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  • Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name?

    Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name?

    Abstract

    Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo), the so-called ‘sleeping beauty’ of EU defence, is awake. Still barely predictable only a year ago, PeSCo is an ambitious, binding and inclusive legal framework aimed at incentivising defence cooperation among member states. PeSCo is based on binding commitments between member states that could promote increased defence spending, improve force commitments for EU operations and stimulate European defence equipment programmes. In addition to the regular assessment of these commitments, PeSCo will also house a number of concrete projects designed to improve the effectiveness of EU military operations and to sustain European capability development. Taken together, these elements are designed to potentially shape national mindsets and practices in defence through a structured framework at the EU level.

    Elaborating on the likely form and extent of PeSCo, this Chaillot Paper not only sketches out the historical metamorphosis of PeSCo but it also looks more specifically at how it could change the operational and capability development dynamics of EU defence cooperation. The paper is not primarily occupied with questions about its finalité politique, but it is rather an analytical guide to assist experts and lay readers alike navigate the major operational and capability issues at stake.

    Chaillot Paper, EU Institute for Security Studies, No. 142 (written with Antonio Missiroli and Thierry Tardy)

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  • The Cybridisation of EU Defence

    The Cybridisation of EU Defence

    While the issue of cyber security is pervasive, cyberdefence is not. Not only are documents such as the EU Global Strategy replete with references to the challenges emanating from cyber, but EU member states and institutions are taking important steps (such as greater investment in cyber capabilities and the establishment of dedicated national authorities) to ensure Europe’s cyber security. Yet less attention has been paid to the specific defence dimensions of the EU’s cyber security efforts.

    Although this is perhaps to be expected, cyber defence cannot be overlooked, not least because it has treaty implications related to EU solidarity (Article 222 TFEU) and mutual defence (Article 42.7 TEU) in case of an attack aimed at EU member states.

    EUISS Policy Brief, 2017, No. 24

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  • Funding EU Defence Cooperation

    Funding EU Defence Cooperation

    European Union member states have spent decades working to identify and fill military capability gaps through initiatives such as the Headline Goals and the Capability Development Plan (CDP). In the European Defence Agency (EDA), participating member states are accustomed to operating on a strictly intergovernmental and largely voluntary basis when pursuing common defence projects. Even outside of the EU, groups of European countries have engaged in bi- and multi-lateral efforts such as Benelux cooperation that are designed to integrate forces, procure capabilities and/or engage in defence research efforts.

    Yet multiple studies have pointed to the costs involved in cross-border defence initiatives and the record on European defence cooperation is mixed. However, through carefully targeted financial incentives the European Commission hopes that the European Defence Fund can help change the rules of the game for European defence cooperation. 

    EUISS Policy Brief, 2017, No. 11

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  • European defence, 60 years after the Treaty of Rome

    European defence, 60 years after the Treaty of Rome

    The symbolism of the Capitoline Hill, where the Treaty of Rome was signed over sixty years ago, cannot have been lost on the original signatories of the treaty. As the former location of temples to the gods Saturn and his son Jupiter, the Capitoline Hill embodied wealth, renewal and liberation. Far from just mythology, however, European leaders back in 1957 laid the foundations for an economic and political union designed to avert future war and generate prosperity in Europe. These aims, just like the city of Rome itself, are eternal. Sixty years after the signing of the treaty, however, Europe finds itself at an inflection point. As the EU Global Strategy warns, ‘we live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the EU. Our Union is under threat’. This word threat has not been used haphazardly, as security and defence is playing an increasingly integral role in protecting Europeans and ensuring European unity. 

