Goal: Euro-Atlantic Security in the Indo-Pacific Age
This paper outlines how Europe can contribute to alleviating the “two-front” predicament in U .S. global strategy . It shows how Europeans can help free up the United States’ strategic bandwidth in Europe so as to enable a proper U .S. prioritization of China without weakening Europe’s deterrence architecture. The paper also shows how Europeans can contribute to U.S.-led efforts to uphold deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
The Marathon Initiative, 2023, co-authored with Luis Simón and Octavian Manea
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Daniel Fiott 