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Yearbook of European Security 2019
Abstract
The 2019 Yearbook of European Security provides an overview of events in 2018 that were significant for European security and charts major developments in the EU’s external action and security and defence policy. With a new data-rich look, the 2019 Yearbook of European Security contains many novel features including region and issue-specific sections, content-centric timelines, key document sources, information boxes and an index. The book particularly focuses on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its geographical dimensions. Additionally, it concentrates on the Common Security and Defence Policy with a special focus on missions and operations and policies and new initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund.
This year’s book comes with a data poster insert that captures the EU’s global action.
EUISS Book, 2019
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The Poison Pill: EU Defence on US Terms?
It took two letters. One, sent to Brussels on 1 May 2019 by two US undersecretaries, accused the EU of damaging transatlantic cooperation and hindering US access to Europe’s defence market through the rules it plans to set for the participation of third states in the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The other, sent to Washington on 16 May 2019 by senior EU officials of equal standing, refuted these claims by showing the objective and transparent way in which the EU had established the EDF and PESCO.
Unlike the letter from Washington, which was laced with robust language and questionable accusations, the EU response argued that, even with the introduction of the two initiatives, the European defence market would remain more open than that of the US. The EU institutions also stated that by creating the EDF and PESCO, the Union was showing its collective determination to reduce European capability duplication and enhance interoperability, while also ensuring the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry. In essence, the EU pointed out that its security and defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing – something the US has been requesting from European allies for some time.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2019, No. 7
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The European Union
Many theorists and policymakers may be surprised to learn that an international organization, such as the European Union, has the capacity to form and articulate its own grand strategy. However, identifying “who” makes EU grand strategy is challenging. A range of institutions and actors play a role in the formulation, consolidation, and execution of the EU’s grand strategy. These institutions, together with EU member states, define “grand strategy” in differing ways. Furthermore, some actors are more conscious than others that they are actually engaged in “grand strategy”–making rather than simply debating policies. This chapter identifies the leading actors in EU grand strategy; why and how these actors pursue grand strategy goals using a variety of instruments; discusses what those goals have been; and the prospects for their attainment.
Chapter in “Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases”, Oxford University Press, 2019 (written with Luis Simón)
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Innovating and Offsetting? The Political Economy of US Defence Innovation
Defence is the ultimate public good, and it thus falls to government to determine the appropriate amount of public revenue to commit to the defence of the realm. This will depend on history, strategic threat, international security obligations, entreaties from allies and, of course, the threat faced. The Political Economy of Defence is structured to identify, explain and analyse the policy, process and problems that government faces from the starting point of national security through to the ultimate objective of securing a peaceful world. Accordingly, it provides insights into how defence budgets are determined and managed, offering relevant and refreshingly practical policy perspectives on defence finance, defence and development trade-offs, sovereignty vs globalisation debates, and many other pertinent issues. It will appeal to policymakers, analysts, graduate students and academics interested in defence economics, political economy, public economics and public policy.
The Political Economy of Defence, pp. 377 – 397 (Edited by Ron Matthews)
Cambridge University Press, 2019
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Protecting Europe: The EU’s Response to Hybrid Threats
Abstract
Hybrid threats – unconventional threats that fall under the threshold of military force – have become a ubiquitous feature of today’s security environment. Although the EU is much better placed to detect and combat hybrid threats today than was the case five years ago, this new form of asymmetric conflict remains a major challenge. This Chaillot Paper seeks to provide practical and operational insights on how the EU can best respond to and counter hybrid threats. It focuses on three key policy domains that are of vital significance in a hybrid context – borders, critical infrastructure and disinformation – and shows how the EU has developed specific strategies to combat hybrid challenges in these areas. The paper underlines the importance of developing an overarching strategic response, and of improving coordinated EU approaches to hybrid threats.
