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Sovereignty over Supply? The EU’s Ability to Manage Critical Dependences while Engaging with the World

Abstract
Fears about the EU’s trade, resource and technology dependences have only grown since the outbreak of the pandemic, even though US-China trade disputes and the rolling out of 5G have played a significant role, too. Some analysts have pointed to the beginning of a ‘decoupling’ of certain supply chains away from China, and, while evidence suggests that some ‘reshoring’ has taken place since at least 2011, there are debates about whether the production of certain technologies should be relocated back to Europe after decades of de-industrialisation. Decoupling and/or reshoring are a reaction to geopolitically risky dependences, with the fear being that certain products, technologies or raw materials will be unavailable during times of crisis or that a reliance on third-party supplies will limit political freedom. In the digital age – where data dominates – there are also concerns that dependences may lead among other things to espionage or a curtailment of personal rights and freedoms. Despite the fact that decoupling is unfeasible, save perhaps for in very specific critical technology domains, the threat perception surrounding critical supplies has given rise to a different vocabulary and EU communiques and strategies are today replete with references to ‘technological sovereignty’, ‘open strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2020, No. 21 (written with Vassilis Theodosopoulos).
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The European Space Sector as an Enabler of EU Strategic Autonomy

Today, the European Union can boast a degree of strategic autonomy in space. Projects such as Galileo have not only enhanced the EU’s economy, but they may confer on the Union the ability to amplify its Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy. While the EU continues to promote the safe, secure and sustainable use of space, it is also true that space is rapidly becoming a political arena that hangs over geopolitical competition on earth. Space is crucial for EU security and defence. Yet the EU is at a cross-roads and it needs to develop ways to ensure that it maintains its strategic autonomy in space. Without strategic autonomy in space, there can be no strategic autonomy on earth. There is a need for the Union to invest in its space presence, push the technological frontier in space, ensure that its ground- and space-based critical infrastructure is protected, ensure that its industrial supply chains are resilient and utilise new initiatives in security and defence to further enhance the EU’s ability to act autonomously.
Study for the European Parliament, 2020
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Yearbook of European Security 2020

Abstract
The 2020 Yearbook of European Security provides an overview of events in 2019 that were significant for European security and it charts major developments in the EU’s external action and security and defence policy. The 2020 Yearbook of European Security contains region- and issue-specific sections, content-centric timelines, key EU document sources, information boxes and an index. In order to enrich the reading experience, this year’s edition of the book also includes references to various EUISS analytical publications that were produced throughout 2019.
The book draws on new data sources too and each of the geographical sections benefit from visuals on crises that affect the EU. Like past editions of the Yearbook, the reader can consult a range of data sources on multilateralism, the EU’s integrated approach and EU security and defence.
EUISS Book, 2020 (Written with Vassilis Theodosopoulos)
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The EU’s Strategic Compass and Its Four Baskets: Capability Development

The Strategic Compass promises to give the EU greater clarity over the strategic direction of CSDP and, potentially, EU security and defense more broadly. Which direction is the EU headed? What do North, South, East, and West mean in the context of CSDP? Who is carrying the Compass, and who is joining the Union on the route? Can EU security and defense ever function as effectively and accu- rately as a compass? These are longstanding questions, of course, but the process the EU is about to embark on also calls for a debate about what the EU will pack in its back-packs (just a pickaxe, or is a proverbial Swiss Army Knife required for the journey?). An uncomfortable truth is that any discussion about capabilities under the Strategic Compass process will have to deal squarely with the unfulfilled promises of the past: that is, the Union’s longstanding inability to fill capability shortfalls. After twenty years of CSDP, the gaps barely merit mentioning, although they serve as a painful reminder of failed commitments. While Europeans are starting to bring online air-to-air refueling and strategic airlift capabilities, the continent is still behind in areas such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and it continues to struggle to generate the force packages required for missions and operations.
The Strategic Compass emerges at an important time for the EU, especially given the geopolitical challenges it currently faces. Yet, there is a risk that if there is insufficient and/or no sustained buy-in from member state governments, the Compass will only raise expectations further without making any real material difference. The Compass’ third basket on capabilities therefore emerges as a crucial pillar of the whole exercise – without capacity, defense is simply built on stilts. Yet, before the EU identifies what ca- pabilities it requires – through the other baskets – it needs to make sense of the geopolitical terrain facing the EU. The truth is that this is not your father’s CSDP anymore, and missions and operations have to keep abreast with technological and strategic/tactical shifts in conflict. The wid- er political context should be kept in mind too. The EU will need to grapple with the uncertain economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Union appears committed to achieving technological sovereignty all while Washington and Beijing battle for global supremacy.
With this context in mind, developing a capabilities bas- ket under the Strategic Compass will require engagement with at least four major questions: 1) Should EU capability development cater only to the needs of CSDP, or is a wider concept of EU security and defense required?; 2) What is the correct balance between filling existing capability shortfalls and investing in future technologies, systems, and platforms?; 3) What capabilities should be prioritized to simultaneously respond to operational needs, industrial objectives, and increased technological sovereignty?; and 4) Is the current EU capability development process still fit for its purpose? Unavoidably, it will also be necessary to reflect on what is meant by “capability” today and what the expression “full spectrum” implies in the context of an increasing- ly contested operational landscape and the so-called digital revolution.
German Council on Foreign Relations, 2020 (edited by Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz)
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Uncharted Territory? Towards a Common Threat Analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence

Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2020, No. 16
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The EU and Crisis Management in the age of Technological Disruption

International organisations are playing catch-up to the rapid development of emerging technologies and greater digitalisation, especially as these new systems and processes are being produced at a seemingly breakneck speed by a range of commercial and government actors. As of today, international actors such as the United Nations and the European Union at least agree that artificial intelligence (AI), 5G, Big Data and even quantum computing, are likely to affect every area of life in profound – if uncertain – ways. How these technological developments are likely to affect peacekeeping and crisis management is unclear.
The EU currently deploys 17 missions and operations with around 5,000 personnel in 11 countries. They face many of the same challenges as UN peace operations and, in fact, find themselves in the same operating area as the UN, for instance in Mali, Somalia, Iraq and others. In seeking to unravel and respond to the uncertainties surrounding digital technologies in peace operations that affect both organisations, a look at developments in the EU context can provide useful insights and reveal opportunities for collaboration.
TechPops ZIF Berlin, 2020
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Financing Rhetoric? The European Defence Fund and Dual-use Technologies

The European Defence Fund reveals an intriguing aspect of dual-use theory and practice, namely, that the European Commission has committed to maintaining a specific ‘defence’ focus for the Fund in a sector that is increasingly marked by dual-use technologies and systems. This chapter analyses how the European Commission defines ‘defence’ in the context of globalised technology markets before then showing how the Commission intends to balance civil, security and defence research when the EU is funding defence research projects. Drawing on technology domains such as cyber and Artificial Intelligence, the chapter sheds light on how the newly found desire to fund defence research and capability projects at the EU level works in practice.
In, Emerging Security Technologies and EU Governance, 2020
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EU-Japan Cooperation on Defence Capabilities: Possibilities?

European countries and Japan both possess advanced defence technologies and they can bring to bear a range of civilian or dual-use technologies for defence procurement and defence research. At the same time, both players recognise that it is increasingly difficult for individual countries to manage defence equipment projects without cooperation. Therefore, it is clear that both Japan and Europe have a vested interest in cooperating with each other on capabilities and industrial defence issues.
Within this context, there is scope to assess the current level of cooperation between Europe and Japan on defence capability development and equipment procurement. In the particular context of the EU-Japanese economic (EPA) and strategic (SPA) partnerships , this paper asks what the current scope is for closer cooperation between the two partners and whether there are any avenues that could be explored to improve cooperation. It first looks at the strategic rationale for closer European-Japanese cooperation on defence capabilities, and later analyses the hurdles to improving and promoting a higher level of cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels.
Real Elcano Analysis, 2020, No. 76 (written with Michito Tsuruoka)
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Europas Verteidigung sollte nicht Opfer des Lockdowns sein

Covid-19 wird die Welt nicht sicherer machen, im Gegenteil. Die EU sollte den Verteidigungssektor bei ihren finanziellen Planungen deshalb besonders berücksichtigen. Ein Gastbeitrag.
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2020
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The EU must not let the four horsemen of the Apocalypse weaken Europe’s security

