-
Protecting Europe: The EU’s Response to Hybrid Threats
Abstract
Hybrid threats – unconventional threats that fall under the threshold of military force – have become a ubiquitous feature of today’s security environment. Although the EU is much better placed to detect and combat hybrid threats today than was the case five years ago, this new form of asymmetric conflict remains a major challenge. This Chaillot Paper seeks to provide practical and operational insights on how the EU can best respond to and counter hybrid threats. It focuses on three key policy domains that are of vital significance in a hybrid context – borders, critical infrastructure and disinformation – and shows how the EU has developed specific strategies to combat hybrid challenges in these areas. The paper underlines the importance of developing an overarching strategic response, and of improving coordinated EU approaches to hybrid threats.
Chaillot Paper, EU Institute for Security Studies, No. 151 (written with Roderick Parkes)
-
The Scrutiny of the European Defence Fund by the European Parliament and National Parliaments
Since 2016, the European Union has developed a number of new initiatives on security and defence. In particular, the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund have been designed to allow the EU to become a more autonomous actor with regard to crisis management, capacity building and protecting Europe and its citizens. Yet the development of these new initiatives raises questions about their overall coherence and the role of parliamentary scrutiny. It is necessary to analyse the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments in relation to the scrutiny of the European Defence Fund. There is a need for recommendations on how parliamentary scrutiny can be enhanced at the EU level in the area of security and defence.
Study for the European Parliament, 2019
-
A Scenario Involving the Hijacking of a Foreign Submarine
At 04:44 on 17 May 2021, government au- thorities from the Republic of Zirta re- ceived communication from the ‘New Petra Circle’ (NPC) terror group that a diesel-powered submarine (Kilo-class) belonging to the navy of the Federal Republic of Parousia had been hijacked in the Zirtian harbour city of Plimsolla. Parousian officials confirmed to Zirtian authorities that they had lost direct communication with the captain of the Skulla-class submarine PK216. The NPC, which was based in Parousia and had been known to violently oppose the Parousian government, stated that 20 crew members on board PK216 were members of the group and the remaining 30 submariners had been placed in the holding bay.
Chaillot Paper, EUISS, 2019, No. 150
-
Military CSDP operations: strategy, financing, effectiveness
This chapter looks at the intersection of the legal and operational parameters in which military operations are deployed under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). To this end, the chapter focuses on the challenges related to ‘mission creep’ and the flexibility of operational objectives, to the financial and legal aspects of deployment and to how geopolitical and strategic shifts affect military deployments under an EU banner. After an overview of the institutional architecture involved in deploying EU military operations, the chapter analyses case studies such as EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia, the EU’s military training missions and new initiatives such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and Permanent Structured Cooperation. The chapter concludes by considering the broader strategic dynamics that currently affect EU military operations.
In, S. Blockmans and Panos Koutrakos (eds) Research Handbook on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2018
-
The Multiannual Financial Framework and European Defence
Thirteen billion euros. This amount of money is perhaps of little significance when taken as a stand-alone item in the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). But in light of the fact that the European Commission has requested this amount for defence research and capability development, it becomes much more important. In a radical break from the past, the EU is about to make sizeable investments in defence. As illustrated in Figure 1, the European Defence Fund (EDF) requires 13 billion euro from 2021 to 2027 to enhance the EU’s defence capabilities and support the European defence industry. Once this financial support comes online, the EU will be able to provide financial incentives for EU defence capability development through an investment of 8.9 billion euro. An additional 4.1 billion euro will ensure that the Union will, in its own right, become the fourth largest investor in defence research in the EU. What is more, under the EU’s plans to enhance military mobility in Europe, the Commission has requested a financial envelop of 6.5 billion euro under the next MFF to develop and adapt Europe’s transport networks for civil and military purposes.
Intereconomics, 2018, Vol. 53, No. 2
-
Strategic Autonomy: Towards ‘European Sovereignty’ in Defence?
