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  • Yearbook of European Security 2018

    Yearbook of European Security 2018

    Abstract

    The EUISS Yearbook of European Security (YES) 2018 is the Institute’s annual publication compiling key information and data related to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2017. YES 2018 opens with a preface by Federica Mogherini, High Representative for the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). While the HR/VP recognises that ‘the very idea of a rules-based international order is questioned’, the EU ‘has emerged as a reliable force for diplomacy, dialogue and multilateralism’. YES 2018 provides an account of the EU’s engagement with the world through evidence-based, data-rich chapters that are designed to inform policymakers and officials, experts and academics and think tank representatives about the progress made by the EU and the challenges it faced in 2017.

    All of the familiar features of the YES are present in this edition including details about the organisational aspects of the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU partners, restrictive measures, geographic instruments, CSDP missions and operations, EU agencies and bodies and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. However, this year’s version of the Yearbook includes new features including: an overview of the work programmes of the presidencies of the Council of the EU as they relate to foreign, security and defence policy; narratives of the EU’s engagement with select countries and regions in its southern and eastern neighbourhoods and the wider world; an overview of new EU defence initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation; and a new chapter on European security that focuses on the internal-external nexus and cybersecurity. Furthermore, to improve the readability of the 2018 Yearbook there are a host of informative data visualisations and for the first time the Yearbook includes a statistical annex for data and an index for reference purposes.

    EUISS Book, 2019 (written with Jakub Bund)

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  • EU Defence Capability Development: Plans, Priorities, Projects

    EU Defence Capability Development: Plans, Priorities, Projects

    Enthusiasts of strategic studies will be familiar with the tripartite, quasi-mathematical equation of ends, ways and means. Over a period of 18 months or so – beginning in June 2016 with the publication of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and culminating with Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017 – the European Union has made strides on both ends and ways for greater cooperation in the area of defence. On ends, the EUGS has made clear that while Europeans ‘live in times of existential crisis’ the EU aims to improve security, democracy and prosperity and to invest in the resilience of states and societies in its wider neighbourhood in an integrated manner, while also supporting cooperative regional orders and a rules-based global order. On ways, the EUGS indicates that the Union must develop full spectrum capabilities as part of its overall approach to foreign and security policy and it must ‘systematically encourage defence cooperation and strive to create a solid European defence industry’.

    On means, however, there is still some way to go before the EU has the defence capabilities required to meet its strategic objectives. Despite the publication of an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD), the development of a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), a European Defence Fund (EDF) and PESCO, there are challenges related to defence capability development in a Union of 28 – soon to be 27 – member states.

    EUISS Policy Brief, 2018, No. 6

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  • Humanitarian Diplomacy

    Humanitarian Diplomacy

    Humanitarian diplomacy has emerged as a concept to promote and dissuade certain types of humanitarian action. The concept took hold mainly in the post-Second World War era and the advent of global humanitarianism. It is a distinct form of diplomacy. Governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations “conduct” humanitarian diplomacy in the hope of influencing the policies of other governments and international organizations. Humanitarian diplomacy also looks to raise public awareness about humanitarian issues. The concept is, however, not free from controversy or from challenges.

    The Encyclopaedia of Diplomacy, 2018

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  • Protecting Europe, Permanently? The Future of EU Defence

    Protecting Europe, Permanently? The Future of EU Defence

    One of the first initiatives that emerged from the EU Global Strategy was the formation of a single military planning and conduct capability for the strategic command of some of the EU’s military CSDP operations. The logic is that having a single command structure for operations, as opposed to an individual structure for each operation, would improve the EU’s reaction time to crises. This is certainly true but one must consider that many factors such as a lack of financing and capabilities (both human and material) and complex rules of engagement affect the effectiveness of CSDP operations.

    Luckily, EU-funded defence research projects are already off the ground but the real test will be whether the fund leads to the development of capabilities that can enhance Europe’s ability to act strategically and autonomously.

    The coordinated annual review on defence is another interesting initiative. The rationale for such a review is valid, as the idea is that the European Defence Agency can assist member states overcome national and unsynchronised defence planning. The review should certainly lead to greater coherence of defence spending and capability priorities, but a key challenge will be generating the right degree of transparency among member states. The early signs are good but one must remember that the review is entirely voluntary and so it cannot be taken as a given that every member state will engage in a constructive manner.