    New level of ambition endorsed in 2016 

    Whether it is through reassurance measures in Eastern Europe or missions in the Mediterranean and Levant, European governments are rising to the mounting security challenges facing Europe. EU institutions and member states have also recently developed a range of initiatives that are designed to enhance European defence. On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome, in 2016, the European Council endorsed a new level of ambition for European defence including a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, which is designed to lead to greater synchronisation of defence planning; a European Defence Fund, which will result in investments in defence research (a first for the EU) and joint capability development; and a permanent Military Planning and Conduct Capability to be used to streamline command and control for certain EU military missions. Rapid reaction, innovative capabilities and a stronger industrial base are the chief objectives of these measures. It is, however, worth reflecting on how the EU reached this point. 

    Few windows of opportunity

    Historically, closer European defence cooperation has emerged at distinct points in time. While European defence has been both responsive to and a product of internal political dynamics (i.e. what European governments want) and external factors (i.e. what European governments react to), history has only afforded a few ‘windows of opportunity’ through which to make progress. Followers of the Roman god Saturn would have been familiar with this. Saturn was known, among many other things, as the god of patience. His followers prayed to him every December at Saturnalia to ensure that the next harvest would come. Followers of European defence, looking with reverence and hope to each December European Council meeting, have certainly had to be patient as well. Progress on European defence has not always resembled the annual cycle of harvests consistently expected by farmers. 

    The failed European Defence Community (EDC) 

    The first window of opportunity for European defence emerged after the Second World War with Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom signing the Treaty of Brussels in 1948 for collective defence. In the face of Soviet aggression, a second window of opportunity opened up in the 1950s when the idea for a European Defence Community (EDC) – known also as the ‘Pleven Plan’ – was put forward. The EDC strove to fully integrate the forces of Western European states into a ‘European army’. However, a mixture of concerns about rearmament and supranational control of forces – plus the fact that NATO had been established in 1949 – contributed to the EDC’s demise only four years later in 1954. 

    Today, the EDC is often held up as an example of the ‘does’ and don’ts’ of European defence cooperation. It is certainly true that there are some striking similarities between the 1950s and the present day. Then, the Soviet Union pushed against an iron curtain that tore through Europe; now, Russia has rattled security in Eastern Europe and parts of the Mediterranean. Then, the United Kingdom was formally outside of the European Steal and Coal Community and the EDC; now, it is leaving the EU. Then, the Korean War showed Western Europeans that communism could be advanced militarily and this forced them to prepare for a potential Soviet invasion; now, North Korea is but one example of (in this case nuclear) international crisis that afflicts global and European security. 

    Yet the old adage is surely right: history never repeats itself but it does rhyme. There are important differences between the 1950s and the present day. For example, successive US presidents since the 1950s have bought into American support for European security. Think of the Marshall Plan, the Truman Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and support for European integration and one gets a flavour of how invested in European security successive US administrations have been. In rhetorical terms at least, the incumbent holder of the presidential office has referred to institutions of European security as either ‘obsolete’ or past their sell-by date. In the 5th century the Vandals plundered the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline Hill causing sacrilege to the Roman virtues of wealth, renewal and liberation. Today, the American president is calling into question the fundamental basis for European and transatlantic security 60 years after the signing of the Treaties of Rome. 

    The hour of Europe?

    Yet European defence cooperation has always been reactive to external and internal events. Take, for example, the early 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The fall of communism gave way to an immediate sense of euphoria – after all, Germany was reunited and Eastern Europe was freed from the shackles of the Soviet Union – but it also presented Europe with the challenge of ending conflict in the Balkans. Back in 1991, the tensions in the Balkans led one former foreign minister to gallantly proclaim that this was ‘the hour of Europe… not of the Americans’. This was not to be the case, of course. Yet Europe’s experiences in the Balkans did lead to a renewed desire to enhance European defence cooperation. European inaction in the Balkans gave rise to frustration and another window of opportunity opened.  