Chaillot Paper, EU Institute for Security Studies, No. 151 (written with Roderick Parkes)
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The Scrutiny of the European Defence Fund by the European Parliament and National Parliaments
Since 2016, the European Union has developed a number of new initiatives on security and defence. In particular, the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund have been designed to allow the EU to become a more autonomous actor with regard to crisis management, capacity building and protecting Europe and its citizens. Yet the development of these new initiatives raises questions about their overall coherence and the role of parliamentary scrutiny. It is necessary to analyse the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments in relation to the scrutiny of the European Defence Fund. There is a need for recommendations on how parliamentary scrutiny can be enhanced at the EU level in the area of security and defence.
Study for the European Parliament, 2019
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A Scenario Involving the Hijacking of a Foreign Submarine
At 04:44 on 17 May 2021, government au- thorities from the Republic of Zirta re- ceived communication from the ‘New Petra Circle’ (NPC) terror group that a diesel-powered submarine (Kilo-class) belonging to the navy of the Federal Republic of Parousia had been hijacked in the Zirtian harbour city of Plimsolla. Parousian officials confirmed to Zirtian authorities that they had lost direct communication with the captain of the Skulla-class submarine PK216. The NPC, which was based in Parousia and had been known to violently oppose the Parousian government, stated that 20 crew members on board PK216 were members of the group and the remaining 30 submariners had been placed in the holding bay.
Chaillot Paper, EUISS, 2019, No. 150
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Military CSDP operations: strategy, financing, effectiveness
This chapter looks at the intersection of the legal and operational parameters in which military operations are deployed under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). To this end, the chapter focuses on the challenges related to ‘mission creep’ and the flexibility of operational objectives, to the financial and legal aspects of deployment and to how geopolitical and strategic shifts affect military deployments under an EU banner. After an overview of the institutional architecture involved in deploying EU military operations, the chapter analyses case studies such as EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia, the EU’s military training missions and new initiatives such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and Permanent Structured Cooperation. The chapter concludes by considering the broader strategic dynamics that currently affect EU military operations.
In, S. Blockmans and Panos Koutrakos (eds) Research Handbook on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2018
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The Multiannual Financial Framework and European Defence
Thirteen billion euros. This amount of money is perhaps of little significance when taken as a stand-alone item in the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). But in light of the fact that the European Commission has requested this amount for defence research and capability development, it becomes much more important. In a radical break from the past, the EU is about to make sizeable investments in defence. As illustrated in Figure 1, the European Defence Fund (EDF) requires 13 billion euro from 2021 to 2027 to enhance the EU’s defence capabilities and support the European defence industry. Once this financial support comes online, the EU will be able to provide financial incentives for EU defence capability development through an investment of 8.9 billion euro. An additional 4.1 billion euro will ensure that the Union will, in its own right, become the fourth largest investor in defence research in the EU. What is more, under the EU’s plans to enhance military mobility in Europe, the Commission has requested a financial envelop of 6.5 billion euro under the next MFF to develop and adapt Europe’s transport networks for civil and military purposes.
Intereconomics, 2018, Vol. 53, No. 2
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Strategic Autonomy: Towards ‘European Sovereignty’ in Defence?
Strategic autonomy. Two familiar words that are yet again in vogue in Europe but which cause confusion and, in some quarters, even alarm. The last time strategic autonomy stirred controversy was in 2003 during the run-up to the Iraq War, but perhaps the most well-known instance followed the Balkan crisis of the 1990s.
The objective of this Brief is to better comprehend how the EU conceives of strategic autonomy, rather than dwell on a broader focus on ‘Europe’ or ‘NATO Europe’. To this end, the Brief compares the range of defence initiatives that have been developed by the EU since 2016 against three different conceptual visions of strategic autonomy: autonomy as responsibility, autonomy as hedging and autonomy as emancipation. Each of these forms of autonomy have implications for transatlantic burden sharing and the EU’s level of ambition on security and defence.
EUISS Policy Brief, 2018, No. 12
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Daniel Fiott 