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Uncharted Territory? Towards a Common Threat Analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence
Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2020, No. 16
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The EU and Crisis Management in the age of Technological Disruption
International organisations are playing catch-up to the rapid development of emerging technologies and greater digitalisation, especially as these new systems and processes are being produced at a seemingly breakneck speed by a range of commercial and government actors. As of today, international actors such as the United Nations and the European Union at least agree that artificial intelligence (AI), 5G, Big Data and even quantum computing, are likely to affect every area of life in profound – if uncertain – ways. How these technological developments are likely to affect peacekeeping and crisis management is unclear.
The EU currently deploys 17 missions and operations with around 5,000 personnel in 11 countries. They face many of the same challenges as UN peace operations and, in fact, find themselves in the same operating area as the UN, for instance in Mali, Somalia, Iraq and others. In seeking to unravel and respond to the uncertainties surrounding digital technologies in peace operations that affect both organisations, a look at developments in the EU context can provide useful insights and reveal opportunities for collaboration.
TechPops ZIF Berlin, 2020
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Financing Rhetoric? The European Defence Fund and Dual-use Technologies
The European Defence Fund reveals an intriguing aspect of dual-use theory and practice, namely, that the European Commission has committed to maintaining a specific ‘defence’ focus for the Fund in a sector that is increasingly marked by dual-use technologies and systems. This chapter analyses how the European Commission defines ‘defence’ in the context of globalised technology markets before then showing how the Commission intends to balance civil, security and defence research when the EU is funding defence research projects. Drawing on technology domains such as cyber and Artificial Intelligence, the chapter sheds light on how the newly found desire to fund defence research and capability projects at the EU level works in practice.
In, Emerging Security Technologies and EU Governance, 2020
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EU-Japan Cooperation on Defence Capabilities: Possibilities?
European countries and Japan both possess advanced defence technologies and they can bring to bear a range of civilian or dual-use technologies for defence procurement and defence research. At the same time, both players recognise that it is increasingly difficult for individual countries to manage defence equipment projects without cooperation. Therefore, it is clear that both Japan and Europe have a vested interest in cooperating with each other on capabilities and industrial defence issues.
Within this context, there is scope to assess the current level of cooperation between Europe and Japan on defence capability development and equipment procurement. In the particular context of the EU-Japanese economic (EPA) and strategic (SPA) partnerships , this paper asks what the current scope is for closer cooperation between the two partners and whether there are any avenues that could be explored to improve cooperation. It first looks at the strategic rationale for closer European-Japanese cooperation on defence capabilities, and later analyses the hurdles to improving and promoting a higher level of cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels.
Real Elcano Analysis, 2020, No. 76 (written with Michito Tsuruoka)
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Europas Verteidigung sollte nicht Opfer des Lockdowns sein
Covid-19 wird die Welt nicht sicherer machen, im Gegenteil. Die EU sollte den Verteidigungssektor bei ihren finanziellen Planungen deshalb besonders berücksichtigen. Ein Gastbeitrag.
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2020
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The EU must not let the four horsemen of the Apocalypse weaken Europe’s security
The looming economic recovery may take its toll on Europe’s armed forces and civilian experts – they will be expected to do more with less money. This has to be avoided at all costs.
Were there not four horsemen of the Apocalypse? Just as the virus was spreading in China, Europe was having to deal with the border crisis with Turkey, a humanitarian crisis in Syria, a civil war in Libya, keeping Russia at bay and responding to instability and terrorism in the Sahel. At the same time, Europeans were scratching their heads about how to deal with President Trump’s “America First” strategy. There was a little thing called Brexit, too. Of course, none of these problems have gone away and they will remain regardless of how many future waves of COVID-19 appear.
Several commentators believe that these issues are nothing in comparison to the epochal changes we are about to face because of the pandemic. Many are already talking about the end of or, at the very least, a reconfiguration of globalisation. Linked to this assumption is the idea that strategic competition between the US and China will likely intensify as both states try to readjust their economies, while exercising a form of “social distancing” in strategic terms. With this reading, it is as if the horses of plague and conquest are already upon us.