    From Maastricht to Lisbon 

    To this end, the then members of the Western European Union agreed to the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’ in 1992. These tasks denoted a range of military operations that European countries should be prepared to undertake autonomously, if so required. In 1997, the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam not only reaffirmed commitment to the Petersberg Tasks, but it also established the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the position of High Representative for EU foreign policy. A year later, France and the United Kingdom organised a summit at St Malo on 3-4 December 1998 to specifically call for the EU to ‘have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so’. This objective was echoed by member states at the Cologne European Council in 1999, which saw the establishment of a range of defence-relevant institutions such as the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff (plus a Satellite Centre and EU Institute for Security Studies) all designed to enhance the EU’s ability to act autonomously on defence. In the same year, the Helsinki European Council agreed to a set of capability targets (called the ‘Helsinki Headline Goals’) designed to specify in greater detail what military capabilities the EU would require as a defence actor.  

    The momentum created by efforts during the 1990s would bleed into the perhaps aptly named noughties. In 2003, the EU was developing a ‘European constitution’ and it was preparing for the largest single enlargement of the Union in history. The United States would also intervene in Iraq. The rift in Europe caused by this war may easily be forgotten, but at the time several European governments wanted to push European defence much further. 2003 was a year in which the first European Security Strategy was published. This document not only sought to emphasise the common challenges faced by the EU and the US, but it also made a case for the importance of multilateralism and the liberal international order. In this same year, the EU would deploy its first – admittedly civilian – common mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would be the first of 34 missions that would be deployed by the EU (16 of which are still ongoing today). In 2004, a specialised agency for defence – the European Defence Agency – would be put to work on capability programmes and defence industrial policy. This particular window of opportunity in history was seized upon by European governments. 

    “Progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” 

    In 2007, with the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, European governments jumped on another moment of opportunity. This treaty would reform the original Treaties of Rome by double-hatting the post of the High Representative with a Vice-Presidency of the European Commission and creating a European External Action Service. More specifically for defence, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a range of interesting mechanisms including mutual assistance (article 42.7) in case of terrorist attacks on EU territory and permanent structured cooperation (PeSCo) for those member states wishing to make more binding commitments to one another on defence (article 46). The treaty also called for the ‘progressive framing of a common Union defence policy’. In the context of a financial crisis that began in 2008, ministers met in Ghent in 2010 to explore the possibility of launching PeSCo and to enhance the pooling and sharing of defence capabilities. 

    Palpable desire to seize today’s window of opportunity 

    Sixty years on from the signing of the Treaties of Rome, therefore, the EU has come some way in developing its common defence. The EU Global Strategy published in the summer of 2016 gave way to a much needed – albeit short – reflection on European defence and the year ended with two plans outlining some ambitious proposals. The Palazzo dei Conservatori – where the Treaties of Rome were signed and where European leaders met on 25 March 2017 – and its predecessor the Temple to Jupiter Optimus Maximus were places routinely accustomed to the sound of the rustling of paper. The former edifice once housed Rome’s urban administrators and magistrates and the latter structure at some point served as a Roman archive. European leaders and institutions are increasingly aware that the EU needs more than documents and paper if it is to meet the security challenges Europeans face. On the sixtieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, the steps taken by the EU to enhance European defence show a desire to seize on this latest window of opportunity.

    European Defence Matters magazine, No. 13

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  • The European Defense Market: Disruptive Innovation and Market Destabilization

    The European Defense Market: Disruptive Innovation and Market Destabilization

    The global defense industry is shifting toward a new paradigm in which an emphasis on technology-driven capability development is being undermined by disruptive innovations emanating from the commercial sector. This evolution is likely to result in important effects on the defense market, lessening barriers to entry and turning upside down the approach to innovation. For the defense sector this entails that shifts in the organizational behavior of firms and military establishments are required if the full benefits of innovation are to be captured and integrated into defense capability development processes. This article analyses this shifting paradigm with the European defense market as a departure point. Briefly exploring the shifts in defense industrial processes since the 20th century, this article outlines the benefits of integrating the defense and civilian technological and industrial bases.

