-
A Future Scenario for a More Strategic EU Defence
Abstract
As the journalist from Euronews asked what it was like to be held hostage by jihadists for four months since June 2024, the three student backpackers could not hold back the tears. Europeans Paulus Klimitz and Katriona Wicedz and the American John O’Connor were visibly emotional as the EU Ambassador to Burkina Faso thanked EU forces for rescuing the tourists. Flanked by the Force Commander of the 1,500-strong EUFOR Sahel, the Ambassador told the assembled press that EU special forces had broken into Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) compounds under cover of darkness to free the youngsters. Present in the country since June 2024, EU forces had not only stopped JNIM and AQIM from seizing territory in Burkina Faso’s Banfora, Sindou, Bobo-Dioulasso and Orodara regions, but they had also led to an overall reduction in kidnap- pings and sporadic killings – in May 2024 there were fifteen hostage takings per month and by September only three. Indeed, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the Union’s military presence had contributed to an 80% reduction in hostage takings.
Chaillot Paper, EUISS, 2020, No. 157
-
Strategic Investment: Making Geopolitical Sense of the EU’s Defence-Industrial Policy
Abstract
This Chaillot Paper focuses on new EU initiatives in the defence domain – in particular the creation of the European Defence Fund – and on the Union’s evolving role and engagement in this sector. The paper seeks to address three specific questions: (i) how can economic and political factors be balanced in EU defence industrial policy?; (ii) what strategic considerations are driving forward defence innovation investments at the EU level?; and (iii) how can the Union’s institutions ensure that investments in defence innovation evolve into tangible capabilities for EU defence?
Cautioning against an exclusively economic interpretation of why the EU should invest in the European defence industry, the paper argues that the political dimension of capability development should not be overlooked. It also analyses how the EU’s future defence investments should be seen in light of changes to the global defence market and shifting geopolitical trends.
Chaillot Paper, EU Institute for Security Studies, No. 156
-
Defence Industrial Cooperation in the European Union: The State, the Firm and Europe
This book provides an empirical understanding of how EU-level defence industrial cooperation functions in practice.
Using the Liberal Intergovernmental theoretical model, the book argues that while national economic preferences are an essential factor of government interests they only explain part of the dynamic that leads to the development of defence industrial policy at EU level. Moving beyond a simple adumbration of economic preferences, it shows how the EU’s institutional framework and corpus of law are used by governments to reaffirm their position as the ultimate arbiter and promoter of national economic preferences in the defence industrial sector. To this end, the work asks why and how EU member state governments, European defence firms, and EU institutions developed EU-level defence industrial policy between 2003 and 2009. The book also analyses significant policy developments, including the establishment of a European Defence Agency and two EU Directives on equipment transfers and defence procurement.
This book will be of much interest to students of EU policy, defence studies, security studies and International Relations in general.
Routledge Books, 2019
-
What Does It Mean to Be a European Defense Company Today?
Après deux décennies marquées par de faibles investissements, la remontée des budgets de défense en Europe et le lancement de nouvelles initiatives (Coopération structurée permanente et Fonds européen de défense en particulier) laissent penser que le tabou sur l’utilisation de fonds européens dans le domaine de la défense est tombé, ouvrant de nouvelles opportunités. Là où des réticences existent chez certains responsables politiques européens face à l’ambition européenne d’une plus grande autonomie stratégique, les industriels du continent ont mesuré l’ampleur des enjeux en termes de préservation des savoir-faire et de compétitivité.
Éditoriaux de l’IFRI, 2019
-
Stress Tests: An Insight into Crisis Scenarios, Simulations and Exercises
Abstract
Crisis simulations and exercises are an effective way of broadening the minds of decision-makers, forecasting the future, identifying capability gaps, pin-pointing the weaknesses and strengths in the crisis response architecture and developing crisis response networks.
The EU increasingly makes use of crisis scenarios. However, simulations and exercises can only add value to preparedness efforts when they are but one element of a wider crisis response architecture. Greater efforts are required in terms of information gathering and sharing and linking the EU and national crisis response mechanisms and networks.
