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CSDP in 2020: The EU’s Legacy and Ambition in Security and Defence
The past 20 years of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have taught us more about the EU as an international actor. While the Union has not entirely lived up to the ambitions set down by European ministers at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EU has developed the ability to deploy civilian and military missions and operations. In more recent years, the EU has advanced cooperation on defence through the EU Global Strategy with a range of new tools.
Looking back over the last 20 years of CSDP, this book provides an analytical overview of the key historical developments and critically appraises the successes and failures charted over two decades. A host of leading think tank analysts and a senior EU official look at issues such as institutional design, operations and missions, capabilities, industry and civilian crisis management.
The book is not just a historical record, however: several chapters look at the geopolitical challenges facing the EU. The contributors look at emerging security challenges, the nature of permissibility, the internal-external security nexus, the defence industry and civilian CSDP. Together, the chapters underline the need for the EU to match its rhetoric on security and defence with capabilities and political ambition.
EUISS Book, 2020
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Will European Defence Survive Coronavirus?
The tragedy that is the Coronavirus has already claimed too many lives, but it has also allowed Europe’s public services to shine. Citizens across Europe are rightly applauding the tireless work of medical professionals, police and transport workers. Europe’s armed forces have also been called on to roll back the virus. Whether this should be likened to a ‘war’ is open for debate, but Europe’s militaries have mobilised to supply extra hospital space and to support the public through emergency quarantine and hospital capacities and the airlifting of medical equipment. Europe’s air forces can also assist with the repatriation of thousands of European nationals that are still stuck in foreign lands.
Real Elcano Commentary, 2020
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Small can be beautiful… in defence
How are small states supposed to make sense of all the changes that have taken place in EU security and defence since 2016? It can often feel like EU defence is a subject reserved for the ‘big fish’ like France and Germany, but EU initiatives like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund were designed as inclusive mechanisms to take defence cooperation forward as a union and not simply for cliques of states. Whatever size a state may be, these new defence initiatives presume that success can only be achieved if governments pool more of their sovereignty together. Without getting into a debate about what constitutes a ‘small state’, it is difficult for EU states – regardless of size – to reconcile the push for EU defence integration with their own sovereignty.
Countries such as Ireland initially hesitated to join PESCO and some lingering doubts may still exist. My own country, Malta, has stayed away from the idea of deeper EU defence cooperation on the basis that it may affect the island’s neutrality (mind you, this neutrality has not stopped Malta from participating in Common Security and Defence Policy – (CSDP missions and operations in the past). Denmark, by dint of its CSDP opt out, cannot be part of PESCO. Even so, Copenhagen, Dublin and Valletta can all benefit from the new European Defence Fund through the financing of defence research and capability projects. In this regard, while the vision in EU defence may be the preserve of leaders like President Emmanuel Macron or HR/VP Josep Borrell, it is up to the EU’s legion of small and medium-sized states to ensure that EU defence is European by motive, design and construction.
It is a crucial time for the EU’s smaller states and how they collectively manage and articulate their interests in defence will affect the nature of the EU as an international actor. This means that in order to be seen as credible partners in defence, they need to live up to their commitments under PESCO and enthusiastically develop PESCO projects too. PESCO’s collective commitments do not single out the behaviour of any one state, so it is easy for smaller Member States to simply piggyback on the efforts of those with more resources and political will. This is why demonstrating tangible outcomes through the PESCO projects are vital. Yet even here genuine commitment is required: presumably no small EU state wants to be part of a PESCO project that is eventually abandoned or discontinued.
Interestingly enough, a logic has emerged through the PESCO projects whereby governments look around the EU for project partners. This same philosophy should be pursued by states under the European Defence Fund too. It is simply short-sighted to believe that a hastily cobbled together group of governments or industrial and research actors from across the Union will win a bid under the Fund. True, cross border cooperation is a precondition for financial support under the Fund but how should governments decide on the partners to choose? In some cases, it may be necessary to build on existing cooperation that benefits from a common language and strategic vision (see how Benelux cooperation functions, for example).
Bids under the European Defence Fund that are put together with only an economic imperative mind may still be successful, of course, but this is no alternative for a sound strategic partnership to anchor defence research and capability programmes. ‘Knowing thy partner’ is key here. Small states need to build up their strategic partnerships in the European Defence Fund and PESCO, as this will help rationalise their capability development and spending plans. This could help smaller states develop and access capabilities they are unable to accrue nationally. What is more, coherent defence partnerships can help create a political critical mass that may be useful when negotiating the nature of EU defence integration.