    Another major step forward has been the establishment of a European Defence Fund by the European Commission. Under the fund, the EU will – for the first time – invest in defence research and capability development. While the bulk of investments will be made after 2020, the Commission has already earmarked €90 million for defence research until the end of 2019 and it has made a proposal to spend €500 million on capability development from 2019 to 2020. This puts the Commission in the higher tier of defence investors in Europe but there is still much work to be done on knowing where best to target EU funds to help the development transition from defence technologies to scalable capabilities. Luckily, EU-funded defence research projects are already off the ground but the real test will be whether the fund leads to the development of capabilities that can enhance Europe’s ability to act strategically and autonomously.

    How will PESCO lead to closer defence cooperation when it is still a largely intergovernmental affair governed by the unanimity principle?

    Finally, we end 2017 with an historic agreement on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO is a treaty-based political framework that takes a contractual approach to defence cooperation based on common binding commitments and projects. These commitments will be subject to an annual review by the HR/VP to provide top-down support. PESCO is already leading to interesting common projects such as cyber threat response teams, a crisis response operation core, military mobility and many more. However, despite the momentous nature of PESCO a number of questions still remain, including: how will PESCO lead to closer defence cooperation when it is still a largely intergovernmental affair governed by the unanimity principle?

    There can be no doubt that the EU has collectively taken great strides on its defence over the past year. However, we must see all of these initiatives as a means to an end – a more responsive, more capable and more responsible EU. Thus, the real mark of whether these initiatives will improve EU defence will come when the Union is a more capable defence actor that can stand up to a range of security challenges. The key will be maintaining this momentum; both in bad and good times.

    The Progressive Post, 2017

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  • Towards Military Mobility?

    Towards Military Mobility?

    The idea that the transportation of military personnel and equipment within Europe is still subject to physical, legal and regulatory barriers may seem odd, especially given the freedom of movement experienced under the Schengen Agreement and the nature of collective deterrence as defined by NATO’s founding Washington Treaty. NATO has established a working group and developed customs formalities that are designed to promote military transportation across Europe. Yet the issue of military mobility is exercising policy minds in important ways. Concerned that administrative procedures were unnecessarily slowing down cross-border movements in the EU, a European Parliament report on defence in October 2016 called for a sort of ‘military Schengen’ for the rapid movement of defence forces, personnel, equipment and supplies in the EU (especially in the context of any possible invocation of the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU) by member states).

    Since then, however, not only was an EU joint communication on improving military mobility published on 9 November 2017, but a dedicated action plan will be released by March 2018. The aim of these documents is to first fully map out the nature of the barriers to military mobility in Europe and to propose some concrete initiatives that can overcome them.

    EUISS Policy Brief, 2017, No. 31

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  • EU-NATO Cooperation: The Case of Defense R&D

    EU-NATO Cooperation: The Case of Defense R&D

    The aim of this chapter is to analyze how the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stimulate defense research and development (R&D) cooperation among their respective members. The chapter also seeks to understand how, if at all, the EU and NATO cooperate with each other as organizations in the domain of defense R&D. Looking at each organization separately and then as interrelated institutions, this chapter aims to offer readers a clearer understanding of how European governments cooperate with one another for pursuing defense R&D.

    In: Karampekios, N., Oikonomou, I., Carayannis, E. (eds) The Emergence of EU Defense Research Policy. Innovation, Technology, and Knowledge Management. Springer, Cham. 

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  • Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name?

    Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name?

    Abstract

    Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo), the so-called ‘sleeping beauty’ of EU defence, is awake. Still barely predictable only a year ago, PeSCo is an ambitious, binding and inclusive legal framework aimed at incentivising defence cooperation among member states. PeSCo is based on binding commitments between member states that could promote increased defence spending, improve force commitments for EU operations and stimulate European defence equipment programmes. In addition to the regular assessment of these commitments, PeSCo will also house a number of concrete projects designed to improve the effectiveness of EU military operations and to sustain European capability development. Taken together, these elements are designed to potentially shape national mindsets and practices in defence through a structured framework at the EU level.

    Elaborating on the likely form and extent of PeSCo, this Chaillot Paper not only sketches out the historical metamorphosis of PeSCo but it also looks more specifically at how it could change the operational and capability development dynamics of EU defence cooperation. The paper is not primarily occupied with questions about its finalité politique, but it is rather an analytical guide to assist experts and lay readers alike navigate the major operational and capability issues at stake.

    Chaillot Paper, EU Institute for Security Studies, No. 142 (written with Antonio Missiroli and Thierry Tardy)

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  • The Cybridisation of EU Defence

    The Cybridisation of EU Defence

    While the issue of cyber security is pervasive, cyberdefence is not. Not only are documents such as the EU Global Strategy replete with references to the challenges emanating from cyber, but EU member states and institutions are taking important steps (such as greater investment in cyber capabilities and the establishment of dedicated national authorities) to ensure Europe’s cyber security. Yet less attention has been paid to the specific defence dimensions of the EU’s cyber security efforts.