    The Economics of Peace and Security, 2017, Vol. 12, No. 1 (written with Renaud Bellais)

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  • Another Russian invasion of Ukraine? A Scenario

    Another Russian invasion of Ukraine? A Scenario

    In the summer of 2020, Russian forces entered Dnipropetrovsk International Airport (Ukraine’s fourth largest city), blockaded the M34 motorway that links Dnipropetro- vsk to Kiev and seized railway lines in the region. At the same time, Russia deployed the Admiral GrigorovichLadnyy and Smetlivyy frigates and the Azov and Caesar Kunikov landing ships in the Sea of Azov, sent air detachments and funneled supplies through the coastal cities of Mariupol and Berdyansk. Paratroopers, tank battalions and mecha- nised warfare equipment were then deployed to the Kherson, Zaporizhia and Dnipro- petrovsk regions via bases in Russia’s Southern Military District. Following Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014, the Russian military had modernised their air and land as- sault capabilities through regular training – with a view to one day deploying forces in southern and eastern Ukraine. Yet what appeared to be an act of war was in fact an act of humanitarian assistance – or rather, an act of war under the cover of humanitarian assistance.

    Indeed, Ukraine was in need of humanitarian assistance due to mass flooding – only Russia went further than that. Once in control of the airport, it impounded all EU aid supplies sent to the region to help cope with the flooding and started its own deliveries of aid and supplies to the region via Crimea and the Sea of Azov. Although interna- tional calls on Russia were issued immediately to allow international humanitarian aid into the affected regions, it became clear that Moscow had taken full political and mili- tary control of the Kherson, Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions. More than 5,000 personnel and 900 pieces of equipment were deployed in the three regions, including Spetsnaz brigades and elements of the 4th Air Force such as the Mi-8 transport aircraft and Ka-52 attack helicopters. These were not sufficient grounds for NATO to intervene: after all, this was not an Article 5 situation. Once accused of mainly supplying aid provi- sions to Russian-friendly populations and rebel groups, Russia expelled all remaining international observers and aid providers from the region. ‘What we are seeing in the south of Ukraine is a wilful attempt by Russia to deliver aid selectively and the imposi- tion of martial law’, claimed one Western diplomat. Yet ambassadors at the UN Security Council found no clear path forward on how to deal with the humanitarian disaster in Ukraine – especially given the presence of Russian forces on the ground.

    EUISS Report, 2017, No. 34

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  • Promoting European Defence Cooperation and the Promise of Financial Incentives

    Promoting European Defence Cooperation and the Promise of Financial Incentives

    The European Union (EU) has never directly funded defence research or military capability development before; so the fact that EU financial support for both defence research and joint capability development is now possible following the release of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) is curious and interesting. The fact that defence research and capability development are now seen as vital strategic investments on behalf of the EU marks a radical shift in the way the EU thinks about and supports defence. Following the release of the EDAP on 30 November 2016 and the unveiling of the European Defence Fund (EDIF1), the European Commission outlined how it intends to invest in defence. The fund is comprised of two ‘windows’. The first is centred on defence research, and will see the EU allocate €90 million for defence research from 2017 to 2020 out of the EU budget – €25 million of which has already been earmarked for 2017. In time, this ‘research window’ could be endowed with a €500 million per year allocation, called the European Defence Research Programme (EDRP). If agreed, this programme would be operational from 2020 onwards (Fiott and Bellais, 2016).

    The second ‘window’ within the defence fund focuses on defence capability development. This ‘capability window’ aims to pool national resources with a view to financing joint capability development projects. Based on how much the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) participating member states (pMS) have spent on collaborative equipment projects in the past, the Commission estimates that a reference figure of approximately €5 billion per year for the ‘capability window’ could be enough to launch various capability projects. From 2010-2014, the EDA’s pMS spent an average equivalent amount of €7.56 billion per year on collaborative projects. To encourage member states to actively participate in the ‘capability window’, the European Commission has innovatively suggested the potential use of a number of financial incentives. The hope is that such incentives could stimulate defence cooperation between European states in ways not seen before. This is new terrain for the EU. It is worth reflecting on the EDIF and whether financial incentives can potentially serve as a ‘game changer’ for European defence cooperation.