Yet, Newton’s laws of motion may help us to at least frame what might be around the corner. On the one hand, there are centripetal trends that might be aggravated and give rise to security concerns a lot sooner than they might otherwise have been expected. On the other, centrifugal forces may result in unexpected problems, such as the collapse of regimes and governments, civil unrest and even war. Europe needs to be prepared for all of these events; COVID-19 shows that we no longer have the luxury of saying “big events” may never happen.
There may be some comfort in knowing that even before the pandemic, the European Union was already beginning to take its strategic autonomy more seriously in areas like defence, currency and technology. However, COVID-19 emphasises the necessity of European solutions to cross-border crises. This crisis may call for a bold step forward in EU integration underpinned by treaty change, but it may equally result in governments seeking solace in the seemingly comfortable, albeit insufficient, bosom of national sovereignty.
This crisis may call for a bold step forward in EU integration underpinned by treaty change, but it may equally result in governments seeking solace in the seemingly comfortable, albeit insufficient, bosom of national sovereignty.
What about the other two horsemen: war and famine? As of today, it seems likely that the EU will emerge from the pandemic before Africa and the Middle East. As Europe implements its economic stimulus package, there will be neighbouring countries that simply lack the medical and sanitation infrastructure to “flatten the curve.” They will lack the financial resources to kick start their economies too. Many in the EU’s wider neighbourhood are already stricken by war, conflict and the aggravating effects of climate change. The crisis could lead to greater poverty and exploitation.
The migration crisis could be exacerbated too, and put additional strain on Europe’s southern states. The perfect storm of the pandemic, war and human trafficking is already upon us in Libya. Populists inside and outside of the EU may well seize on this issue, too. Furthermore, despite historically low oil prices, the virus could nonetheless significantly damage global food supply chains and undermine much-needed state-backed food subsidies in the poorest countries.
Any fresh or aggravated instability in Europe’s near and wider neighbours obviously needs to be avoided. This is why in April, a package of €20 billion was put together to support the EU’s most vulnerable neighbours. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, has also spoken about debt relief for Africa.
European assistance to Africa will be deployed alongside China, who have the resources and a desire to make amends for being the country where the outbreak began. This will not make aid coordination on the ground any easier.
Beyond money, however, we should expect calls for greater EU support, with police and military advice and logistical medical support to intensify. The EU is already on the ground in places such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. EU personnel in Mali have even contracted the virus. Yet, COVID-19 could require the mobilisation of different capacities, such as the airlifting of medical equipment to vulnerable countries, the setting up of mobile field hospitals or sharing best practices on how to manage country-wide “lockdowns.” Fortunately, the EU is uniquely well-placed to handle these tasks, given it’s more than 20 years’ worth of the experience in deploying civil, development, humanitarian, diplomatic and military tools in vulnerable countries and regions.
Yet, in dealing with the four horsemen of the Apocalypse, the EU will be up against a number of difficulties. For example, European assistance to Africa will be deployed alongside China, who have the resources and a desire to make amends for being the country where the outbreak began. This will not make aid coordination on the ground any easier, especially as the EU has already warned that medical aid could be instrumentalised for propaganda purposes. Partnerships with NATO, the UN, Japan, South Korea and others will be essential in upholding a genuine multilateral approach to the crisis that beckons in Africa.
Without well-resourced and motivated civil and military actors, the four horsemen of the Apocalypse could trample all over Europe’s security.
However, perhaps the most worrying challenge facing European security right now is rooted in the continent’s economic recovery. Even though the EU put a number of tools in place in 2016 to enhance security and defence cooperation, years of under-investment in defence capabilities have taken their toll. In this regard, national approaches will not help Europe, and with Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Governments just need to invest in European cooperation – it’s that simple.
Europe’s armed forces are playing a heroic role at home, and the way they have repatriated citizens and delivered medical equipment has been truly extraordinary. Yet, the looming economic recovery may take its toll on Europe’s armed forces and civilian experts – they will be expected to do more with less money. This has to be avoided at all costs. Without well-resourced and motivated civil and military actors, the four horsemen of the Apocalypse could trample all over Europe’s security.