    Although this is perhaps to be expected, cyber defence cannot be overlooked, not least because it has treaty implications related to EU solidarity (Article 222 TFEU) and mutual defence (Article 42.7 TEU) in case of an attack aimed at EU member states.

    EUISS Policy Brief, 2017, No. 24

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  • Funding EU Defence Cooperation

    Funding EU Defence Cooperation

    European Union member states have spent decades working to identify and fill military capability gaps through initiatives such as the Headline Goals and the Capability Development Plan (CDP). In the European Defence Agency (EDA), participating member states are accustomed to operating on a strictly intergovernmental and largely voluntary basis when pursuing common defence projects. Even outside of the EU, groups of European countries have engaged in bi- and multi-lateral efforts such as Benelux cooperation that are designed to integrate forces, procure capabilities and/or engage in defence research efforts.

    Yet multiple studies have pointed to the costs involved in cross-border defence initiatives and the record on European defence cooperation is mixed. However, through carefully targeted financial incentives the European Commission hopes that the European Defence Fund can help change the rules of the game for European defence cooperation. 

    EUISS Policy Brief, 2017, No. 11

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  • European defence, 60 years after the Treaty of Rome

    European defence, 60 years after the Treaty of Rome

    The symbolism of the Capitoline Hill, where the Treaty of Rome was signed over sixty years ago, cannot have been lost on the original signatories of the treaty. As the former location of temples to the gods Saturn and his son Jupiter, the Capitoline Hill embodied wealth, renewal and liberation. Far from just mythology, however, European leaders back in 1957 laid the foundations for an economic and political union designed to avert future war and generate prosperity in Europe. These aims, just like the city of Rome itself, are eternal. Sixty years after the signing of the treaty, however, Europe finds itself at an inflection point. As the EU Global Strategy warns, ‘we live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the EU. Our Union is under threat’. This word threat has not been used haphazardly, as security and defence is playing an increasingly integral role in protecting Europeans and ensuring European unity. 

    New level of ambition endorsed in 2016 

    Whether it is through reassurance measures in Eastern Europe or missions in the Mediterranean and Levant, European governments are rising to the mounting security challenges facing Europe. EU institutions and member states have also recently developed a range of initiatives that are designed to enhance European defence. On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome, in 2016, the European Council endorsed a new level of ambition for European defence including a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, which is designed to lead to greater synchronisation of defence planning; a European Defence Fund, which will result in investments in defence research (a first for the EU) and joint capability development; and a permanent Military Planning and Conduct Capability to be used to streamline command and control for certain EU military missions. Rapid reaction, innovative capabilities and a stronger industrial base are the chief objectives of these measures. It is, however, worth reflecting on how the EU reached this point. 

    Few windows of opportunity

    Historically, closer European defence cooperation has emerged at distinct points in time. While European defence has been both responsive to and a product of internal political dynamics (i.e. what European governments want) and external factors (i.e. what European governments react to), history has only afforded a few ‘windows of opportunity’ through which to make progress. Followers of the Roman god Saturn would have been familiar with this. Saturn was known, among many other things, as the god of patience. His followers prayed to him every December at Saturnalia to ensure that the next harvest would come. Followers of European defence, looking with reverence and hope to each December European Council meeting, have certainly had to be patient as well. Progress on European defence has not always resembled the annual cycle of harvests consistently expected by farmers. 

    The failed European Defence Community (EDC) 

    The first window of opportunity for European defence emerged after the Second World War with Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom signing the Treaty of Brussels in 1948 for collective defence. In the face of Soviet aggression, a second window of opportunity opened up in the 1950s when the idea for a European Defence Community (EDC) – known also as the ‘Pleven Plan’ – was put forward. The EDC strove to fully integrate the forces of Western European states into a ‘European army’. However, a mixture of concerns about rearmament and supranational control of forces – plus the fact that NATO had been established in 1949 – contributed to the EDC’s demise only four years later in 1954. 

    Today, the EDC is often held up as an example of the ‘does’ and don’ts’ of European defence cooperation. It is certainly true that there are some striking similarities between the 1950s and the present day. Then, the Soviet Union pushed against an iron curtain that tore through Europe; now, Russia has rattled security in Eastern Europe and parts of the Mediterranean. Then, the United Kingdom was formally outside of the European Steal and Coal Community and the EDC; now, it is leaving the EU. Then, the Korean War showed Western Europeans that communism could be advanced militarily and this forced them to prepare for a potential Soviet invasion; now, North Korea is but one example of (in this case nuclear) international crisis that afflicts global and European security. 