Strategic autonomy. Two familiar words that are yet again in vogue in Europe but which cause confusion and, in some quarters, even alarm. The last time strategic autonomy stirred controversy was in 2003 during the run-up to the Iraq War, but perhaps the most well-known instance followed the Balkan crisis of the 1990s.
The objective of this Brief is to better comprehend how the EU conceives of strategic autonomy, rather than dwell on a broader focus on ‘Europe’ or ‘NATO Europe’. To this end, the Brief compares the range of defence initiatives that have been developed by the EU since 2016 against three different conceptual visions of strategic autonomy: autonomy as responsibility, autonomy as hedging and autonomy as emancipation. Each of these forms of autonomy have implications for transatlantic burden sharing and the EU’s level of ambition on security and defence.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2018, No. 12
-
Artificial Intelligence: What Implications for EU Security and Defence?
Consider a world where human decision-making and thought processes play less of a role in the day-to-day functioning of society. Think now of the implications this would have for the security and defence sector. Over the next few decades, it is likely that Artificial Intelligence (AI) will not only have major implications for most areas of society such as healthcare, communications and transport, but also for security and defence. AI can be broadly defined as systems that display intelligent behaviour and perform cognitive tasks by analysing their environment, taking actions and even sometimes learning from experience.
The complex attributes of the human mind are well known, but to replicate most of these abilities in machine or algorithmic form has given policymakers and scholars pause for thought. What is more, much of the concern generated by AI centres on whether such intelligence may eventually lead to post-human systems that can generate decisions and actions that were not originally pre-programmed. Accordingly, optimists argue that AI has the potential to revolutionise the global economy for the better, whereas some pessimists have gone as far as to forecast that AI will mark the end of modern society as we know it.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2018, No. 10 (written with Gustav Lindström)
-
European Armaments Standardisation
The standardisation of armaments has been a long-standing focus of EU efforts to enhance the Union’s military effectiveness, to improve capability development and to support the competitiveness of the European defence industry. Armaments standardisation is a process that can lead to cost savings for defence spending by injecting added-value in defence production processes and the avoidance of capability and equipment duplication. Standardisation is a method of improving interoperability within and between European armed forces and a process that can enhance the operational effectiveness of Europe’s militaries. Both the EU and NATO have taken measures over many years and decades to enhance armaments standardisation in Europe. Yet the nature of the contemporary global defence market is that many more technologies and components integrated into military systems are sourced and/or produced in the civilian sector. The line drawn between defence equipment and capabilities on the one hand, and civilian products and technologies on the other, is increasingly blurred. In this context, and in relation to recent developments on EU defence cooperation, this study analyses the standardisation approaches taken by the EU in relation to maritime information sharing and remotely piloted aircraft systems. It makes recommendations on how EU approaches to armaments standardisation can be expanded and enhanced.
Study for the European Parliament, 2018
-
America First, Third Offset Second?
In 2014, the US Department of Defense announced that it would embark on a new defence innovation initiative termed the ‘Third Offset Strategy’. This Obama-era strategy was conceived to overcome the perceived military-technological rise of states such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Since the election of President Donald Trump, however, questions about the continued relevance of the Third Offset Strategy have emerged. Daniel Fiott considers the factors that are driving forward defence innovation efforts in the US under the current administration, and the challenges of doing so.
The RUSI Journal, Vol. 163, No. 4
-
European Defence Markets and Industries: New Initiatives, New Challenges
The author discusses how the excessive focus of European countries on national priorities have been leading to a number of structural problems, in the European defence market, related to international competition, military redundancies and unnecessary costs. The article reflects on the recent efforts by the EU to support the European Defense and Technological Industrial Base and it concludes with some thoughts on the challenges facing the EU and the European defence market. The paper is structured in three major parts. First, it provides an overview of recent initiatives on EU defence. Second, it examines the latest developments designed to turn these initiatives into action. Third, it concludes by outlining some strategic elements important in the context of future European defence, notably the required balance between the political will of Member States, the European financial incentives for defence and the potential interest of European industry on these incentives.
Instituto da Defensa Nacional, 2018, No. 150
-
Subscribe
Subscribed
Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
Daniel Fiott 