The looming economic recovery may take its toll on Europe’s armed forces and civilian experts – they will be expected to do more with less money. This has to be avoided at all costs.
Were there not four horsemen of the Apocalypse? Just as the virus was spreading in China, Europe was having to deal with the border crisis with Turkey, a humanitarian crisis in Syria, a civil war in Libya, keeping Russia at bay and responding to instability and terrorism in the Sahel. At the same time, Europeans were scratching their heads about how to deal with President Trump’s “America First” strategy. There was a little thing called Brexit, too. Of course, none of these problems have gone away and they will remain regardless of how many future waves of COVID-19 appear.
Several commentators believe that these issues are nothing in comparison to the epochal changes we are about to face because of the pandemic. Many are already talking about the end of or, at the very least, a reconfiguration of globalisation. Linked to this assumption is the idea that strategic competition between the US and China will likely intensify as both states try to readjust their economies, while exercising a form of “social distancing” in strategic terms. With this reading, it is as if the horses of plague and conquest are already upon us.
Yet, Newton’s laws of motion may help us to at least frame what might be around the corner. On the one hand, there are centripetal trends that might be aggravated and give rise to security concerns a lot sooner than they might otherwise have been expected. On the other, centrifugal forces may result in unexpected problems, such as the collapse of regimes and governments, civil unrest and even war. Europe needs to be prepared for all of these events; COVID-19 shows that we no longer have the luxury of saying “big events” may never happen.
There may be some comfort in knowing that even before the pandemic, the European Union was already beginning to take its strategic autonomy more seriously in areas like defence, currency and technology. However, COVID-19 emphasises the necessity of European solutions to cross-border crises. This crisis may call for a bold step forward in EU integration underpinned by treaty change, but it may equally result in governments seeking solace in the seemingly comfortable, albeit insufficient, bosom of national sovereignty.
This crisis may call for a bold step forward in EU integration underpinned by treaty change, but it may equally result in governments seeking solace in the seemingly comfortable, albeit insufficient, bosom of national sovereignty.
What about the other two horsemen: war and famine? As of today, it seems likely that the EU will emerge from the pandemic before Africa and the Middle East. As Europe implements its economic stimulus package, there will be neighbouring countries that simply lack the medical and sanitation infrastructure to “flatten the curve.” They will lack the financial resources to kick start their economies too. Many in the EU’s wider neighbourhood are already stricken by war, conflict and the aggravating effects of climate change. The crisis could lead to greater poverty and exploitation.
The migration crisis could be exacerbated too, and put additional strain on Europe’s southern states. The perfect storm of the pandemic, war and human trafficking is already upon us in Libya. Populists inside and outside of the EU may well seize on this issue, too. Furthermore, despite historically low oil prices, the virus could nonetheless significantly damage global food supply chains and undermine much-needed state-backed food subsidies in the poorest countries.
Any fresh or aggravated instability in Europe’s near and wider neighbours obviously needs to be avoided. This is why in April, a package of €20 billion was put together to support the EU’s most vulnerable neighbours. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, has also spoken about debt relief for Africa.
European assistance to Africa will be deployed alongside China, who have the resources and a desire to make amends for being the country where the outbreak began. This will not make aid coordination on the ground any easier.
Beyond money, however, we should expect calls for greater EU support, with police and military advice and logistical medical support to intensify. The EU is already on the ground in places such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. EU personnel in Mali have even contracted the virus. Yet, COVID-19 could require the mobilisation of different capacities, such as the airlifting of medical equipment to vulnerable countries, the setting up of mobile field hospitals or sharing best practices on how to manage country-wide “lockdowns.” Fortunately, the EU is uniquely well-placed to handle these tasks, given it’s more than 20 years’ worth of the experience in deploying civil, development, humanitarian, diplomatic and military tools in vulnerable countries and regions.
Yet, in dealing with the four horsemen of the Apocalypse, the EU will be up against a number of difficulties. For example, European assistance to Africa will be deployed alongside China, who have the resources and a desire to make amends for being the country where the outbreak began. This will not make aid coordination on the ground any easier, especially as the EU has already warned that medical aid could be instrumentalised for propaganda purposes. Partnerships with NATO, the UN, Japan, South Korea and others will be essential in upholding a genuine multilateral approach to the crisis that beckons in Africa.
Without well-resourced and motivated civil and military actors, the four horsemen of the Apocalypse could trample all over Europe’s security.
However, perhaps the most worrying challenge facing European security right now is rooted in the continent’s economic recovery. Even though the EU put a number of tools in place in 2016 to enhance security and defence cooperation, years of under-investment in defence capabilities have taken their toll. In this regard, national approaches will not help Europe, and with Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Governments just need to invest in European cooperation – it’s that simple.
Europe’s armed forces are playing a heroic role at home, and the way they have repatriated citizens and delivered medical equipment has been truly extraordinary. Yet, the looming economic recovery may take its toll on Europe’s armed forces and civilian experts – they will be expected to do more with less money. This has to be avoided at all costs. Without well-resourced and motivated civil and military actors, the four horsemen of the Apocalypse could trample all over Europe’s security.
Euronews, 2020