    ARES Group Comment, 2017, No. 16

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  • Defence in Detail

    Defence in Detail

    Abstract

    The following pages bring together data on defence spending from three different sources: the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Data for 2016 from the EDA were not available at time of publication. IISS and SIPRI figures dis- played below are available for all 28 EU member states, whereas NATO figures are available for the 22 EU member states also party to the Alliance (EU-NATO 22 hereafter).

    In contrast to previous editions of the Yearbook, data are presented in US dollars instead of euros to maintain compatibility with the full databases and international comparisons offered by each organisation. Each organisation has a different methodology for collect- ing and harmonising data between different countries, leading to slight discrepancies be- tween the datasets. After briefly explaining the methodologies of each organisation, this section commentates on the differences the data show for 2014-2016.

    NATO countries send data on defence expenditures, defined as ‘payments made by a na- tional government specifically to meet the needs of its armed forces or those of its allies’, directly to the NATO Defence Planning Division, which then harmonises what each state counts and adjusts the figures according to their methodology.5 With the exception of Bulgaria, defence expenditure levels for all allies include pensions. Gross Domestic Prod- uct (GDP) levels and deflators are taken either from the OECD or DG ECFIN, and NATO uses average annual exchange rates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Interna- tional Financial Statistics (IFS) database.

    IISS uses primary sources data (official budgetary documentation and correspon- dence with governments) to assess the defence spending levels of EU-NATO coun- tries. IISS attempts to approximate the NATO definition (e.g. by including military pensions) where data is available. In addition to reporting an independent assessment of defence budgets, the IISS Military Balance also reports defence expenditure levels ac- cording to NATO. IISS exchange rates are derived from GDP figures in the IMF World Economic Outlook database by dividing the domestic currency figure by the US dollar figure to obtain the number of units of domestic currency per US dollar. GDP deflators and inflation rates also come from the IMF World Economic Outlook database.

    EUISS Yearbook of European Security 2017

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  • The CARD on the EU Defence Table

    The CARD on the EU Defence Table

    In the 14 November 2016 Council conclusions, member states recognised that there was a need to ‘deepen defence cooperation and ensure more optimal use, including coherence, of defence spending plans’. Although the European Defence Agency (EDA) has been working towards these objectives since 2004, a more ‘structured way to deliver identified capabilities based on greater transparency, political visibility and commitment from Member States’ is still required.

    If the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) called for the ‘gradual synchronisation and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development practices’, the coordinated annual review on defence (‘CARD’) announced at the end of 2016 is the mechanism designed to meet these objectives. The High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) is expected to deliver proposals for the CARD in June 2017, with a view to fully establishing the annual review by the end of the year. Accordingly, it is worth reflecting on whether and especially how CARD can change the way defence cooperation operates in Europe. 

    EUISS Policy Brief, 2017, No. 17

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  • Patriotism, Preferences and Serendipity: Understanding the Adoption of the Defence Transfers Directive

    Patriotism, Preferences and Serendipity: Understanding the Adoption of the Defence Transfers Directive

    The 2009 adoption of the EU directive on intra-Community transfers of defence equipment (‘ICT directive’) (2009/43/EC) aims to harmonize defence transfer licencing in the EU. The directive is part of a ‘defence package’ – along with a directive on defence procurement (2009/81/EC) – that is geared to liberalizing and regulating the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). A major theoretical question is why the EU Member States would agree to the ICT directive when it did not ultimately make much difference to the functioning of the EDEM. A number of competing theories exist that help explain why the 2009 ‘defence package’ was adopted. In the hope of engaging with this theoretical debate, and expanding our empirical understanding of the ICT directive, this article contends that insights from judicial politics, economic patriotism and liberal intergovernmentalism are best placed to explain why the EU Member States eventually adopted the directive.

    Journal of Common Market Studies, 2019, Vol. 55, No. 5

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