Political capital that is built on the back of partnerships in defence will be a much-needed commodity in the years ahead, especially if the voices of smaller states are to be heard at all. Currently, there is a debate about how to evolve decision-making in EU external action and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is being held aloft as an answer to the EU’s lack of consistency and coherence in foreign policy. To date, all decisions on external action have been taken by unanimity meaning that a single Member State (regardless of their size) can veto an EU decision. This means that if Malta hypothetically vetoes a decision, then the supposed interests of less than 500,000 people will decide the security of millions of other European citizens. It is not too hard to see why unanimity can stifle EU action.
Whatever the likeliness of the introduction of QMV for external action, there is perhaps some comfort for governments that such a form of voting would never be extended to security and defence and fundamental questions such as the use of force. This comfort may persist for a while longer, although QMV will be used by the Commission to agree on the European Defence Fund’s 7-year work programme and it can be used in PESCO for certain decisions. All of this is to say that if smaller member states frown at the prospect of QMV, they need to come up with their own alternative solutions for improving the coherence of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policies. Not only can the EU ill afford sluggish decision-making capacities as it enters a phase of global geopolitical competition, but a number of smaller Member States may actually be in favour of QMV.
Smaller states need a more coherent strategic vision of their own interests beyond electoral cycles, and they need to work closer together on the security challenges and threats facing the Union. We already know that (in)security is interconnected with states sending troops and civilian experts to Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as farther afield. Yet, there is no common European threat perception or strategic culture. Interestingly, in 2020 there may be an appetite to change this state of affairs by working towards a specific initiative called the ‘strategic compass’. Building on the EU’s current military level of ambition, some difficult questions might be asked during such a process: how can the Union become a more effective defence actor and what will this imply for the EU’s operational footprint, as well as uncovering what type of military actor the Union should ultimately become.
Such an exercise will rely heavily on the input and leadership of Member State governments. This is an opportunity for ministries of foreign affairs, national security and defence to define the contours of the EU’s military objectives together. For the next two years or so, this initiative will be a focus of Brussels-based policymakers and during this time a range of large (Germany and France) and small (Croatia, Portugal, Slovenia) states will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU during this initiative. In addition to the Commission’s work on defence, where it will give greater strategic thought to EU capability development, there is a risk that Member States feel somehow disconnected from EU defence policymaking in Brussels. This is dangerous. To ensure the buy-in and legitimacy given by governments, the EU needs a collective strategic reflection on defence. Yes, Brussels will be involved but any such reflection first needs to begin at home.
Nortia Defence Series, IIEA, March 2020
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Digitalising Defence: Protecting Europe in the Age of Quantum Computing and the Cloud
Abstract
Digital technologies can vastly improve the operational readiness, effectiveness and technological sovereignty of Europe’s armed forces. For defence to benefit from digitalisation, both the greater interoperability of digital technologies and financial investment is required. The Multi-annual Financial Framework is a test for how serious EU member states are about the digital agenda but low national defence R&D investments are also contributing to an erosion of Europe’s digital power.
Europe does not have enough statistical clarity of the digital state of its armed forces today. A number of ‘quick win’ initiatives can be undertaken by the EU in the short term. Without overhauling existing initiatives, member states could record progress on their national defence digitalisation efforts through the reporting mechanisms available under the CARD and PESCO.
Beyond short-term measures, discussions about the digitalisation of defence could be integrated into the forthcoming ‘strategic compass’. The Union needs better foresight capacities to understand the link between digital capability development and digital vulnerabilities and how digitalisation should be included in any future European threat analysis and defence strategy.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2020, No.
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A Future Scenario for a More Strategic EU Defence
Abstract
As the journalist from Euronews asked what it was like to be held hostage by jihadists for four months since June 2024, the three student backpackers could not hold back the tears. Europeans Paulus Klimitz and Katriona Wicedz and the American John O’Connor were visibly emotional as the EU Ambassador to Burkina Faso thanked EU forces for rescuing the tourists. Flanked by the Force Commander of the 1,500-strong EUFOR Sahel, the Ambassador told the assembled press that EU special forces had broken into Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) compounds under cover of darkness to free the youngsters. Present in the country since June 2024, EU forces had not only stopped JNIM and AQIM from seizing territory in Burkina Faso’s Banfora, Sindou, Bobo-Dioulasso and Orodara regions, but they had also led to an overall reduction in kidnap- pings and sporadic killings – in May 2024 there were fifteen hostage takings per month and by September only three. Indeed, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the Union’s military presence had contributed to an 80% reduction in hostage takings.
Chaillot Paper, EUISS, 2020, No. 157
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Strategic Investment: Making Geopolitical Sense of the EU’s Defence-Industrial Policy
Abstract
This Chaillot Paper focuses on new EU initiatives in the defence domain – in particular the creation of the European Defence Fund – and on the Union’s evolving role and engagement in this sector. The paper seeks to address three specific questions: (i) how can economic and political factors be balanced in EU defence industrial policy?; (ii) what strategic considerations are driving forward defence innovation investments at the EU level?; and (iii) how can the Union’s institutions ensure that investments in defence innovation evolve into tangible capabilities for EU defence?