Euronews, 2020
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CSDP in 2020: The EU’s Legacy and Ambition in Security and Defence
The past 20 years of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have taught us more about the EU as an international actor. While the Union has not entirely lived up to the ambitions set down by European ministers at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EU has developed the ability to deploy civilian and military missions and operations. In more recent years, the EU has advanced cooperation on defence through the EU Global Strategy with a range of new tools.
Looking back over the last 20 years of CSDP, this book provides an analytical overview of the key historical developments and critically appraises the successes and failures charted over two decades. A host of leading think tank analysts and a senior EU official look at issues such as institutional design, operations and missions, capabilities, industry and civilian crisis management.
The book is not just a historical record, however: several chapters look at the geopolitical challenges facing the EU. The contributors look at emerging security challenges, the nature of permissibility, the internal-external security nexus, the defence industry and civilian CSDP. Together, the chapters underline the need for the EU to match its rhetoric on security and defence with capabilities and political ambition.
EUISS Book, 2020
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Will European Defence Survive Coronavirus?
The tragedy that is the Coronavirus has already claimed too many lives, but it has also allowed Europe’s public services to shine. Citizens across Europe are rightly applauding the tireless work of medical professionals, police and transport workers. Europe’s armed forces have also been called on to roll back the virus. Whether this should be likened to a ‘war’ is open for debate, but Europe’s militaries have mobilised to supply extra hospital space and to support the public through emergency quarantine and hospital capacities and the airlifting of medical equipment. Europe’s air forces can also assist with the repatriation of thousands of European nationals that are still stuck in foreign lands.
Real Elcano Commentary, 2020
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Small can be beautiful… in defence
How are small states supposed to make sense of all the changes that have taken place in EU security and defence since 2016? It can often feel like EU defence is a subject reserved for the ‘big fish’ like France and Germany, but EU initiatives like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund were designed as inclusive mechanisms to take defence cooperation forward as a union and not simply for cliques of states. Whatever size a state may be, these new defence initiatives presume that success can only be achieved if governments pool more of their sovereignty together. Without getting into a debate about what constitutes a ‘small state’, it is difficult for EU states – regardless of size – to reconcile the push for EU defence integration with their own sovereignty.
Countries such as Ireland initially hesitated to join PESCO and some lingering doubts may still exist. My own country, Malta, has stayed away from the idea of deeper EU defence cooperation on the basis that it may affect the island’s neutrality (mind you, this neutrality has not stopped Malta from participating in Common Security and Defence Policy – (CSDP missions and operations in the past). Denmark, by dint of its CSDP opt out, cannot be part of PESCO. Even so, Copenhagen, Dublin and Valletta can all benefit from the new European Defence Fund through the financing of defence research and capability projects. In this regard, while the vision in EU defence may be the preserve of leaders like President Emmanuel Macron or HR/VP Josep Borrell, it is up to the EU’s legion of small and medium-sized states to ensure that EU defence is European by motive, design and construction.
It is a crucial time for the EU’s smaller states and how they collectively manage and articulate their interests in defence will affect the nature of the EU as an international actor. This means that in order to be seen as credible partners in defence, they need to live up to their commitments under PESCO and enthusiastically develop PESCO projects too. PESCO’s collective commitments do not single out the behaviour of any one state, so it is easy for smaller Member States to simply piggyback on the efforts of those with more resources and political will. This is why demonstrating tangible outcomes through the PESCO projects are vital. Yet even here genuine commitment is required: presumably no small EU state wants to be part of a PESCO project that is eventually abandoned or discontinued.
Interestingly enough, a logic has emerged through the PESCO projects whereby governments look around the EU for project partners. This same philosophy should be pursued by states under the European Defence Fund too. It is simply short-sighted to believe that a hastily cobbled together group of governments or industrial and research actors from across the Union will win a bid under the Fund. True, cross border cooperation is a precondition for financial support under the Fund but how should governments decide on the partners to choose? In some cases, it may be necessary to build on existing cooperation that benefits from a common language and strategic vision (see how Benelux cooperation functions, for example).