The results of crisis simulations and exercises can be neglected by political authorities, but usually the costs of not planning in advance are high. Instead of supporting simulations and exercises in the wake of a crisis, it is better to engrain a culture of foresighting and scenario testing in crisis response architectures before a crisis emerges.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2019, No. 9
-
EU – NATO Relations: Defence Industry, Industrial Cooperation and Military Mobility
Abstract
Issues pertaining to the defence industrial sector represent a perennial tension in EU- NATO relations. The tension exists both between the two organisations and the con- stituent members of each body. In short, the possibilities for and limits to EU-NATO cooperation on defence-industrial matters are conditioned by considerations of indus- trial competitiveness and strategic autonomy. Whereas NATO has a well-established defence planning process and fora to stimulate allied industrial relations, the EU de- fence-industrial toolbox includes legislation (e.g. directives on defence equipment transfers and procurement), a political framework called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and a European Defence Fund (EDF) that will support defence research and capability development. The introduction of EU initiatives such as the EDF and PESCO has given rise to concern in both the US and NATO that the Union is developing policy tools that may discriminate against non-EU members and duplicate military capabilities. Such claims are founded on subjective data as well as a failure to take account of how the EU has agreed to PESCO and the EDF, and wilfully gloss over the realities of market access in the US. Suspicion of these EU initiatives should be seen in a context where the current US administration has pressured European allies to spend more on defence. The US president has also delivered some alarming messages on the US’s commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
Despite the current level of friction, however, the EU and NATO have pledged to work closely together on defence-industrial matters. For example, the July 2016 Joint Declaration speaks about the need to ‘facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research and industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic’. The follow up declaration of July 2018 reiterated the need for EU-NATO coherence, complementarity and interoperability. However, while the 2018 declaration referred to successful instances of cooperation in maritime security, hybrid threats, capacity building and military mobility, defence-industrial cooperation was notable by its absence.
This chapter examines how far the EU and NATO have come in enhancing defence-industrial cooperation, but also outlines the challenges and indicates possible ways ahead. By additionally focusing on military mobility, this contribution also sheds light on the challenges of cooperation when various civil and military stakeholders are involved.
EUISS Book, 2019
-
Yearbook of European Security 2019
Abstract
The 2019 Yearbook of European Security provides an overview of events in 2018 that were significant for European security and charts major developments in the EU’s external action and security and defence policy. With a new data-rich look, the 2019 Yearbook of European Security contains many novel features including region and issue-specific sections, content-centric timelines, key document sources, information boxes and an index. The book particularly focuses on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its geographical dimensions. Additionally, it concentrates on the Common Security and Defence Policy with a special focus on missions and operations and policies and new initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund.
This year’s book comes with a data poster insert that captures the EU’s global action.
EUISS Book, 2019
-
The Poison Pill: EU Defence on US Terms?
It took two letters. One, sent to Brussels on 1 May 2019 by two US undersecretaries, accused the EU of damaging transatlantic cooperation and hindering US access to Europe’s defence market through the rules it plans to set for the participation of third states in the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The other, sent to Washington on 16 May 2019 by senior EU officials of equal standing, refuted these claims by showing the objective and transparent way in which the EU had established the EDF and PESCO.
Unlike the letter from Washington, which was laced with robust language and questionable accusations, the EU response argued that, even with the introduction of the two initiatives, the European defence market would remain more open than that of the US. The EU institutions also stated that by creating the EDF and PESCO, the Union was showing its collective determination to reduce European capability duplication and enhance interoperability, while also ensuring the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry. In essence, the EU pointed out that its security and defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing – something the US has been requesting from European allies for some time.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2019, No. 7
-
The European Union
Many theorists and policymakers may be surprised to learn that an international organization, such as the European Union, has the capacity to form and articulate its own grand strategy. However, identifying “who” makes EU grand strategy is challenging. A range of institutions and actors play a role in the formulation, consolidation, and execution of the EU’s grand strategy. These institutions, together with EU member states, define “grand strategy” in differing ways. Furthermore, some actors are more conscious than others that they are actually engaged in “grand strategy”–making rather than simply debating policies. This chapter identifies the leading actors in EU grand strategy; why and how these actors pursue grand strategy goals using a variety of instruments; discusses what those goals have been; and the prospects for their attainment.
Chapter in “Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases”, Oxford University Press, 2019 (written with Luis Simón)
-
Innovating and Offsetting? The Political Economy of US Defence Innovation
Defence is the ultimate public good, and it thus falls to government to determine the appropriate amount of public revenue to commit to the defence of the realm. This will depend on history, strategic threat, international security obligations, entreaties from allies and, of course, the threat faced. The Political Economy of Defence is structured to identify, explain and analyse the policy, process and problems that government faces from the starting point of national security through to the ultimate objective of securing a peaceful world. Accordingly, it provides insights into how defence budgets are determined and managed, offering relevant and refreshingly practical policy perspectives on defence finance, defence and development trade-offs, sovereignty vs globalisation debates, and many other pertinent issues. It will appeal to policymakers, analysts, graduate students and academics interested in defence economics, political economy, public economics and public policy.
The Political Economy of Defence, pp. 377 – 397 (Edited by Ron Matthews)
Cambridge University Press, 2019
-
Subscribe
Subscribed
Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
Daniel Fiott 