Cautioning against an exclusively economic interpretation of why the EU should invest in the European defence industry, the paper argues that the political dimension of capability development should not be overlooked. It also analyses how the EU’s future defence investments should be seen in light of changes to the global defence market and shifting geopolitical trends.
Chaillot Paper, EU Institute for Security Studies, No. 156
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Defence Industrial Cooperation in the European Union: The State, the Firm and Europe
This book provides an empirical understanding of how EU-level defence industrial cooperation functions in practice.
Using the Liberal Intergovernmental theoretical model, the book argues that while national economic preferences are an essential factor of government interests they only explain part of the dynamic that leads to the development of defence industrial policy at EU level. Moving beyond a simple adumbration of economic preferences, it shows how the EU’s institutional framework and corpus of law are used by governments to reaffirm their position as the ultimate arbiter and promoter of national economic preferences in the defence industrial sector. To this end, the work asks why and how EU member state governments, European defence firms, and EU institutions developed EU-level defence industrial policy between 2003 and 2009. The book also analyses significant policy developments, including the establishment of a European Defence Agency and two EU Directives on equipment transfers and defence procurement.
This book will be of much interest to students of EU policy, defence studies, security studies and International Relations in general.
Routledge Books, 2019
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What Does It Mean to Be a European Defense Company Today?
Après deux décennies marquées par de faibles investissements, la remontée des budgets de défense en Europe et le lancement de nouvelles initiatives (Coopération structurée permanente et Fonds européen de défense en particulier) laissent penser que le tabou sur l’utilisation de fonds européens dans le domaine de la défense est tombé, ouvrant de nouvelles opportunités. Là où des réticences existent chez certains responsables politiques européens face à l’ambition européenne d’une plus grande autonomie stratégique, les industriels du continent ont mesuré l’ampleur des enjeux en termes de préservation des savoir-faire et de compétitivité.
Éditoriaux de l’IFRI, 2019
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Stress Tests: An Insight into Crisis Scenarios, Simulations and Exercises
Abstract
Crisis simulations and exercises are an effective way of broadening the minds of decision-makers, forecasting the future, identifying capability gaps, pin-pointing the weaknesses and strengths in the crisis response architecture and developing crisis response networks.
The EU increasingly makes use of crisis scenarios. However, simulations and exercises can only add value to preparedness efforts when they are but one element of a wider crisis response architecture. Greater efforts are required in terms of information gathering and sharing and linking the EU and national crisis response mechanisms and networks.
The results of crisis simulations and exercises can be neglected by political authorities, but usually the costs of not planning in advance are high. Instead of supporting simulations and exercises in the wake of a crisis, it is better to engrain a culture of foresighting and scenario testing in crisis response architectures before a crisis emerges.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2019, No. 9
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EU – NATO Relations: Defence Industry, Industrial Cooperation and Military Mobility
Abstract
Issues pertaining to the defence industrial sector represent a perennial tension in EU- NATO relations. The tension exists both between the two organisations and the con- stituent members of each body. In short, the possibilities for and limits to EU-NATO cooperation on defence-industrial matters are conditioned by considerations of indus- trial competitiveness and strategic autonomy. Whereas NATO has a well-established defence planning process and fora to stimulate allied industrial relations, the EU de- fence-industrial toolbox includes legislation (e.g. directives on defence equipment transfers and procurement), a political framework called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and a European Defence Fund (EDF) that will support defence research and capability development. The introduction of EU initiatives such as the EDF and PESCO has given rise to concern in both the US and NATO that the Union is developing policy tools that may discriminate against non-EU members and duplicate military capabilities. Such claims are founded on subjective data as well as a failure to take account of how the EU has agreed to PESCO and the EDF, and wilfully gloss over the realities of market access in the US. Suspicion of these EU initiatives should be seen in a context where the current US administration has pressured European allies to spend more on defence. The US president has also delivered some alarming messages on the US’s commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
Despite the current level of friction, however, the EU and NATO have pledged to work closely together on defence-industrial matters. For example, the July 2016 Joint Declaration speaks about the need to ‘facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research and industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic’. The follow up declaration of July 2018 reiterated the need for EU-NATO coherence, complementarity and interoperability. However, while the 2018 declaration referred to successful instances of cooperation in maritime security, hybrid threats, capacity building and military mobility, defence-industrial cooperation was notable by its absence.
This chapter examines how far the EU and NATO have come in enhancing defence-industrial cooperation, but also outlines the challenges and indicates possible ways ahead. By additionally focusing on military mobility, this contribution also sheds light on the challenges of cooperation when various civil and military stakeholders are involved.
EUISS Book, 2019
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Daniel Fiott 