Bids under the European Defence Fund that are put together with only an economic imperative mind may still be successful, of course, but this is no alternative for a sound strategic partnership to anchor defence research and capability programmes. ‘Knowing thy partner’ is key here. Small states need to build up their strategic partnerships in the European Defence Fund and PESCO, as this will help rationalise their capability development and spending plans. This could help smaller states develop and access capabilities they are unable to accrue nationally. What is more, coherent defence partnerships can help create a political critical mass that may be useful when negotiating the nature of EU defence integration.
Political capital that is built on the back of partnerships in defence will be a much-needed commodity in the years ahead, especially if the voices of smaller states are to be heard at all. Currently, there is a debate about how to evolve decision-making in EU external action and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is being held aloft as an answer to the EU’s lack of consistency and coherence in foreign policy. To date, all decisions on external action have been taken by unanimity meaning that a single Member State (regardless of their size) can veto an EU decision. This means that if Malta hypothetically vetoes a decision, then the supposed interests of less than 500,000 people will decide the security of millions of other European citizens. It is not too hard to see why unanimity can stifle EU action.
Whatever the likeliness of the introduction of QMV for external action, there is perhaps some comfort for governments that such a form of voting would never be extended to security and defence and fundamental questions such as the use of force. This comfort may persist for a while longer, although QMV will be used by the Commission to agree on the European Defence Fund’s 7-year work programme and it can be used in PESCO for certain decisions. All of this is to say that if smaller member states frown at the prospect of QMV, they need to come up with their own alternative solutions for improving the coherence of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policies. Not only can the EU ill afford sluggish decision-making capacities as it enters a phase of global geopolitical competition, but a number of smaller Member States may actually be in favour of QMV.
Smaller states need a more coherent strategic vision of their own interests beyond electoral cycles, and they need to work closer together on the security challenges and threats facing the Union. We already know that (in)security is interconnected with states sending troops and civilian experts to Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as farther afield. Yet, there is no common European threat perception or strategic culture. Interestingly, in 2020 there may be an appetite to change this state of affairs by working towards a specific initiative called the ‘strategic compass’. Building on the EU’s current military level of ambition, some difficult questions might be asked during such a process: how can the Union become a more effective defence actor and what will this imply for the EU’s operational footprint, as well as uncovering what type of military actor the Union should ultimately become.
Such an exercise will rely heavily on the input and leadership of Member State governments. This is an opportunity for ministries of foreign affairs, national security and defence to define the contours of the EU’s military objectives together. For the next two years or so, this initiative will be a focus of Brussels-based policymakers and during this time a range of large (Germany and France) and small (Croatia, Portugal, Slovenia) states will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU during this initiative. In addition to the Commission’s work on defence, where it will give greater strategic thought to EU capability development, there is a risk that Member States feel somehow disconnected from EU defence policymaking in Brussels. This is dangerous. To ensure the buy-in and legitimacy given by governments, the EU needs a collective strategic reflection on defence. Yes, Brussels will be involved but any such reflection first needs to begin at home.
Nortia Defence Series, IIEA, March 2020
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Digitalising Defence: Protecting Europe in the Age of Quantum Computing and the Cloud
Abstract
Digital technologies can vastly improve the operational readiness, effectiveness and technological sovereignty of Europe’s armed forces. For defence to benefit from digitalisation, both the greater interoperability of digital technologies and financial investment is required. The Multi-annual Financial Framework is a test for how serious EU member states are about the digital agenda but low national defence R&D investments are also contributing to an erosion of Europe’s digital power.
Europe does not have enough statistical clarity of the digital state of its armed forces today. A number of ‘quick win’ initiatives can be undertaken by the EU in the short term. Without overhauling existing initiatives, member states could record progress on their national defence digitalisation efforts through the reporting mechanisms available under the CARD and PESCO.
Beyond short-term measures, discussions about the digitalisation of defence could be integrated into the forthcoming ‘strategic compass’. The Union needs better foresight capacities to understand the link between digital capability development and digital vulnerabilities and how digitalisation should be included in any future European threat analysis and defence strategy.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2020, No.
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Daniel Fiott 