    Yet the old adage is surely right: history never repeats itself but it does rhyme. There are important differences between the 1950s and the present day. For example, successive US presidents since the 1950s have bought into American support for European security. Think of the Marshall Plan, the Truman Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and support for European integration and one gets a flavour of how invested in European security successive US administrations have been. In rhetorical terms at least, the incumbent holder of the presidential office has referred to institutions of European security as either ‘obsolete’ or past their sell-by date. In the 5th century the Vandals plundered the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline Hill causing sacrilege to the Roman virtues of wealth, renewal and liberation. Today, the American president is calling into question the fundamental basis for European and transatlantic security 60 years after the signing of the Treaties of Rome. 

    The hour of Europe?

    Yet European defence cooperation has always been reactive to external and internal events. Take, for example, the early 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The fall of communism gave way to an immediate sense of euphoria – after all, Germany was reunited and Eastern Europe was freed from the shackles of the Soviet Union – but it also presented Europe with the challenge of ending conflict in the Balkans. Back in 1991, the tensions in the Balkans led one former foreign minister to gallantly proclaim that this was ‘the hour of Europe… not of the Americans’. This was not to be the case, of course. Yet Europe’s experiences in the Balkans did lead to a renewed desire to enhance European defence cooperation. European inaction in the Balkans gave rise to frustration and another window of opportunity opened.  

    From Maastricht to Lisbon 

    To this end, the then members of the Western European Union agreed to the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’ in 1992. These tasks denoted a range of military operations that European countries should be prepared to undertake autonomously, if so required. In 1997, the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam not only reaffirmed commitment to the Petersberg Tasks, but it also established the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the position of High Representative for EU foreign policy. A year later, France and the United Kingdom organised a summit at St Malo on 3-4 December 1998 to specifically call for the EU to ‘have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so’. This objective was echoed by member states at the Cologne European Council in 1999, which saw the establishment of a range of defence-relevant institutions such as the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff (plus a Satellite Centre and EU Institute for Security Studies) all designed to enhance the EU’s ability to act autonomously on defence. In the same year, the Helsinki European Council agreed to a set of capability targets (called the ‘Helsinki Headline Goals’) designed to specify in greater detail what military capabilities the EU would require as a defence actor.  

    The momentum created by efforts during the 1990s would bleed into the perhaps aptly named noughties. In 2003, the EU was developing a ‘European constitution’ and it was preparing for the largest single enlargement of the Union in history. The United States would also intervene in Iraq. The rift in Europe caused by this war may easily be forgotten, but at the time several European governments wanted to push European defence much further. 2003 was a year in which the first European Security Strategy was published. This document not only sought to emphasise the common challenges faced by the EU and the US, but it also made a case for the importance of multilateralism and the liberal international order. In this same year, the EU would deploy its first – admittedly civilian – common mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would be the first of 34 missions that would be deployed by the EU (16 of which are still ongoing today). In 2004, a specialised agency for defence – the European Defence Agency – would be put to work on capability programmes and defence industrial policy. This particular window of opportunity in history was seized upon by European governments. 

    “Progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” 

    In 2007, with the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, European governments jumped on another moment of opportunity. This treaty would reform the original Treaties of Rome by double-hatting the post of the High Representative with a Vice-Presidency of the European Commission and creating a European External Action Service. More specifically for defence, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a range of interesting mechanisms including mutual assistance (article 42.7) in case of terrorist attacks on EU territory and permanent structured cooperation (PeSCo) for those member states wishing to make more binding commitments to one another on defence (article 46). The treaty also called for the ‘progressive framing of a common Union defence policy’. In the context of a financial crisis that began in 2008, ministers met in Ghent in 2010 to explore the possibility of launching PeSCo and to enhance the pooling and sharing of defence capabilities. 

    Palpable desire to seize today’s window of opportunity 

    Sixty years on from the signing of the Treaties of Rome, therefore, the EU has come some way in developing its common defence. The EU Global Strategy published in the summer of 2016 gave way to a much needed – albeit short – reflection on European defence and the year ended with two plans outlining some ambitious proposals. The Palazzo dei Conservatori – where the Treaties of Rome were signed and where European leaders met on 25 March 2017 – and its predecessor the Temple to Jupiter Optimus Maximus were places routinely accustomed to the sound of the rustling of paper. The former edifice once housed Rome’s urban administrators and magistrates and the latter structure at some point served as a Roman archive. European leaders and institutions are increasingly aware that the EU needs more than documents and paper if it is to meet the security challenges Europeans face. On the sixtieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, the steps taken by the EU to enhance European defence show a desire to seize on this latest window of opportunity.

    European Defence Matters magazine, No. 13

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